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It is argued that propositions are general, which
is taken to mean that there are no such things as
'singular terms' in the sense that certain parts of
sentences are connected in a direct and simple one-to-
one way with isolable bits of the world. Rather, it is
suggested, the kinds of expressions usually called
singular terms can be used to refer to individual things
because of their respective meanings. An expression's
possessing a meaning is understood univocally for both
singular and general terms: it means that the expres¬
sion implies certain characteristics which anything must
have before the expression can properly be applied to
it. The claim that the proposition is general is under¬
stood, therefore, as the claim that any part of a
proposition which purports to pick out and individuate
some item does so through devices common to the rest
of the proposition, and thus cannot be thought of as
non-general any more than the predicative component can
be.
Bradley first articulated this view, and that he
did is the chief burden of Part I. In Part II this view
is supported through an examination of the three kinds
of singular terms: proper names, demonstratives, and
definite descriptions. In each case it is argued that
the expressions involved are general, as a consequence
of their possessing moaning.
PART I. BRADLEY
CHAPTER 1. IDEAS
1. Terms and Distinctions:
Judgement as Assertion
Bradley's conception of logic was radically anti-
psychologist ic, i.e., it was directly counter to earlier
theories of logic which attempted to depict logic as
the 'working of the mind*, or the 'nature of thought'.
An appropriate example of the sort of thing Bradley was
specifically against can be found in Mill's Logic, where
he accepts a definition of
Logic to be the Science, as well as the Art, of
reasoning; meaning by the former term, the analysis
of the mental process which takes place whenever
we reason, and by the latter, the rules, grounded
on that analysis, for conducting the process cor¬
rectly. ... A right understanding of the mental
process itself, of the conditions it depends on,
and the steps of which it consists, is the only
basis on which a system of rules, fitted for the ^
direction of the process, can possibly be founded."
Bradley rejected such psychologism for a variety
of reasons, but most notably because of his rejection
of the theory of the association of ideas which lay
beneath it. The problems of logic could not be explained
for Bradley by inspecting ideas in the mind and dis¬
covering the laws of their regular association.
Without pursuing Bradley any further into his
specific criticisms of psychologism, I shall turn to
"kj. S. Mill, A System of Logic, p. 3.
2On this topic see R. Wollheim, F. H. Bradley, clu 1.
2
inquire about his own positive conception of logic. At
the beginning of The Principles of LoctIc he starts
straightaway on a discussion of the "judgement", which
he acknowledges as the centre of logic. He is not
interested in its relation to "psychical states", but
rather in its general character; he says
Judgement, in the strict sense, does not exist
where there exists no knowledge of truth and
falsehood; and, since truth and falsehood depend
on the relation of our ideas to reality, you can¬
not have judgement proper without ideas.^
We can notice a number of points of importance in
this passage; first of all, ideas seem somehow central
to judgement, in spite of Bradley1s aversion to psycho-
logism and things mental in logic. But this is decep¬
tive, as we shall see below, for Bradley's use of 'idea'
is quite different from that found in associative
theories. A further point is the dependency of judge¬
ment upon knowledge of truth and falsehood; this seems
vague, for it tells us nothing of the exact relation¬
ships among judgement, truth, and knowledge. We get the
impression, however, that of the great variety of kinds
of sentences, those which can express judgements are the
ones suitaide for recording knowledge or conveying
information, i.e., declarative sentences, as opposed to
PL, I, 1, p. 1 (I shall refer to Bradley's works
throughout this thesis by using "PL" for Principles of
Logic. "AR" for Appearance and Reality, and "ETR" for
Essays on Truth and Reality.)
"~PL, I, 1, p, 2.
commands, expressions of emotion, of persuasion, pro¬
mises, etc. Of course, the knowledge involved in this
particular argument is not the knowledge expressed in
such judgements, but rather is knowledge of whether the
putative judgement is either true or false, or neither;
but it is only meaningful declarative sentences which
can express something true or false. This impression,
however, is not warranted. Bradley argues at some
length that judgements can be expressed by incomplete
sentences, incomplete at least from the grammarian's
point of view. He says that
The practical man would laugh at your distinction
that, in exclaiming "Wolf," I cannot be a liar,
because 1 use no subject or copula, but that, if
1 go so far as "This is a wolf." I am thereby
committed. ... in watching a sunset, it is
enough for me to say the word "down" or "gone,"
and everyone knows I am judging and affirming.
It might be said, no doubt, that the subject is
elided, but this would be a mere linguistic
prejudice.
So we cannot even say, as it might have appeared above,
that what expresses judgements are declarative sentence
We might draw the weaker conclusion though, that
declarative sentences can express judgements, while non
declarative ones cannot. (Xncidently, the passage just
quoted rests ill with Wollheim's claim that "Bradley's
view of language is, I think, peculiarly a logician's
p
view." He says this in a different context, but with
1PL, I, 2, pp. 56, 57.
2
Wollheim, op. cit., p. 70,
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regard to this one, Bradley seems to be responsive to
language itself, and not to the logician who, if he
treats "wolf" as a proposition at all, says it must
have the form (3x)Fx or the like. I think Bradley's
position here treats the problem of logical form much
too lightly, and ignores entirely the logician's task
of explicitly displaying the form of a proposition
which can permit formal justification of the inferences
to be derived from it. How, e.g., could Bradley
formally represent "wolf" as one premise along with
several others which altogether imply "We should leave
this spot quickly"?)
So far we have gleaned little; but at least it
seems that whatever it is in language that is connected
with judgement must be either true or false, but not
neither. In fact this is correct, for Bradley says as
much in numerous passages. One such, stripped of the
rhetorical irony of its contend;, says, "... the
essence of judgement lie[s] . . . in the production of
truth and falsehood. . . .Elsewhere he says that a
judgement
either attributes the idea to reality, and. so
affirms that it is true, or pronounces it to be
merely a bare idea, and that the facts exclude the
meaning it suggests. The ideal content which is
also fact, and the ideal content which is nothing
beyond itself, are truth and falsehood as they
appear in judgement.2
1PL, I, 1, p. 17.
'"Ibid., pp. 33-34.
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But there is little else the original passage can tell
us, which brings me to one last point concerning it:
it does not even say just what judgements are. Are
they the sentences we utter, the statements we make,
are they propositions, affirmations, assertions, or
what? All of these are connected in some important
ways with truth and falsehood, and it would be of some
help to understand how Bradley uses these associated
terms before looking- at his organic description of
judgement.
We cannot expect that Bradley uses these terms
with their more recent nuances, but we can look to see
if he recognises any of the distinctions which require
the modern usages. 1 take these distinctions to be
roughly described by the following: a sentence
token is spoken at a particular time by a particular
person, or written in a particular place; a different
token of the same sentence type may be uttered or
written elsewhere. A sentence may be ambiguous as to
what statement it (or the user of it) makes, but what
is stated is not; for example, if I say "lie caught the
fly", the mere utterance may be taken as involving a
baseball or an insect, the ambiguity of "fly" infecting
the whole sentence. But I used this sentence to make
one statement, not two, as the contest would betray. A
statement might be thought of as a contexfcually dis¬
ambiguated sentence. But the statement I make may
literally mean something contrary to what I had intended
an example given by Russell concerns a person who says,
"I ain't never done no harm to no one", which was meant
by the speaker to state something like what is stated
by "I have never hurt anyone", but instead literally
states what is stated in "There was at least one moment
when I was injuring the whole huraan race.""®" (In fact
I think Russell's analysis is wrong: the literal sense
seems closer to "1 have at least once hurt someone",
which is just the opposite of what was intended by the
speaker.) Russell therefore distinguished what was
meant ("the state of mind of those who utter sentences")
from what was stated, by calling the former the "asser¬
tion". But interesting though the distinction may bo,
I shall reserve the term "assertion" for a different
and more traditional use, letting the term "intended
statement" suffice for the immediate difficulty.
With regard to statements, we must notice that they
are language-specific in at least two ways: as unam¬
biguous sentences, they are still in a specific language
no matter how unambiguous "the large book is on the
table" is, it is not the same unambiguous sentence as
" Tt^oouL-a^ !i • more radically, nor
is "that is a book" the same statement as "the object
^Russell, "Mr. Strawson on Referring", Hind, v. GC,
1957, pp. 385-389; p. 388.
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on the table is a book55. But in both casos we want to
say that something is the same, and we call that a
proposition.
Those distinctions have all been introduced for the
same underlying motive: to give a name to something
felt to be the same in different cases, each occasion
more abstract or remote from speech act3 or occurrences
than the last. But with propositions especially, some
have converted this method into a criticism; they ask,
how can we know when two propositions are really the
same proposition? What is this stipulated criterion of
1
identity? If this general objection is accepted,
however, it has consequences more radical than usually
supposed; for at the bottom, token sentences are col¬
lections of word tokens, which in turn consist of letter
or sound tokens. But a token is always of a type
(otherwise it would be a more mark or noise), and how
would we even know when a mark is a token, if to recog¬
nise the type we had to be able to specify an identity
criterion, but could not? How, for example, would we
know that a "t" is a "T"; or if those are of different
types, how about "X" and which are still visibly
different? lit the lowest level the type-token business
tries to connect brute, unmeaning, different physical
^E.g., v. Quino, l/ord and Object, p. 201 ff, for
detailed rejection of an identity criterion based on
sameness of moaning, and hence a rejection of proposi¬
tions.
8
objects via a common form, and if sameness is a problem
anywhere, it is hero also. We seem to be driven to
confine our attention (if attention be any longer pos¬
sible) to unique, irretrievably particular vibrations
and inkspots if we cannot even find sound-types or let¬
ters.
Propositions have also been introduced as items
relevant to language and logic from two independent
considerations. They have been said to bo the objects
of "propositional attitudes"; they are what we believe
or disbelieve, doubt, suppose, or sometimes oven wish,
know, etc. They have also been said to be the vehicles
2
of truth and falsehood. Objections have been raised
against both of these formulations,0 but I shall not
pursue them; it is sufficient here to have simply
x-ecorded hoi? ♦proposition' has boon used in recent
writings. But one thing should be noted: only in con¬
nection with propositions have truth and falsity been
mentioned so far. liven those who talk of propositions
as objects of propositional attitudes usually construe
^"E.g., Russell, "On Propositions: What They Are
and How They llean", reprinted in Logic and Knowledge,
pp. 285-320. "A proposition may be defined as: What
we believe when we believe truly or falsely." p. 285,
2
E.g., Russell, Principles of Llathoaatics: "A
proposition, we may say, is anything that is true or
that is false." pp. 12-13.
3
E.g., v. Quino, op, ext.
9
1
thorn as being true or false. The way we introduced
statements, however, was without regard for truth ox-
falsity. The sentence token 'Hake way unruly woman" is
unambiguous when used in a context which rondox-s clear
the woman referred to, and so could be used to make a
statement. For most logicians this would be unaccepta¬
ble, and they would restrict statements to disambigu¬
ated true or false sentences.
A further aspect of statements is sometimes empha¬
sised by logicians: if a person makes a statement P,
they say, he not only says that P, but also claims
thereby that P is true. But this is what lias more
usually been called ''asserting", and I shall use this
o
term for such cases. Ramsey has argued that in saying
"»P' is true" one says no more than when one says "P",
and this has led logicians to think that, as "is true"
is redundant, so also is a category of "assertions",
distinct from statements or propositions, redundant.
But this is a mistake; the difference can be brought
out clearly if we remember that statements can be used
hypothetically, can be entertained, considered, recalled,
etc., with no decision or claim on our part as to
whether they are true or not. But when we assert, we
are affirming that what we say is true. Since when wo
1
h.g., ICneale, "intentionality and Intensionality",
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary
Volume XLlf, 19C8, pp. 73-90; esp. p. 78.
2
mousey, The Foundations of Iiathomatics, pp. 142-43.
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say "P" we are usually asserting it, Rajasey is right to
point out the superfluity of adding "is true". For
example, if X ask "Where is my pillowcase?", it is
sufficient for you to say "It is on the pillow". You
need not have said, "It is on the pillow, and what I
just said is true". What you did say was sufficient,
because it was clear that you were claiming it to be
(intending that it be taken as, considering it to be)
true; you were assorting, and hence did not have to
add e:splicitly that you thought it to be true. Since
when we utter sentences that can be true or false we
are usually always asserting a statement, asserting
and making a statement tend to become confused. But
that is no reason to conclude that the typical super¬
fluity of "is true" implies that assertions and state¬
ments cannot be distinguished, and that a separate
category called assertion should be abolished.
Russell has also used the term "assertion" in
several other ways besides this one and his use men¬
tioned above: an assertion is what ho has elsewhere
called a proposition, i.e., what can be true or false,
and it is also (or better) what is now called a "predi¬
cate" or "propositional function,"^" But neither of
these meanings for "assertion" is any longer prevalent
1
Russell, Principles of Ilathomatics, p. 39.
or useful, since other terms are available, and I shall
ignore them below.
I shall now turn from this digression to Bradley
to see how he uses these related terms. Consider the
following remarkable passage:
If we leave mere ideas and go on to judgements.
it has been asked whether these make a statement
in respect of the errfcerision of their elements, or
the intension, or both. ... I will begin by
the assertion that every proposition can bo read
in whichever of these ways we prefer. , . . Every
judgement makes a double affirmation, or a single
affirmation which has two sides. It asserts a
connection of different attributes, or [etc.].
... If you take the proposition "Dogs are
mammals", then this means that [etc,3, . . . And
it is possible to interpret every judgement in
this self-same way.
Ignoring the specific topic (one could hardly do other¬
wise, the way I have condensed the passage), the main
thing to notice is how many terms abound. Propositions
are judgements, judgements make statements and affirma¬
tions, and they assert. A sentence is quoted, and
called a proposition. Such terminological confusion
need not indicate confusion itself, however. At most
we can conclude that Bradley does not use these terns
as we are inclined to. Because, for example, he calls
"Dogs are mammals" a proposition, rather than using that
terra, as we might, for what is expressed by "that dogs
are mammals", we cannot therefore take it that he does
not think "Dogs are mammals" is a sentence (or sentence
I, 4, p. 174. Underlines added.
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type, strictly). But that it is a sentence does not
interest him particularly. Indeed Bradley nowhere to
ny knowledge discusses the relationship of sentences
and propositions, nor even specifically demarks the
distinction. That a particular expression is or is not
a sentence is unimportant for hira, compared to the
proposition connected with the particular sentence.
And to quote a sentence and talk of propositions means
no more than that one wants to discuss propositions.
But what does he take a proposition to be? I thinlc it
is clear enough from the passage that he uses this term
synonymously with "judgement". He rarely uses the
terra "proposition" anyway, and surely never uses it as
it is often used now. To the contrary, his use else¬
where also suggests that he takes a proposition to be
1
a judgement. But again, too much should not be inferred
from this, because he does distinguish between something
which can be true or false, and the affirmation of its
truth, as we shall see below.
Judgements, it seems, make statements and affirma¬
tions, and also assert. In fact judgements are, for
Bradley, assertions, as I have chosen to use that term.
When he says that they make statements, he is using the
sense of "statement" which I mentioned when introducing
the term "assertion". At one point he even uses
.g., v. PL, I, 2, p. 42.
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"proposition", "judgement", and "statement" in throe
successive sentences on the same topic, showing quite
clearly his assimilation of these terms. That for
Bradley judgements are assertions is supported also by
numerous passages. For example, in discussing the kinds
of "analytic judgements of sense", he considers judge¬
ments expressed by one word, and says of them:
When we hear the cry of "Wolf," or "Fire," or
"Rain," it is impossible to say that we hear no
assertion. He who raises the cry is always taken
to affirm, to have uttered a sign and to have used
it of the real.^
Elsewhere he says,
. . . judgement, as we knox*, implies belief.^
Of the terms I have distinguished, it is only assertions
which could be said to imply belief. Again, discussing
"analytic judgements" in general, he says.
Let us turn at once to the judgements which
assert within what is given in present per¬
ception. 4
Such examples abound which more or less explicitly iden¬
tify judgements with assertions, but it would be tire¬
some to multiply them here; the ones I have quoted
should suffice.
^■PL, I, 4, pp. 169-170.
^PL, I, 2, p. 56.
3PL, I, 3, p. 115.
4PL, I, 2, p. 93.
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Bradley's use of "judgement", or at least what we
have seen of it so far, is practically the same as
Froge's, and it will be instructive to compare them.
Froge says,
A judgement is always to be expressed by means of
the sign t— . . . . If we omit the little vertical
stroke at the left of the horizontal stroke, then
the judgement is to be transformed into a mere
complex of ideas; the author [then] is not ex¬
pressing his recognition or non-recognition of the
truth of this. ... In this case, we qualify the
expression with the words 'the circumstance that'
or 'the proposition that'. . . . As a constituent
of the sign the horizontal stroke combines the
s '/ill]joIs following it into a whole; assertion,
which is expressed by the vertical stroke at the
left end of the horizontal one, relates to the
whoIe~tTius formed. The horizontal stroke I wish
to call the content-stroke, and the vertical the
judgement-stroke.1
With the publication of "Sense and Reference" Frege
changed this somewhat, splitting the "content" into
"thought" and "truth-value". But still, over and above
these two aspects, there is in the judgement "the ac-
knowledgment that the truth-value is the True." So
for Frege, a judgement is an affirmation of the truth
of a "content", an "assertion" of a "pro|X>sition. "
This propositional content is characterised as a "com¬
plex of ideas". Likewise for Bradley, as we have seen,
judgements are assertions; but what for Bradley corres¬
ponds to Frege's proposition? What is it that can be
Frege, Becrriffsschrift. in Translations from the
Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frogcp (ed. Geach and
Black), pp. 1-2.
2
Frege, The Basic Latjs of Arithmetic. Furth, pp. G-7.
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true or false, and which a judgement affirms to be true?
It is not what Bradley calls propositions, for he uses
that term interchangeably with "judgement"; but he does,
as I suggested above, distinguish such an element in
judgements. His terminology for it is bewilderingly
prolix--an indication, I think, of its importance. In
the passage I quoted on page 4, for example, he calls
it both "ideal content" and simply "idea"-~both of
which reflect a similarity to Frege. Elsewhere he
calls it "adjectival", a "floating adjective", a
"loosened adjective", and "adjective divorced", or even
a "predicate". Sometimes he gets especially literary
and talks of "a parasite cut loose, a spirit without a
body seeking rest in another, an abstraction from the
concrete, a xaere possibility which by itself is nothing,
. . . paradoxical shadows and ghosts of fact. . . .
He is occasionally explicit enough, though, to let us
recognize a Fregean proposition: concerning one-word
judgements he says,
Such single words, it may perhaps be said, are
really interjections and never predicates. If
they were really interjections, we must stubbornly
maintain, they could not be the vehicle of truth
and falsehood.2
In short, predicates, i.e., ideal contents, are "vehicles
of truth and falsehood", a turn of phrase to gladden the
1PL, I, 1, p. 8.
2PL, I, 2, p. 57.
heart of a modern logician. But here we must part com¬
pany with Frege, for he goes on to analyse the content
of a judgement in terms of what has since become an
orthodoxy: function and argument. The expression
"complex of ideas" is never emphasised, and even seems
in the light of his subsequent work to be not much more
than a metaphor. For Bradley, however, the notion of
idea is central to his analysis of the judgement, and
to get anywhere in understanding this analysis we shall
have to be clear about what he thinks ideas are.
2. Ideas: Content and Existence;
Sicms and lieanincr
Bradley introduces ideas in a very general and
fundamental way by first noticing that there are two
aspects or sides to everything that is: existence and
content. Concerning anything, "we perceive both that
1
it is and what it is." "For a fact to exist," he says
o
"it must be something." This distinction clearly
applies to things in the world, to "facts" (which seem
to be for him either things or complexes of things,
parts of reality: facts are what exist). By pointing
this out I mean to emphasize that what a thing is, its
content, is an integral aspect of the thing itself.
The content is not something in the mind's eye of the
1PL, I, 1, p. 3.
2Ibid.
beholder, something stuck by the mind upon a bare 'that
There are no bare etiolated 'thats' which possess no
content, nor are there such 'thats' with content
attached. These are just wrong ways of conceiving
the matter. But what is a content, without which not?
A fact, says Bradley,
is not real unless it has a character which is
different or distinguishable from that of other
facts. And this, which makes it what it is, we
call its content. We may take as an instance
any common perception. The complex of qualities
and relations it contains, makes up its content,
or that which it is. . . .^
The content, then, consists of qualities and relations;
but not just some of a thing's qualities and relations:
the content of a particular dog is not just doginess,
although that would be part of it. The content of that
dog would be the complex of all its properties, its
colour, weight, length of hair, etc., and relations,
owned by so-and-so, born of so-and-so, etc.
This content, however, must be sufficient to make
that dog different from all other dogs; but unless
Bradley means that every thing or fact has an unique
'essential' property, possessed of and characteristic
of it alone, he faces the notorious problem that any
compound or complex of properties and relations is
logically capable of multiple realisation. The usual
way out of this problem is to admit spatial and
1Ibid.
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temporal relations as genuine relations of a thing on a
par -with all its other properties and relations. But
Bradley seems to be of two minds on this issue. When
he is explicitly discussing this topic, which he recog¬
nises as the crux of the debate over the identity of
indiscernables, he concedes that in some respects space
and time are peculiar; however, he adds that, "all this
is true, but it hardly shows that the character of space
or time is not a character, . . . Things, it would
seem, could genuinely differ merely spatially or
temporally; and if they did not differ at least this
way, then they must in some other way, if they really
are things, and not one thing:
... So far as we know, there might be counter¬
parts, one or more, of anything existing in space
or time, and that, considered spatially or tem¬
porally, there would be between these different
things absolutely no difference at all nor any
possible distinction. They xjould differ, of
course, . . . but that difference would not con¬
sist in space or time but merely in quality.2
Thus if the content of a fact or thing- included spatial
and temporal qualities and relations, it would be
relatively simple to understand how that content dif¬
fered from all others even though the non-spatio-
temporal properties were indiscernable.
But elsewhere Bradley has different ideas. In dis¬
cussing the nature of self-identity and things, he asks
^AR, App. C, p. 528.
2AR, App. C, p. 529.
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us to consider an atom which, has moved from one place
to another:
raise the doubt at the end of our atom's process,
if the atom is the same. The question raised can¬
not be answered without an appeal to its character.
St [i.e., the atom] is different in one respect—
namely, the change of place; but in another
respect--that of its own character—it remains the
sarae. Arid this respect is obviously identical
content.-*•
A thing's content, its character, excludes spatial rela¬
tions; it has the same character wherever it is. So
what makes the content of one thing different from that
of another thing cannot be sought in their respective
places: change of place does not effect change of con¬
tent, as one might have thought from the preceding
quote. Another passage which suggests that a thing's
character does not include spatial and temporal rela¬
tions is the following:
For the identity in time of an existing thing . . .
you require both temporal continuity and again
sameness in the thing's proper character. And
mutatis mutandis what is true here about temporal
continuity is true also about spatial. . . . How
whether a wholly unbroken continuity in time or
space is requisite for the singleness of a thing,
is a question I here pass by; but some unbroken
duration obviously is wanted if there is to be
duration at all. And the maintainance of its
character by the thing seems to me also to be
essential. The character of course may change,
but this change must fall outside of that which
we take to be the thing's essential quality. For
otherwise iuso facto we have a breach in con¬
tinuity. 2
1AR, I, 8, p. 62.
2AR, App. C, p. 530.
Bradley continues by saying that for a thing with con¬
tent A to eisist continually through some duration--even
though a part of A, say b, might change--the rest of A,
say c, must remain the same; this c contains the thing's
essential quality, without which there cannot be dura¬
tion. "The duration of a thing, unless the thing's
quality is throughout identical, is really nonsense.
The point to notice here is that a thing's essential
quality, a part of its character, remains the same while
a thing endures through a change of time or space; hence
temporal and spatial relations (which ex hypothesi do
not remain the same) are not a part of the character,
or at least not a part of the "essential" part of the
thing's content.
The operative word here, as in the passages quoted
above (pages 18 n. 1 and 19 n. 1) is "character," and it
seems as though Bradley is in fact loading this word to
act like "essence". Character is, or at least includes,
an "essential" property of the thing in question; the
uniqueness and distinctness of things is found redupli¬
cated among their properties. This interpretation is
greatly reinforced by a passage close to the one just
quoted:
. . . Questions of identity turn always upon
sameness in character, and the reason why you
cannot reply [to such questions] generally, is
that you do not know this general character which
"••Ibid.
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is taken to make the thing's essence. It is not
always material substance, for we might call an
organism identical, though its particles were all
different. It is not always shape, or size, or
colour, or, again, always the purpose which the
thing fulfills. The general nature, in fact, of
a thing's identity seems to lie, first, in the
avoidance of any absolute break in its existence,
and, beyond that, to consist in some qualitative
sameness which differs with different things. And
with soiae things--because literally we do not know
in what character their sameness lies—we are help¬
less when asked if identity has been preserved.!
We may sympathize with this helplessness Bradley has
found, for it would seem to stem ultimately from hi3
conception of character as an essence. If the charac¬
ter, or essence, of a thing is constituted by the com¬
plex of properties and relations internal to the thing,
if they are what "make it up", Bradley appears to be
holding a Lockean theory of real essences, and we and
Bradley should naturally find the same difficulty Locke
described concerning using real essences as a basis for
distinguishing things: "Nor indeed can we rank and
sort things, and consequently (which is the end of
sorting) denominate them, by their real essences,
2
because we know them not." It is not all that clear
that Bradley is advocating a doctrine of Lockean real
essences, however, mainly because of an ambiguity in
"character". Bornetimes he does seem to mean by that
1AR, I, 8, p. 63.
2
Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding»
±11, 6, 9, p. 246.
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the content, the whole complex of properties and rela¬
tions of a thing; at other times, as in the last passage
cited, he writes as if "character" meant "property",
albeit a special one. For if the general character of
a thing is not always its shape, or size, etc., does
this not suggest that in some cases it might be the
shape, or size, etc? This certainly seems to be his
meaning in the illustration he gives for the passage
cited last, concerning whether a silk stocking, which
is mended with other thread until no silk is left, is
still the same stocking. The essence of a thing here
seems to be some character with respect to which a
changed thing is still the same thing. But how in the
world this kind of sortal-essence of identification can
furnish the principium individualionis for things is
beyond me; this problem leaves me hopeless, not helpless.
It does not improve matters much either if Bradley were
taken to construe essence as a particular-property among
the other general-properties of a thing, rather than a
special one of its ordinary properties. For what is
gained by saying- that a thing has redness, roundness,
smoothness, and "it-ness", even if we could make sense
of that?
To sum up, Bradley sees two aspects to all that
is: existence and content. The content of an existing
thing or fact is the complex of properties and relations
which characterize it. This content is supposed to be
sufficient to differentiate the thing or fact from all
others, but Bradley is not clear as to how it is sup¬
posed to do this. He equivocates about space and time
as properties or relations of a thing, and appears to
advocate an essence as what individuates. But on either
interpretation of what he means by essence, I cannot
see how it will do what is required. My conclusion is
that we should ignore the explanations in terms of
essences, for neither are they particularly intelligible
nor will they play any more of a significant role in the
subsequent exposition than they do in Bradley's general
view. I think we should ignore also the claim that
contents differentiate, because Bradley has not estab¬
lished it, nor do I see how he could short of counting
spatial and temporal properties as genuine properties
of a thing to which the identity of indiscernibles is
applicable; but also, and worse, such a claim (that
contents suffice for differentiation) is inconsistent
with one of the most fundamental doctrines of his logic:
that all judgements are general. For if a judgement is
an idea which corresponds to the content of a fact, and
which is referred (if true) to that fact in reality,
then if this content were so constituted as to be the
content of this and only this fact, the idea correspond¬
ing to this could be referred only to this fact; the
idea itself would necessarily be a sincrular term, and
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how then could the judgement be general?"'" All of this
should, I think, finally cause us to construe "content"
as meaning for Bradley simply the complex of a thing's
properties and relations, and to steer clear of the
further implications ho sometimes imputes to it.
The passages I have quoted above to shorn Bradley's
equivocation on space and time as relations of a thing
may not appear too convincing in the light of numerous
places in which they are treated as such. But what is
in question here is not whether space and time are rela¬
tions or not (they clearly are for Bradley); the question
is rather whether they are included in that "essential"
part of a thing's character, so as to enable otherwise
identical things to be differentiated on the basis of
space or time alone. On this I think he is of two minds,
at least on the present level of analysis. Compare,
e.g., the passages discussed above on pages 18 and 19
with: "In the case of a single shed, where it remains
throughout one and the sane, it is still qualified by
its temporal diversity, so as to be also so far dif¬
ferent, and, so far again, not indiscernible." (PL, II,
I, 6, p. 298 n. 8.) Also: "We must get rid of the
erroneous notion (if we have it) that space and time
are 'principles of individuation,' in the sense that a
temporal or spatial exclusion will confer uniqueness
upon any content." (PL, 1, 2, p. 63.) I think these
passages are plainly inconsistent, and that one cannot
say that Bradley held one view and not the other.
However, analysis is a falsification for Bradley,
and when he moves in his dialectical fashion closer
towards the 'real truth', he becomes involved in further
issues clearly incompatible with, e.g., the michanging-
ness of a moving atom. I an thinking in particular of
the doctrine of internal relations. In discussing the
suggestion that spatial relations are external to things,
he says:
The question I am putting is whether relations can
qualify terras A, B, and C, from outside merely and
without in any way affecting and altering them
internally. And this question I am compelled to
answer negatively. At first sight obviously such
external relations seem possible and oven existing.
They seem given to us, we saw, in change of spatial
position and again also in comparison. That you do
not alter what you compare or rearrange in space
seems to Common Sonse quite obvious. . . .
(AE, App. B, p. 814.)
lie continues with several arguments purporting to show
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Ideas, as I noted at the outset, are not for
Bradley something mental or psychical. To be sure, thejr
are phenomena, as are "sensations and emotions", but for
logic this is unimportant. What is. important, logically
that spatial relations also are internal. "The merely
external," he concludes, "is, in short, our ignorance
set up as reality. ..." (AR, App. B, p. 517.) To the
objection that, in spite of his arguments, a billiard-
ball or a man is the same even after moving about on or
around the table, he replies:
A thing may remain unaltered if you identify it
with a certain character, while taken otherwise the
thing is suffering chang-e. If, that is, you take
a billiard-ball and a man in abstraction from place,
they will of course--so far as this is naintained--
be indifferent to change of place. But on the
other hand neither of them, if regarded so, is a
thing which actually exists; each is a more or
less valid abstraction. But take them as existing
things and take them without mutilation, and you
must regard them as determined by their places and
qualified by the whole material system into which
they enter. And, if you demur to this, 1 ask you
once more of what you are going to predicate the
alterations and their results. The billiard-ball,
to repeat, if taken apart from its place and its
position in the whole, is not an existence but a
character, and that character can remain unchanged,
though the existing thing is altered with its
changed existence. Everything other than this
identical character may be called relatively
external. It may, or it may not, be in comparison
unimportant, but absolutely external it cannot be.
And if you urge that in any case the relation of
the thing's character to its spatial existence is
unintelligible, and that how the nature of the
thing which falls outside our abstraction contrib¬
utes to the whole system, and how that nature is
different as it contributes differently, is in the
end unknown—l shall not gainsay you. But 1 pre¬
fer to be left with ignorance and with inconsisten¬
cies and with insoluble difficulties, difficulties
essential to a lower and fragmentary point of view
and soluble only by the transcendence of that
appearance in a fuller whole, a transcendence which
in detail seems for us impossible--I prefer, I say,
to be left thus rather than to embrace a worse
alternative. I cannot on any terms accept as
absolute fact a mere abstraction and a fixed
2G
speaking, is that icioas are symbols or signs for some¬
thing else. (Bradley notes in passing that one might
restrict the term symbol to natural signs, only to
point out that he, to the contrary, uses the terras
standing inconsistency. (AK, App. B, pp. 517-518.)
A merely external qualification ... is but
appearance and in the end is not rational or real.
(AR, App. C, p. 528.)
In the end, presumably the Absolute, we transcend the
appearance of external relations. But this is truly a
Sisyphean ascension, for we have to push away not only
space as external, but space itself, as well as time,
and ultimately even relations and qualities. Moreover,
into the maw of the Absolute we must finally heave the
very distinction of fact and idea, and with it goes all
thought as false. (Surely our labours must now be at
an end.')
It may be thought that Bradley's doctrine of the
concrete universal explains hot; judgement, while
necessarily of one particular thing or fact, remains
general. Unfortunately they are of no real help here,
for they are simply (another name for) individuals, one
thing containing or embracing a diversity. (PL, I, G,
p. 188.) Their generality is not the generality of an
idea, but the generality of one thing containing a
myriad of internal distinctions (qualities and relations).
This may well l^e what all ideal complexes must in the
end reduce to for Bradley--especially since he contrasts
concrete universale with alastract ones, branding the
latter unreal, in fact, he suggests, there is ulti¬
mately only one concrete universal, only one individual.
(PL, 1, 6, p. 190.) hot only do concrete universals
not function as ideas, but really there is only one of
them (AR, II, 13, pp. 124-126.) At this point I feel
lost in agnosticism and silence; in the interests of
continuing this discussion, therefore, I shall stick to
the "subordinate view", and shall be content to remain
with ignorance at such a "lower and fragmentary" level,
or perhaps worse. Bradley himself occasionally thus
rationalises the particular direction of his thought
when it suits him: I shall do likewise. This means,
as far as I am concernod, that the concrete universal
is unintelligible, that judgements employ abstract
universals, that abstract universals, i.e., ideas, are
different from facts and things, "... that for working
purposes we treat, and do well to treat, some relations
as external merely ..." (AK, App. B, p. 515.), and
that ideas are not particular, i.e., they cannot
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interchangeably.) In any idea there is both meaning
and image, and the image is "nothing but a sensible
i
reality". It is the svrabolic nature of an idea that
is relevant.
As we have seen above, all facts have two aspects,
existence and content. A symbol, however, has a third
o
side, "its signification, or that xdiich it means". Are
symbols or signs a special kind of fact? That this is
so is clearly Bradley's intention, for he says,
But there is a class of facts which possess an
other and additional third side. They have
meaning; and by a sign we understand any sort of
fact which is used as a meaning.3
One would therefore think that we have tables, rocks,
houses, etc., on the one hand, and on the other, maces,
foxes, doves, etc.; these later, like the former, exist
and are something-, but they also stand for monarchical
authority, cunning, peace, etc. Bradley does think of
symbols this way—indeed the fox example is his own.
He also talks of flowers which we give to someone: it
is not important that we give tills or that flower, even
though that is just what we do. We do give a particular
necessarily apply to only one thing. Otherwise, there
seems little point in logic, or anything else for that
matter, except to nod and smile.
1PL, I, 1, p. 7.
^PL, I, 1, p. 3.
3Ibid.
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flower, but only as a symbol, the meaning of which
(friendship, etc.) will likely outlast the physical
flower itself. The meaning we associate with a symbol
nay or may not be related to the content of the symbol
as fact: Bradley says that the "meaning consists of a
part of the content (original or acquired)This is
easy enough to understand for certain cases, i.e., those
where the meaning is. related to the content of the fact-
symbol, where the symbol stands for a part of the original
content of the symbol--for example, a rose standing for
roseness, or more prosaically, for the genus Rosa, say,
in a botanical museum. This is a simple natter of
abstraction, in the sense of ignoring all the properties
and relations of the sample except the desired ones;
here "a part of the content" just means some one (or
several) of the properties and/or relations which
constitute the content of the thing or fact acting as
a symbol. What is troublesome is the alternative case,
where the meaning is not related to part of the (origi¬
nal) content of the fact-symbol, but relates instead to
an acquired part. Obviously something along this lino
is required for the earlier examples: friendship is
certainly not part of the content of any flower, hence
it must be acquired. But how are we to understand this?
How do we add to the content of a thing when the content
PL, I, 1, p. 4. Underline added.
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is the complex of properties and relations it has? I
can imagine giving a flower some now properties, such
as painting the petals a different colour, or removing
a petal, and the like. But how do -we cause it to have
friendship, as a property of its own, so that we can
subsequently confine our attention to that part of its
(acquired) content, and thus use it as a symbol? I
suspect Bradley is here confusing together an idea with
a thing's content, of which I shall have more to say
below.
This problem of property acquisition infects words
also; Bradley includes word-inscriptions (word-tokens)
as facts: "The paper and ink are facts unique and with
definite qualities.Those qualities might be such
things as black, boldface type, in English, five letters,
etc. But as a symbol, none of these are operative: "In
reading, we apprehend not paper or ink, but what they
represent. . . ." Although he nowhere actually says
so, words for him probably represent ideas; thus "horse"
would represent an idea of a horse, (This is reinforced
by a footnote in Appearance and Reality, where, having
said that the mental existence of ideas is a matter
for psychology, he remarks that invoking "Language" to
account for abstract ideas is unsatisfactory, as that
*h?L, I, 1, p. 4.
2Ibid.
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tells us nothing of what passes through the mind. He
scene to bo saying that while parts of language, jL.e.,
words and expressions, represent or moan ideas, it does
not help us discover the mental image—especially for
abstract ideas—just to be told the word which repre¬
sents the idea.") How, then, has the idea of a horse
become part of the content of "horse", which is sup¬
posedly a lot of qualities of ink and paper? Ignoring
this difficulty, a word or expression is a sign for an
idea. An idea is also a sign. Bradley also suggests,
without elaboration, that all signs arc ideas; this
strikes me as false, but that does not affect his main
point that all ideas are signs. As signs they are
facts; they have mental existonce in the form of images,
and the characteristics of the images are their con¬
tents. This much ho concedes to 'psychologrism'; having
conceded it, he relegates these aspects to psychology
as unimportant for logic. It is only their meanings
which are 1ogricall:/ relevant. An idea only becomes an
idea for logic "when it begins to exist for the sake of
o
its meaning." But we now come upon the same difficulty
observed above: ". . . its [i.e., an idea's] moaning,
we may repeat, is a part of the content, used without
1AR, II, 24, p. 352.
2PL, I, 1, p. 5.
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regard to the rest, or the existence.The content of
an idea, as Bradley is well aware, includes properties
and relations such as vivacity, rleetness--or perhaps
it is an id6e fixe—priority to some other idea, con¬
currency with a thirst, etc. In his own words,
I have the "idea" of a horse, and that is a fact
in my mind, existing in relation with the con¬
geries of sensations and emotions and feelings,
which make my momentary state.2
How then is anything remotely relevant to a horse got
from all this? Or if horseness has been added as further
content, which then serves as that part of the whole
content which the idea means, whence this content (remem¬
bering, of course, that contents are complexes of
instantiated properties, that they constitute the char¬
acter of a thing, in this case a mental fact, an image)?
Ilorsenoss is found in horses, not jostling in a man's
mind with the congeries of emotion and what-not.
It may be a pusale why Bradley did not appreciate
this dilemma in such examples as the fox symbolising
cunning; but we can see why it did not bother him in the
case of ideas as signs. In his account of the content
of an idea he trades upon an ambiguity in "content":
A) the content of an idea on the one hand is its




fact in ray mind jostling with other sensations
and emotions for my attention,
B) on the other hand the content of an idea—and
this of course is a very natural -cay of speaking
—is the complex of properties and relations of
whatever is in the image itself.
In this latter sense, if I have an idea of a horse,
the content would include (say) bay, fifteen hands tall,
shod, etc. But natural though this way of speaking may
be, Bradley cannot justify it, given what he has told
us an idea is. It evades the problem raised above
rather neatly, however, by permitting the case of ideas
to be assimilated to the type of meaning represented by
the rose/Eosa example. Just abstract away from the
various particulars of the horse in your image, and you
are left with what is common to all horses, and this is
what your idea of horse means.
Another difficulty arises about ideas: if their
meanings are part of the content (in sense A), and the
content concerns qualities of an actual mental fact,
are not ideas themselves irredeemably mental? (Assuming
that my acquired content would also have this mental
character, for how to add something non-mental to some¬
thing mental is on unsolved problem for Cartesians.)
Again this is met, or rather avoided, by talcing content
in sense B; the meaning of the idea is a common
property (or complex of them), a universal, something
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general abstracted from what the image is an image of,
not from the psychical fact itself. And although the
image of a horse is mental, the horse which the mental
event images is not. Thus the meaning is not mental.
Or so it would seem; I shall remark further on this, and
on the general implications of Bradley's employment of
this ambiguity.
It nay be thought that because of the emphasis
we have noticed upon the "factuality" of ideas, on the
equal status of things and ideas in respect of their
being facts, that Wittgenstein's picture theory bears
some considerable resemblance to Bradley's doctrine of
ideas, especially when we remember that for Bradley
ideas are not only of things, like horses, but also of
facts, like horse-being-in-tho-barn, and that judgement
is a claim that an idea fits a fact. Wittgenstein sai^s
in the Tractatus.
The world divides into facts. A picture is a
model of reality. A picture is a fact. logical
pictures can depict the world. A logical picture
of facts is a thought. I call the sign with which
*we express a thought a propositional sign. A
propositional sign is a fact. Only facts can
empress a sense, a set of names cannot.1
Here we have signs expressing a sense, or thought, which
is a logical picture depicting facts, a model of reality.
Signs with sense, which represent facts, are also
^"Wittgenstein, Tractatus Loqico-Philosophicus. 1.2,
2.12, 2.141, 2.19, 37 3.12, 2.14, 3.142.
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themselves facts. For Bradley, ideas are signs expres¬
sing a "sense", which in turn is a "logical picture" of
what the ideas mean or represent; they represent facts
and are facts as well. But this similarity is super¬
ficial, as might already have been gathered from the
preceding discussion. Facts for Wittgenstein are con¬
catenations of objects, they are irreducibly pluralistic,
while for Bradley they are not; rather they are arti¬
ficially isolated bits of the one substance, reality.
But even as such, they are unitary and cannot be analysed
into individuals in concatenation. Thus Wittgenstein
calls propositional signs facts because they are com¬
posed of objects, i.e., names, in concatenation (not
just in lists, a set); they picture the world because
there is a one-to-one correspondence between those parts
of the sign and parts of the world, and also between
the structure amongst the names (logical form) and the
structure of concatenation. All of this is quite alien
to Bradley. Moreover, propositional signs are not men¬
tal, whatever else they are; ideas, as facts, certainly
are. On the other hand, what a propositional sign
expresses, a thought, would seem to be mental, and we
saw that the meaning expressed by an idea is mental too,
unless "content" is construed in sense B. But as I hope
to make clear below, it is this second version of "con¬
tent" that is most important for Bradley, rendering
even this similarity illusory. A further complication,
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however, finally makes the whole project of comparison
otiose: Bradley ultiiaately rejects that ideas, for
logic, are facts at all. An idea, he says, only
becomes an idea for logic "when it begins to exist for
the sake of its meaning"."'' And as we saw earlier, its
meaning "is a part of the content, used without regard
o
to the rest, or the existence." Again he says,
The "idea", if that is the psychical state, is in
logic a symbol. But it is better to say, the idea
is the meaning, for existence and unessential con¬
tent are wholly discarded. . . . The mental event
is unique and particular, but the meaning in its
use is cut off from the existence. ... An idea,
if we use idea of the meaning-, is neither given
nor presented but taken. It cannot as such exist.
It can not ever be an event, with a place in the
series of time or space. It can be a fact .no more
inside our heads than it can outside them.3
Thus because logical ideas do not exist, they are not
facts; this removes the xaain point of comparing Bradley
to Wittgenstein, But it introduces a problem for
Bradley which I do not think he ever satisfactorily
resolved; it is connected with the ambiguity of "con¬
tent". He saw it as an ambiguity in "idea", and
expressed it in a Hegelian fashion rather untypical of
his Logic:
Thesis. On the one hand no possible idea can be
that which it means.
XPL, I, 1, p. 5.
2
Ibid. Underlines added.
°PL, I, 1, pp. 6-7.
Antithesis. On the other hand no idea is anything
but just what it means.1
He explains this, thinking that he thereby explains
it axjay, by saying that in the first case the idea is
the psychical image, but in the second it is the logical
signification: "In the first it is the whole sign, but
O
in the second it is nothing but the symbolised." He
has not noticed the ambiguity in "the symbolised", which
for him is the same as "the meaning". This term can be
taken or construed in at least three distinct and
important ways:
1) the content of my image as a fact itself
(fleeting, vivid, etc.),
2) the content consisting of the abstract universal
which the thing or fact shares with its image
in my mind,
3) the thing or fact which is being symbolised.
The last of these can be (for the time being) ruled out,
for immediately after the passage last quoted ho goes
on to emphasise the essential distinction j^etween facts
and ideas, in the sense of meaning; i.e., the meaning
of an idea is not the fact to which it applies, if true
(or any other fact, for that matter). We are left,
however, with the other two.
XPL, I, 1, p. 6.
2PL, I, 1, pp. 6-7.
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Although Bradley never, I think, directly appreci¬
ated this ambiguity, it caused him to vacilate when he
thought further about the connection of ideas and exist¬
ence. Yihen he seems to be thinking of the meaning of
signs principally as parts of the contents of a psychical
fact, he insists that in this respect they always do
exist, although this is irrelevant for logic. He notes
that for more abstract ideas there are certain psycho¬
logical difficulties; presumably he has in mind the dif¬
ficulty of conjuring up an image of justice or the like.
But this does not seriously bother him; he says he fol¬
lows Berkeley in this connection, that any idea as
"mental fact contains always an irrelevant sensuous
1
setting." Later in an appended footnote, and also in
Essays on fruth and Loalitv. he relents a bit and says
that there need not always be an associated image, but
still the idea, if it is an idea, must have some
2
individual, particular mental existence. Clearly, in
these contexts he must have been thinking of the content
of the idea as those qualities and relations it has as
a fact itself, for how could the meaning be part of what
is in the image if there is no image?
On the other hand, when he was thinking of the
meanings o:. signs as part of the content, where content
"**PL, I, 1, p. 7, n.; on p. 38 n. 8 he suggests
changing "sensuous" to "psychical".
'"PL, I, 1, p. 38 n. 8; ETE, III, p. 29 n, 1.
is taken in the second way distinguished, he continually
has recourse to the kind of metaphors we noticed earlier
"cut off", "floating", etc. Literally, these ways of
speaking imply that there is something which is now no
longer connected. It is as though he is suggesting
that the idea, separated for logic from its existence
as a mental fact, never-the-less has a kind of shadowy
existence of its own; perhaps one could say it "sub¬
sists". There are better grounds for reading Bradley
this way than construing his metaphors literally,
however; in a note (in the original edition) to the
claim that the meaning of a sign is part of the content,
"cut off, fixed by the mind, and considered apart from
the existence of the sign", he says,
It would not be correct to add "and referred away
to another real subject"; for where we think with¬
out judging, and where we deny, that description
would not be applicable. Nor is it the same thing
to have an idea, and to judge it possible. To
think of a chimera is to think of it as real, but
not to judge it even possible.^
Referring an idea to a real subject I take to mean
asserting that the complex of properties that is the
idea is somewhere instantiated. Thus he is saying
that there are ideas that are not instantiated. I may
truly assert that John is married, referring the idea
of John's-being-married to the fact in reality of
John's marriage; but 1 might have merely wondered
1PL, I, 1, p. 4.
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whether he was. Or I might have denied it, or asserted
that he was single, i.e., asserted falsely, attempting
here to refer an idea, John's-being-single, to a fact,
but failing for lack of a fact. Or again, I might think
of a round square without asserting the possibility of
such an idea being anywhere realized. But if I have an
idea of something that cannot, or does not, or even may
or may not exist, still there must be the idea. To speak
in Bradley's way, if there is an idea which I refer to a
real subject when I assert, there must be the same idea
still if I choose not to assert it, but merely to consi¬
der it. But we can consider many ideas which, were we to
assert them, we would assert falsely, and some we would
necessarily assert falsely. There thus must be some
ideas which we might not, some we do not, and some we
could not refer to reality. There must be some ideas
which "continue to float", indeed some which needs be
always "float", or continue to "subsist" in some other
realm.
That such an interpretation of this passage is not
over-drawn is evidenced by Bradley's own later repudia¬
tion of it in an added footnote, and by an extended dis¬
cussion of the problem in the Essays. The sane
Berkeleyan scruple against the existence of abstract
ideas which caused him originally—when thinking about
meaning as part of the content of mental, existing
facts--to deny that there could be ideas without some
mental image (because he could not, at that time, see
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how an idea could be a psychic reality, a mental fact,
and hence have a proper existence, unless there were an
associated "sensuous setting"), later caused him to
say—when thinking about meaning as part of the content
construed as certain properties of the thing imaged--
1
that there are no ideas not referred to some reality.
I shall pursue this later revision a bit, for it throws
considerable light on how we should ultimately under¬
stand Bradley concerning the ambiguity of "content", and
also because it puts into clear relief a major problem
hinted at parenthetically on page 36 concerning the dis¬
tinction of fact and idea.
The problem which seems to have bothered Bradley
is that ideas seem to be able to have some sort of
existence unconnected with either the mind or the world;
unconnected with the mind, since the existence of an
idea in the mind has nothing to do with ideas as logical
symbols, and moreover he later admits that the aspect
of a sign which is its individual existence may, in the
case of ideas, be absent; unconnected with the world,
since some ideas are obviously not found, some even can¬
not be found in the world, and of those which can be,
they always might be used in what I earlier called
statements, as opposed to assertions. But this is
abstractionism and Platonism which Bradley finds
1PL, I, 1, p. 38 N. 7.
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repugnant. YJliat then to do with ideas not instantiated
in reality, in the actual world?
This problem is similar to certain problems dealt
with by Ileinong, Russell, and Wittgenstein. When
Meinong considered what the idea of the golden mountain
meant, he suggested that it was not really cut off from
reality because there are no golden mountains; rather,
it names an object as do all singular terms. Objects,
however, need not actually exist, i.e., subsist—whether
they do or not is a matter of fact (or logic, presumably,
in the case of self-contradictory objects). His solu¬
tion might be viewed as a novel and somewhat radical
analysis of our conception of "object", one necessitated
by our doctrine of what and how singular terms mean.
Or it lias been construed as suggesting an ambiguity in
"existence", used in one way of anything of which we
talk, and in another way—properly called "subsistence"
--when what is said to exist does so in the actual
world. Russell read Meinong this way, and rejected
this theory because such objects "are apt to infringe
the laxj of contradiction. It is contended, for example,
that the existent present King of France exists, and
o
also does not exist. ..." Russell's own theory had
been similar in that, on the basis of the requirement
"huLnsky, Referring, eh. II.
2
Russell, "On Denoting", in Logic and Knowledge.
p. 45.
that all constituents of a sentence denote something,
he also thought that there were objects denoted by such
expressions as "the golden mountain", "the number 7",
etc., laid up neatly in the "timeless realm of Being.
Unlike Iieinong, Russell thought of these as existing
objects, taking both these terms univocally. As is
■well known, he abandoned this way of thinking when he
conceived his theory of descriptions; with that theory
he skirted the problem of what to do with such names
that name nothing by simply saying that there are no
such names. These 'pseudo-names' are not expressions
with denotations, for any sentence in which they occur
can be analysed into another complex sentence in which
they do not have the appearance of denoting expressions.
Wittgenstein, accepting Russell's theory of descriptions
(and the associated apparatus of quantification), simply
ruled: no objects, no names.
All of these theories, which ontologically might
be called, respectively, the theories of "odd objects"
or "split-level existence", of "objects bountiful", of
"vanishing denoters", and finally of "unnamable non-
objects", are alike in being designed to account for
seemingly unrealised ideas (to revert to Bradley's way
of speaking) for singular terms, ideas which, if
appropriately realised, would be ideas of single things.
Russell, Principles of Hathematics, p. x.
For Bradley, however, the problem is more general,
because although ideas when they are attached, are
attached to one thing, namely, some portion of reality,
the particular part is usually more complex than one
individual. Ideas, in other words, as well as being of
a golden mountain or 7, can also be of the-horse-beirig-
in-the-barn. This means that Bradley considers this
problem about "wandering" ideas to include those dis¬
cussed by Russell concerning what corresponds to proposi¬
tions or judgements as a whole. In particular, Russell
asks: if there is one complex, object, a fact, which
corresponds to a true proposition, what corresponds to
negative propositions, or worse to false ones? The
way Russell poses this question, and the answer he
gives, would seem to indicate that he was aiming directly
at a position like Bradley's; for Bradley's rejection of
unrealised ideas in denials, false judgements, and the
like suggests that there must be something in which they
are realised. But Russell did not have Bradley in mind,
even though Bradley's account appeared two years before
1
Russell's, and Russell was certainly acquainted with it.
1
Russell's discussion is found in "On tho Mature
of Truth and Falsehood", first published as ch. VII of
Philosophical Essays. 1910; it is an elaboration of the
last part of an article reprinted in part as the pre¬
ceding chapter, in which there is a footnote to Bradley's
article of 1908, subsequently reprinted as ch. Ill of
Essays on Truth and Reality, which contains his account
of seemingly unrealised ideas.
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Tiie reason I bother to point this out is that Russell
thought that the only way of answering the demand that
some one thing correspond to a false proposition is the
way of Meinong. That way would posit some objective
fact, an objective falsehood, as though there were same
event, a false event, actually in the world, such as
for example, Humphrey's election to the Presidency, that
corresponded to, or was the 'fleshing-out' of "Humphrey
was elected President".^" Russell rejected the thesis
that something corresponds to false propositions on the
strength of his rejection of Meinong's "objectives", but
he failed to realise that this argument requires
(falsely) that Meinong's theory is the only one possible
as an explanation of false propositions, assuming that
there is something to which they corresjoond. Bradley
assumed this, and suggested an alternative account to
Meinong's, but it was never considered by Russell, who
was content to express incredulity at the prospect of
the existence of false facts, and then to state his own
theory.
The account he did offer of false propositions was
in terras of a theory of judgement which described judge¬
ment as a complex relation between some element of a
self or raind and the various parts of an objective com¬
plex corresponding to the logical parts of the proposi¬
tion judged. "Thus if I judge that A loves B, that is
1
Linslcy, Referring, p. 13.
not a relation of me to 'A's love for B*# but a relation
1
between me and A and love and B." As Geaeh would
symbolize it: R(M,A,L,B). This does permit Russell to
avoid postulating the falsehood of A's love for B if in
fact A does not love B. If the judgement is false or
true the relation R between me, A, B, and the relation
of love L still obtains; but in the former ease L does
not relate A and B, in the latter it does. This account
is not satisfactory, as Geach has pointed out: firstly
there would be different judging relations R for each
type and number of relations of the relation being
judged. In Russell's example, if A and B are individuals
L is of type one and dyadic, and R is type two and
tetradic. But if I judge that A gave B to C, my judge¬
ment is pentadic, or if I judge that "larger than" is
converse to "smaller than", my judgement is expressed
by a relation of (at least) type three. Secondly, it
is not clear that a relation can be one thing alongside
those things it relates, all of which are somehow other¬
wise related; it is not for nothing that relations are
symbolised with gaps, L( , ) , and not just L. But what
are the gaps to be filled with? Not surely those things
it relates, for that would simply reintroduce the com¬
plex which Russell is trying to avoid. But if the
^Russell, "On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood",
Philosophical Essays (1966 ed.), p. 155.
2 c
Geach, -lental nets, $13.
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blanks are simply left blank (or what amounts to the
sarae thing, if relation symbols were considered well-
formed when standing alone with no gaps), we would
seemingly have relations independent of what they
relate, and the way would be open to Bradley's famous
regress of relations relating relations relating
relations . . . Thirdly, if the relation L is before
the mind, but not as relating A and B, or anything else
in particular, how is the "sense" or direction of L
perceived? If we are thinking of "loves" alone, how
o
do we distinguish A loves B from the converse?
These objections are directed at the technical
adequacy of the formal analysis of things related in a
judgement, and do not affect Russell's assumption that
a proposition cannot be construed as one member in
simple dyadic relation between the proposition and
something else in the world. He supported this, as I
remarked above, by rejecting Heinong's objective false¬
hoods. D. F. Pears has suggested that an alternative
This is not e;cactly Geach's second objection, but
I cannot see the force in his way of putting it.
2Russell himself gave up this analysis because it
required a self or subject; he returned to a Heinongian
theory of objectives, or objective facts, which are
referred to (not meant) by propositions; while all
propositions (themselves facts too) are positive,
objectives could be positive or necrative, the latter if
the corresponding proposition contained "not". There
are no false facts, however; if "it is not raining" is
false, its objective would be that it is raining.
Generally, if a proposition is false, its objective is
the actual fact which renders it so; but the constitu¬
ents in the objective of a false proposition may well
to Meinong's theory was adopted by Wittgenstein; propo¬
sitions correspond to possible states of affairs, true
ones being actual states of affairs, false ones remaining
merely possible."'" He points out the similarity of
Wittgenstein's atomic facts (Bachverhalte) to Meinong's
objectives, but says that Russell's objections do not
apply to Wittgenstein. Meinong considered using
"Sachverhalt" instead of "Objective", and Hussurl and
other phenomenologists actual^ did use "Sachverhalt"
to represent something which could possibly be the case.
But whether or not Wittgenstein did is a highly con¬
troversial matter, with persuasive arguments on both
sides.0 I personally agree with Anscombe and Black
that for Wittgenstein Sachverhalte are best understood
as atomic facts. But my purpose here is not to get
involved in interpreting the Tractatus, so let us merely
assume for the time being with Pears that elementary
propositions represent possibilities which may or may
not exist, that "a proposition has a sense that is
not be the constituents meant by the various parts of
the proposition itself. See "On Propositions", Logic
and Knowledge. pp. 314-320. He later even discarded
negative facts by resorting to psychological criteria
of belief and disbelief, and ultimately to feelings of
"surprise" and "quite-so".
"*"D. F. Pears, Bert rand Russell and the British
Tradition in Philosophy, pp. 200-201.




independent of the facts . . .", that "the sense of a
proposition is its agreement or disagreement with possi¬
bilities of existence and non-existence of states of
affairs LSachverhalte].Pears rightly points out that
it would be absurd to expect to discover the meaning of
a proposition by inspecting possibilities which, after
all, are nowhere to be inspected. But if a proposition
is already understood, yet false, it seeras quite
innocent to speak of it as representing a possibility,
o
a possible fact. It is not innocent if we construe
possibilities as something just like actual facts, only
unfortunately not yet summoned up by Fate from a nether
place where they were ranked alongside the actual-facts-
to-be. But we might construe possible facts siraply as
a way of speaking about what certain descriptions (false
ones) would describe if they were true. This makes pos¬
sibilities parasitic upon true propositions, which is
as it should be; language, if it connects with the
world, does so through those parts of it which are
true. But we are now presented with true propositions
representing facts, false ones possibilities, and possi¬
bilities are what would be facts were false propositions
true: shades of Meinong again! But this is harmless
enough if we think of i^ossibilities as we do of
^Wittgenstein, op. cit., 4.061, 4.2.
2
Pears, op. cit., pp. 200-201.
descriptions in general--there no more needs be Humphrey's
election to the Presidency than there need be the round
square.
Whether or not Wittgenstein thought of Sachverhalte
as actual states of affairs or as possibilities may be
moot; but a contemporary logician, Hintikka, speaks
unequivocally of possible states of affairs, or possible
worlds."'" He intends these phrases to be taken in a
quite ordinary way: "Anyone who lias ever considered,
say, the probability of the different possibilities
regarding tomorrow's weather has considered several
'possible states of affairs'." "It would be more
natural to speak of different possibilities concerning-
our 'actual' world than to speak of several possible
worlds. For the purpose of logical and semantical
analysis, the second locution is more appropriate than
the first, however."0 The notion of possible worlds is
quite precise for Hintikka: it amounts to a certain
Hintikka, knowledge and Belief, ch. 3, 6,p "Meaning
as Multiple Reference", Proceedings of the I-CiVSji Inter¬
national Concjress of Philosophy, Vienna. 2n^~to 9't'K "
September 1968?T, pp. 340-345; "A Program and a Set of
Concepts for Philosophical Logic", The lionist, v. 51,
no. 1, 1967, pp. 69-92. The latter article contains
references to a considerable amount of literature on
this topic.
o
Hintikka, "A Program . . .", op. cit,, p. 73.
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development of model theory for first-order logic." He
establishes sis; criteria "which define what he calls
model sets. He then can say that a sentence is true in
some jxjssible world "if and only if it occurs as a
2
member of some model set. ..." These model sets
describe kinds of possible worlds, rather than the pos¬
sible worlds themselves as do the state-descriptions of
Carnap, since the sentences comprising the sets contain
no names (except for particular sentences under con¬
sideration) as in Carnapian state-descriptions, but only
quantifiers and bound variables. Using this seminal
idea of possible worlds, Ilintildca is able to cut boldly
across many problems, including false propositions,
interpretation of modal systems, intensional (or
"referentially opaque") contexts, clarification of the
worth and limits of the "picture theory" as a descrip¬
tion of the way language and reality are connected, and
the nature of singular terms as individuating functions.
Technical details will not be gone into here. For the
issue at hand we need only consider false propositions.
Any particular proposition can Joe false only relative to
some possible world or worlds (or all of them if it is
self-contradictory). With regard to those worlds, its
negation is true, and hence its existentially generalised
^Hintilcka, "A Program . . .pp. cit.. p. 75.
2
ilintildca, "A Program . . .", op, cit., p. 79.
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negation is a member of the model sets 17111011 describe
the kinds of worlds it is false in. Those model sets
which contain the existential generalization of the
proposition itself (rather than its negation) describe
the kinds of worlds in which it is true. How what is
generally called a false proposition simpliciter, what
Russell was considering, for example, is one whose nega¬
tion is in the model set describing the kind of possible
world we consider "actual" or "real". A false proposi¬
tion corresponds to a state of affairs in a possible
world, but not the one kind of possible world we
consider actual.
So far I have not mentioned Hintikka's treatment
of judgement. Although I am not acquainted with any¬
thing by him in which judgements are specifically dealt
with, I imagine he would include them under his general
1
category of "personal modalities1';" the logic of the
'judgement mode', as with logics in general, would be
"a study of the properties and interrelations of clif-
2
ferent possible worlds."4" Fortunately, there is no need
to second-guess Ilintikka on judging, nor to attempt
giving sense to Wittgenstein's mysterious account of
3
propositional attitudes, because it is not really the
1
Ilintikka, "A Program . . op. cit., p. 73, where
he equates this expression with "propositional attitude".
^Hintikka, "A Program . . .", op. cit., p. 72.
3t
Wittgenstein, op. cit., 5.542.
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act of judging that I am interested in. Russell's
theory of judgement was brought up because it was in
that contest that he discussed Ileinong's objective
correlates to false propositions--!.e., Russell himself
had recourse to judging in his attempt to account for
false propositions. We need not bring up judging when
we interest our selves in alternative accounts, such
as the one using possibilities as the correspondents
of false propositions. After all, it is Bradley we are
ultimately interested in here, and as we saw earlier,
Bradley's judgements are what I have (following Frege
among others) called "assertions". Assertions are
propositions which are claimed to be true, or for
Bradley, a "content" or "complex of ideas" which is
claimed to lie true, i.e., found in reality. Comparing
Bradley to Hintikka, then, it is enough to consider the
proposition, and how it relates, truly or falsely, to
the world.
Bradley's answer to the problem of uninstantiated,
or "floating" ideas (arising from false judgements,
denials, negations, suppositions, etc.) is, like
1
Hintikka's, to speak of a multiplicity of worlds.
Any idea which seems to "float" in one world, is
actually anchored in another.
"I am here and for the next few pages deliberately
exaggerating the similarities between Bradley and
Hintikka; see pp. 44-45, where the differences between
their "multiplicities of worlds" is explicitly recognised.
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In the end and taken absolutely (to repeat tills)
there can be no mere idea. Reality is always
before us, and every idea in some sense qualifies
the real. So far as excluded it is excluded only
from some limited region, and beyond that region
has its world. To float in the absolute sense is
impossible. Flotation means attachment to another
soil, a realm other than that sphere which for
any purpose we take here as solid ground and fact.-*-
What are these worlds, and how does Bradley describe
them? One of them, 'that sphere we take as fact', he
describes as
the world which is continuous with my body. It is
the construction which in my waking hours I build
round this centre. My body, taken in one with
my present feelings and with the contend; which in
space and time I can connect with this leas is, is
regarded by me as actual fact while all else is
unreal.2
But the claim that "all else is unreal" is false; the
world continuous with "my felt waking body" is only one
of many realities to be distinguished within the "whole
Universe or the Absolute Reality". He says that "the
subject in a judgement is never Reality in the fullest
sense. It is reality taken, or meant to be taken,
under certain conditions and limits."0 These limits
determine various separate worlds, "worlds all more ox-
loss real but all, so far as it appears, more or less
independent." He lists a great variety of such worlds:
1ETR, III, pp. 35-36.
^ETR, III, p. 30,
3ETR, III, p. 32.
"ETR, III, p. 31.
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the outer world of sensuous fact; the inner world of
ideas, feelings, and moods; the present world; the
world of "ambiguous existence" (past and future); the
worlds of duty, religion, hope, desire, dream, madness,
drunkenness, error, politics, commerce, invention,
trade, and manufacture; the worlds of intellectual
truth and science; the world of imagination (poetry,
fiction, arts in general).''" Reality in some measure is
found in all of those, as are validity and truth. This
is by no means a complete list, for "the diversity and
even the division of our various worlds is indefinite
2and in a sense is endless."
Bradley proceeds to argue in some detail against
various specific ways in which it might be thought that
ideas "float"; we need not pursue him into these, for
generally speaking, his arguments are basically all of
the same nature: they purport to show how an idea
repelled here, is actually found to fall somewhere
else, in some other world. Ilis emphatic conclusion is
that
Every possible idea therefore may be said to be
used existenttally, for every possible idea quali¬
fies and is true of a real world. And the number
of real worlds, in a xjord, is indefinite. Every




3ETR, III, p. 42.
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It mil be remembered that our interest in Bradley's
treatment of "floating" ideas was motivated by a desire
to decide in which sense the content of an idea is to
be understood: is the content (part of which is the
meaning) of an idea the complex of properties and rela¬
tions of the idea as a fact, i.e., as an image occurring
in my mind, or is it the complex of properties and rela¬
tions of the thing in the image? Bradley's introduction
and explanation of signs (although itself not without
difficulties of a similar nature) seen to require the
first; the way he occasionally speaks of ideas seems to
require the second. Consider now the following passage
on "floating" ideas:
If 'judgement' is used in its ordinary sense of
explicit judgement, where we have a distinct predi¬
cate and subject taken as one applied to the other,
then it certainly is true that apart from judgement
we have ideas. And if the issue is raised thus,
and if not to be so predicated means to float,
then inevitably we shall be forced to believe in
floating ideas. For in doubt and denial, to take
obvious instances, we should find the evidence
that they exist. But the issue, if so raised, I
must go on to urge, is raised wrongly. We have
not to choose everywhere between an idea which is
predicated and an idea which simply floats. On
the contrary, an ideal content can qualify and be
attached to a subject apart from any predication
in the proper sense or any explicit judgement.
And by virtue of such an attachment the ideas
which relatively float are everywhere from another
point held captive. The idea comes before my mind
as in suspension and as loose from a certain sub¬
ject, and so far it floats. But none the less as
an adjective it qualifies another subject. It is
not predicated of this other subject, but it comes
as attached to it or as inhering there.1
■^ETk, III, pp. 32-33.
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This is understandable only if ideal content is taken
in the second sense, for how could vividness, for
example, "qualify and he attached to a subject", say,
a horse? The whole tenor of this discussion, indeed
the whole problem of "floating" ideas itself and
Bradley's proposed solution of it, suggest that the
meaning of an idea is a part of the properties and
relations of what is in the image. What purports to
"float" is an idea of a golden mountain, but what
(problematically) does not appear to be found in the
world is the instantiation of the complex of properties
"golden" and "mountain", not some properties and rela¬
tions of the mental image of a golden mountain which
(the image, that is) is found in the world (in ray head
in fact). Thus I think we should construe "content"
and thus "meaning" (as a part of the content) in the
second way, in sense 2) of page 36: the content con¬
sists of the abstract universal which the thing or fact
shares with its image in my mind.
There is, however, a subtle but important difference
between this formulation and the impression to be gained
from the quoted passage. Whereas I have distinguished
between the thing or fact and the image of it which is
my idea, Bradley says that the idea, as an "adjective",
"qualifies another subject". "It comes as attached to
it or as inhering there.What ideas qualify, or are
1Ibid.
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predicated of, is a subject--some fact or thing in some
world or other; also the ideas cone already "attached".
In other words, the relevant complex of properties and
relations are the properties and relations of some
thing or fact, not just those properties and relations
as they are found in ray image. Bradley has merged
these two, and thus lias blurred what he earlier empha¬
sised as a fundamental distinction between fact and
idea. The meaning of an idea is a relevant part of the
complex^ of properties and relations of what is in the
image, but this complex^ is always found to "inhere",
i.e., to be instantiated in some subject, some reality:
that is why they do not "float". Bradley's answer to
this problem of "floating" ideas therefore includes the
identification of the two indexed cor.plexes of the pre¬
ceding sentence, that is, the identification of the
properties and relations of actual things with the
properties and relations of the thing as imaged. The
result is that an idea of a tiling is the same as a
pari of the thing's own content, a conclusion that
Bradley perhaps would not ultimately reject in view of
his metaphysics of the Absolute wherein all distinctions
dissolve.
This situation can be seen from another aspect if
we compare more closely Bradley's and Ilintildca's
multiplicities of worlds, Uhai surely could not have
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been missed earlier is the difference in the way these
worlds are described: for Ilintikka, worlds other than
the actual, real, presented world are mere possibilities
—they are nothing, really, but fictions described by
a set of logically consistent sentences, at least one
of which is false in the actual world. Bradley's
worlds, on the other hand, are an extraordinary pot¬
pourri of disciplines, view-points, forms of discourse,
careers, emotional states, and what-not. I have no
idea what sort of criteria there are for anything to be
a world in Bradley's sense, nor, hence, any idea of
how to indefinitely extend his list of them as he says
we might. (I suspect that his worlds may be vaguely
akin to Wittgenstein's later "language games", but I
could not support such a conjecture.)
In spite of all that, it is obvious that Bradley
considers all these worlds real, not just possible;
indeed, he puts it even more strongly: every possible
idea is found somewhere in reality, in some real world."
This to my mind is Platonism with a vengeance.' If for
"^ETh, III, p. 42. Docs "every possible idea"
include self-contradictory ones? He says that while they
do in some sense exist, ultimately they are creatures of
the intellect, and are not found in the one self-
consistent reality; the sense in which they exist he
describes by saying that, being repulsed from the 'real'
world, they "fall into and coalesce with the residual
mass of unspecified conjunction." What sense that makes
I shall not venture to say. See ETR, III, p. 41n; AR,
App. A, pp. 510-511.
any idea xie may cook up, there is a world to be auto-
natically found for it, we have arrived at the converse
of the reduplication of the world in ideas (where for
each thing, even hair, dirt, and dung, there is an idea)
here we have for each idea a world. While the former
renders thought needlessly prolix, the latter makes it
silly—it removes the raison d'etre of a distinction
between facts and ideas. While perhaps reality and.
ideality do not coalesce, in such a circumstance they
become coextensive, and the idea of a thing becomes
simply part of the thing's properties and relations.
The traditional distinction between a thing and its
properties and relations survives (or as Bradley puts
it, between existence and content), and it is to this
that the distinction between fact and idea has shifted.
Ideas, if that tern still be used, are subclasses
of the complexes which constitute the contents of facts.
This is not going quite as far as 1) on page 36, where
the meaning of an idea is the thing, rather like the
meaning of a Russellian name being what it denotes.
It would be (or better, there would be no point in
differentiating the idea from the thing) if the idea
were the full content (all the properties and relations)
and if the content were supposed to be or include the
"essential character" of the thing; but wo have seen
reasons for rejecting both. Ilorcover, such ideas would
be ideas of particulars, of single things or facts, and
GO
would have no generality at all, even though their con¬
stituents—various properties and relations--would.
But what has happened to meaning? It has gotten
squeezed out of the picture, and in this respect we have
moved considerably towards 1). For where we originally
read Bradley as saying that an idea means part of its
content, we then took the content of an idea as being
the content of the image-thing; but the content of the
thing in the image became merged with the content of the
thing itself in the rejection of "floating" ideas, and
the meaning of an idea was thus part of the content of
the thing which the idea is an image of. Ideas them¬
selves, however, were also seen to coalesce with part
of the contents of things in reality--these latter in
fact were invented in abundance to be the instantiaters
or bearers of seemingly "floating" ideas. Thus ideas
are now seen as being what was earlier called their
meaning.
This result calls into question the use and
interest of Bradley's theory of signs, even within his
own philosophy. (He himself appears to have become a
bit uneasy about this: cf. Essays on Truth and
Healitv» Ill, p. 29n.) Ideas, as he ultimately chooses
to use that term, do not operate in his logic as signs
were supposed to do, and the "third side"—meaning--
disappears. His ideas, as complexes of properties and
relations which are part of the totality of properties
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and relations which are part of the totality of proper¬
ties and relations of facts, suffice for the purpose of
analysing propositions and judgements (to which I shall
turn in the next chapter). The introduction of images,
requiring all the talk about signs and meanings, can
be seen as a vestige of psychologism, in spite of his
insistence that for him ideas had nothing to do with
the ideas of association theories. Not only that, there
were serious difficulties in even understanding the
theory of signs advanced, forcing us to make choices
about interpretation in the face of impossibilities.
These difficulties have come full circle, and led
finally to an interpretation of ideas which, although
quite different from what Bradley originally begins
with, is more satisfactory, because it does suit what
he wants to say in many places, and also because it
avoids the earlier problems about the content of a
sign (how does one add horseness to vivacity, etc,,
etc.), and avoids the psychologism of images. If leaves
unexplained, however, a number of things: the relation¬
ship of images and ideas (as properties), how we think
ideas, how we know them (directly? by abstraction?), and
other worries. But my attitude is that such questions
should be left unanswered in logic, and left to exercise
the psychologist and epistemologist. This is, therefore,
a merit of the revised notion of idea.
G2
3. Summary
Judgements for Bradley are what Frege (and we) call
assertions--they consist of two distinguishable aspects,
a proposition and a claim that the proposition is true.
Bradley's concept corresponding to the Fregean proposi¬
tion is ideal content; a judgement is true when the
ideal content is successfully referred to reality. The
ideas which constitute this ideal content are introduced
by Bradley via a very general discussion of facts. All
facts (or things) have two aspects: content and
existence. Content is the complex of properties and
relations of the fact. (The content of a particular
fact is claimed to characterise uniquely that fact, but
this would require either accepting the identity of
indiscernibles, together with spatial and temporal
properties and relations as genuine properties of a
thing--which Bradley does not unequivocally do--or
accepting a doctrine of "real essences", a doctrine
dubious at best, and useless anyway.)
Signs, or symbols, are facts also, but special
ones because they possess also a third aspect: meaning.
The meaning of a sign is part of its content considered
apart from the rest, as cunning in a fox. With some
signs the relevant part is "acquired", i..e., it is not
part of the original content of the sign at all, but
added to it; Bradley did not notice the oddity of adding
friendship to the properties of a flower.
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Ideas are signs, and as such have existence, con¬
tent, and meaning. An idea is a fact existing as an
image in the raind, its content is the complex of
properties and relations it has as a mental fact
(vividness, duration, co-occurrence with a toothache,
etc.). Its meaning, as for all signs, is part of its
content. But a similar problem arises here as arose
for some signs: the meaning of the idea of a horse,
e.g., is not part of the content of the image as a
mental occurrence, but part of the complex of properties
and relations of what is in the image. "Content" thus
is seen to be ambiguous for Bradley: should we under¬
stand "content" as he describes it, and then try to
conceive adding "horseness" to "vividness" and the like?
Or should we construe "content" (in the context of
ideas) as referring to part of the complex of proper¬
ties and relations of what is imaged, rather than the
image itself?
Bradley was sensitive to an ambiguity, which he
located in "idea", and tried to resolve by saying that
for logic the idea is not the whole sign (the existing
image), but only "the symbolised", only the meaning.
But "the symbolised" is itself ambiguous, not only
because of the ambiguity of "content", but also because
it can even refer to the thing or fact symbolised. The
ambiguity from the two ways of talcing "content" caused
Bradley to equivocate about the existence of ideas:
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when he thought of their meaning as part of the proper¬
ties of the image, he insisted that if I have an idea,
it must exist in reality as an image in my head, or at
least there must be some sensuous setting, for there
clearly cannot exist an idea by itself, unconnected
with my thinking it. But when he was thinking of the
meaning of ideas as parts of the properties of what is
in the image, he argued that they could be unrealised:
such ideas "float53, are "cut off" from reality. Thus
on the one hand ideas must exist in reality, on the
other, they need not.
Bradley later revised his position on this issue:
no ideas are unrealised. His way of handling seemingly
unrealised ideas (e.g., false ideas, conjectures,
denials, etc.) is different from both Meinong's objects
and objectives, and Russell's theory of descriptions
and his analysis of judgement as a relation between
the judger and the various constituents falsely com¬
bined in the false proposition being judged. His
method is to say that they are realised, if not in the
world of actual fact, then in some other world. This
is similar to (one interpretation of) Wittgenstein, and
to Hintikka. In Bradley's account it becomes clear that
he is using the term "content" in the second way, i.e.,
the meaning of an idea is an abstract universal shared
by both a part of the content of the thing which the
idea is an image of, and part of the content of what is
65
in the image. For if I have an idea of a unicorn, it
only makes sense to speak of its meaning in the sense
of the properties included in "unicornness" as Joeing
instantiated in some other, imaginary world; it makes
no sense to speak of the meaning in the sense of some
of the properties of the image itself, such as vivid¬
ness, etc., as being realised in the world of myth¬
ology.
But if we understand the meaning of an idoa this
way, the relation of ideas to facts is rendered obscure;
for Bradley is talking here of the idea itself being
instantiated in a fact in some world. The idea has now
come to be what was earlier thought of as its meaning,
.i.e., the idea is a part of the content of the fact.
The distinction of fact and idea has collapsed back into
that between existence and content, the only difference
between content and idea being that a thing's content
is all its properties and relations, while an idea of
it includes only some of them--those, in particular,
which it shares with others of like kind.
Since in this view ideas have become what earlier
had been construed as their meanings, the theory of
signs with their third aspect drops from importance in
Bradley's analysis of ideas and judgement. This is
welcomed as a way to avoid the difficulties associated
with meaning (as Bradley used that term), and as a
removal of a vestige of psychologist!, the images from logic.
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CHAPTER II. ALL JUDGEMENTS ARE GENERAL
1. Ideas in Judgement
We have seen that the best way to construe ideas
is as a part of the content of things, i.e., as a sub¬
group or complex of the totality of the thing's proper¬
ties. As such, ideas are no more mysterious than
properties, and although this may not seem much of an
advance in some quarters, it has at least rid us of the
necessity of coping with Bradley's version of how ideas
and symbols mean anything. But properties for Bradley
are always the properties of something: they are always
instantiated. This requirement led to his doctrine of
a multiplicity of real worlds, so that ideas of unicorns,
round squares, etc., could be accommodated. However, if
wo reject this explanation, as I think we should for
various reasons (not least of which are that it is
totally unclear just what such worlds are, and that the
distinctions between actual, possible, and impossible
are blotted out--everything becomes real), then we are
left again with "floating adjectives". We seemingly
must accept that properties can be found on their own,
existing uninstantiated. But we should not overlook an
aspect of his theory of meaning which I have so far
neglected. There is of course a difference between the
words or thoughts or whatever which occur in a judge¬
ment, and the actual proper-ties of the thing being
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judged about. I do not emit a patch of red when I judge
"this is red", much less do I emit the very patch which
is indicated by my judgement to be a property of this
object. I think basically Bradley's theory of meaning
was somehow trying to deal with the difference between
properties in things and such properties as thought about
or symbolised in an expression, and obviously it is
necessary to do so. Bradley's account ran into trouble
because of his desire to explain meaning in terms of the
content of a psychological idea; as we saw, this led to
the collapse of ideas into properties, to the ruin of
the distinction between fact and idea, and to the ulti¬
mate glory of the Absolute. To avoid this, I shall use
the term "property" for the various characteristics
that a thing may be discerned to have; they constitute
a thing's content and cannot be separated from the
thing, i.e., they do not 'float'. They do not appear
in judgements, and therefore the problems about falsity,
negation, hypothesis, etc. are irrelevant.
By "ideas" I shall not mean properties as Bradley
ends up doing, but something non-mental associated with
words and expressions used in making judgements. They
are, in short, what are often called universals. The
connection between an idea and the expression it is
associated with I do not plan to elucidate; it is a
large and controversial issue, and not really central
to this discussion. I also do not propose to develop
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an adequate theory of meaning for universale; I do not
think I could at present, nor for that natter has any¬
one to my knowledge been able to do it satisfactorily.
Moreover, the attempt would probably occupy the rest of
these pages, diverting us from the study at hand. I
shall simply assume a primitive, unanalysed sign-
relationship between words and ideas, such that when
properties corresponding to the ideas of a judgement
are found to be in the thing or fact which the judge¬
ment is about, the judgement is true. By thus making
explicit a distinction blurred over by Bradley (he
used nidea" for both ideas and properties) we obtain an
account not subject to the difficulties we found in the
last chapter, yet one still within the spirit of his
basic logical notions and still sjuapathetic towards his
over-all purpose. Bradley himself occasionally appears
to slip into thinking this way, when his earlier
thoughts about images are temporarily out of mind.
A judgement, we have seen, is what I originally
called an assertion: a claim that a (certain) proposi¬
tion is true. Ideal content is what corresponds to the
proposition for Bradley; he says, "Judgement proper is
the act which refers an ideal content to a reality
1
beyond the act." In a later footnote he de-emphasised
the "act" as unimportant for logic. But the act in
"PL, p. 10. I have omitted a parenthetical expres¬
sion ttfhich Bradley later rejected as wrong.
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question corresponds to making the truth claim in an
assertion. We might therefore understand this de-
emphasis as a suggestion that it is what is asserted,
i.e., the proposition or ideal content, which is
important for logic. With regard to certain charac¬
teristics of the judgement, Frege held such a view; he
says,
People distinguish universal and articular judge¬
ments; this is properly a distinction between
contents, not between judgements. What one ought
to say is: 'a judgement whose content is uni¬
versal (particularTT1 For the content has these
properties even when it is presented, not as a
judgement, but as a proposition. The same thing-
holds good for negation.1
I shall heed this suggestion of Bradley's then, and
confine my attention to the proposition within the
assertion, the ideal content within the judgement. This
does not mean that the notion of asserting a proposition
is of no use in logic; to the contrary—its analogue in
formal deductive systems (an expression valid within the
system as opposed to one assumed temporarily for the
p
sake of a proof, say) is of considerable importance.
But with regard to analysing the judgement and its
relation to the world, what can be said of it can be
said of a proposition merely; the actual claim of truth
"Frege, Begriffsschrift. in Translations from the
Phi logophical ./ritings of Gottlob Freqe (ed. Geach and
Black), p. 4.
o
Cf. Church, Introduction to ilathomatical Logic,
p. 197; Whitehead and Russell, Principia Bathematica,
Introduction, I, p. xviii.
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which is the assertion is extrinsic to and dependent
upon the truth or falsity of the asserted proposition,
and this is determined by the nature of the proposition
and how the world is. However, I shall continue to use
the tern "judgement"—without causing too much confusion
I hope--while what I sliall be particularly interested
in is the content within the judgement. This is only
for ease of exposition, because Bradley continually uses
the terra "judgement" even when the points he is making
are principally about contents, and it would be tiresome
to rewrite the terminology on every occasion. It will
be sufficient to remember that when we are considering
judgements, we are considering the relation of its
content to the world, and are ignoring the act which
someone has made in thus referring it to the world.
We must now ask, how do ideas enter into judgements?
Or better, how do ideas make up or constitute judgements,
and how are judgements to be broken up or analysed into
their constituent ideas? In a previous quote we saw
that in judging, an ideal content is referred to reality.
Bradley immediately goes on to dispute both that in
judgement there are two ideas, and that one is the sub¬
ject. To the contrary--there is only one idea in every
judgement, and the subject is the fact in reality of
which the idea is predicated. If this is all there is
to it, analysis is impossible, and the questions I
posed come to a dead stop.
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Fortunately, however, it is not as simple as that.
when he insists that in any judgement there is only one
idea, he is not thereby denying it any complexity.
Eatlxcr, ho is denying that two ideas are connected
together in a judgement as if they were like two pieces
of paper tied or stapled together, the relation between
the ideas being some actual relation between mental facts.
We can readily concur with him here; "the relations
between ideas are themselves ideal. . . . They do not
exist between the symbols, but hold in the symbolised.
What is curious is that he thinks that in rejecting this,
we are bound to conclude that the ideal content is one
idea, even though complex. He says.
We take an ideal content, a complex totality of
qualities and relations, and we then introduce
divisions and distinctions, and we call these
products separate ideas with relations between
them. And this is quite unobjectionable. But
what is objectionable, is our then proceeding to
deny that the whole before our mind is a single
idea. . . .2
I fail to see the force of this; if we say that an ideal
content is a complex of ideas, and are careful not to
think that the relations between then are something like
before and after, or more vivacious and less, etc., then
why must we insist that the complex is really one, and




itself}? Indeed, some pages later Bradley himself says,
rather surprisingly,
it is true that the content asserted is always
complex. It can never be quite simple, but must
always involve relations of elements or dis¬
tinguishable aspects. And hence, after all, in
judgement there must be a plurality of ideas.-
The other doctrine he disputes is the traditional
division of the proposition into subject, predicate,
and copula. His arguments against this are many and
varied, one of them for example, being the one Bussell
was to make so much of later: that it cannot properly
account for relations. Insisting that in "A is simul¬
taneous with B", "A" is the subject and "simultaneous
with B" the predicate, is just arbitrary. "B" could
have been chosen, or better yet both "A" and "B" (more
O
or less Russell's position^), or even "simultaneity".
But if such "torture is admitted, the inquiry will
become a mere struggle between torturers." After con¬
sidering and rejecting a number of interpretations of
the subject-predicate-copula theory, he broaches his
own subject-predicate theory in which the ideal content,
the complex of ideas assorted in a judgement, is the
predicate, and the subject is the fact in reality to
which the content is referred. It is perhaps unfortunate
1
PL, p. 27. Also, see below, pp. 98-100.
2
Russell, Principles of Mathematics. IX, 94, p. 95.
SPL, p. 22.
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that lie used this terminology, for it has led to con¬
siderable misunderstanding and confusion; even Bradley
sometimes finds it necessary to use "subject" in the
earlier "grammatical" sense.
We can already see how the principle that all
judgements are general lias arisen—if in all judgements
there is a plurality of ideas, and if the subject of a
judgement, what the judgement is about, is not a part
of the judgement itself, and if "the predicate must
always be an universal, for every idea, without excep-
1
tion, is universal" , then judgements are every one
universal, or general. This is the conclusion reached
at the end of chapter two of the Logic:
Both in common life and in science alike, a judge¬
ment is at once applied to fresh cases. It is
from the first an universal truth. If it were
particular and wholly confined to the case it
appears in, it might just as well have never
existed, for it could not be used. A mere par¬
ticular judgement does not really exist, and, if
it did exist, would be utterly worthless.2
An examination in detail of what is meant lay the
claim that all judgements are general, and how it is
supported, will occupy tho remainder of this chapter.
2. Categorical and Hypothetical
To see what Bradley means by generality, or uni¬





being conflated ), we must first understand his dis¬
tinction between categorical and hypothetical judge-
ments, and how ho uses it. Fundamentally, judgonent
involves the relation of a synthesis of ideas to reality,
not merely the prior act of synthesising them. With
regard explicitly to the content of judgements, this
involves a shift of attention axmy from how the ideas
are corfDined and towards the relation they have, once
combined, to the world. To the suggestion that truth
or falsity results simply from combining two ideas
Bradley replies:
But reality is not a collection of adjectives, nor
can it be so represented, its essence is to be
substantial and individual. But can we reach self-
existence and individual character by manipulating
adjectives and putting universals together? If
not, the fact is not given directly in any truth
whatsoever. It can never be stated categorically.
And yet, because adjectives depend upon substan¬
tives, the substantive is implied. Truth \;ill
then refer to fact indirectly. The adjectives of
truth presuppose a reality, and in this sense all
judgement will rest on a supposal. It is all
hypothetical; itself will confess that what directly
it deals with, is unreal.2
Thus categorical judgements are directly about some
fact in the world, while hypothetical ones are indirectly
about the world--indirect, because they involve an
inference, a supposal. Other passages reinforce this
account of the distinction:
"'"Pace the "concrete universal", which is just
another name for "individual"; see p. 24 n. 1 above.
2PL, p. 46.
Judgements which assert within what is given in
present perception . . . seem categorical because
they content themselves with the analysis of the
given, and predicate of the real nothing but a
content that is directly presented.
A hypothetical judgement must deal with a sup-
posal.
[The] process of talcing up a statement without
believing it, and of developing its consequences,
is in fact nothing else than a supposition.
The proper terms by which to introduce them
C i.«e«, hypothetical judgements] are "given," or
"if," or "whenever," or "where," or "any," or
"whatever. "•*■
From the last quote we might think that the occur¬
rence of these words is sufficient for identifying a
judgement as hypothetical, and that if the proper
meaning of a judgement involves one of them, then it
is hypothetical. Therefore we would expect Bradley to
reject Mill's claim that the distinction between cate¬
gorical and hypothetical judgements should be de-
emphasised as not really very important, on the basis
that any putative hypothetical judgement can be turned
into a categorical one by analysing away the "if". In
Mill's o\7n words (cited also by Bradley),
What is asserted is not the truth of either of the
propositions but the inferribility of one from the
other. . . . "If A is B, C is D" is found to be an
abbreviation of the following: "The proposition
C is D, is a legitiraate inference from the proposi
tion A is B."2
"^PL, p. 93; p. 85; p. 84; id. 82.
'"Mill, A System of Logic, 1, 4, 3, p. 53.
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But if Bradley were merely to object tliat Mill's
expansion of the abbreviation still contains a supposal,
that its meaning--if it still reflects the original
abbreviation—still involves "if", his position would
be rather lame, and his polemic undeserved. It would
seem to miss Hill's point that, if it is the form "if
P then Q" which makes a judgement hypothetical, then
the distinction of hypotheticals from categoricals is
not so important, because the form can be eliminated
in favor of a complicated categorical of the form
R(Q,P), where R is the relation ". . . is a legitimate
1
inference from -—".
Bradley's position is more complicated, however;
it does not rest merely on the form's containing "if"
or one of its surrogates such as "whenever", etc. A
hypothetical judgement contains or implies a supposal,
i.e., an inference, and just rewriting the judgement to
include a categorical assertion to the effect that an
inference is involved does not render the judgement one
whit less hypothetical. But what, we should ask, makes
1
Actually Hill spoice of a property, not a relation;
thus "if P then Q" would be F(Q), where F is the property
". . . is a legitimate inference from P"; this has the
obvious disadvantage of requiring a new property of Q
for each proposition from which Q can be inferred, and
raakes it impossible to talk, as Mill wanted to, of the
property of "being an inference from something else":
for "if P then Q" is obviously not rendered by "0 is
an inference from something else"--the latter, G(Q), can
be true when the former is false (sinceany proposition
implies itself).
a judgement hypothetical, if not the form? What is it
that a judgement must do or be to avoid containing a
supposal, and thus be categorical, and why is it so
important? The answer to these questions exposes one
of the most fundamental underlying assumptions in
Bradley's logic. It was already hinted at in the above
quotation on categorical judgements. The assumption is
that judgements, if true, are true of reality; the real
is what exists, and it appears to us only through what
is given to us in the present, via perception. Knowl¬
edge, and hence the true judgements in which it is
expressed, can come only through what is given, since
that is our only contact with reality. For a judgement
to be directly true of reality, it must be about a fact
presented to our awareness at the same time of the
judgement; otherwise the judgement is mediate, it ex
hypothesi involves reference to something other than
that which is present. Such a mediating reference is
a supposal or inference away from what we perceive
immediately. This is the force of the ideas of direct¬
ness and indirectness found, in the first quote of this
section. Categoricals are attributed to what is given
at the time of their utterance, while hypotheticals are
attributed to the present given reality only through a
more or less complicated mediating inference. There¬
fore, it is not the form of a judgement which determines
whether it is categorical or hypothetical (which case
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would trivialize the distinction, as Mill pointed out,
since the latter form is convertible to the former),
but it is the nature of the judgement's relation to the
presently perceived world which decides its category
and dictates its proper form. The importance of the
categorical judgement derives from the fact that we can
understand in a simple and clear way how they are true
or false: we just compare the fact we observe with the
judgement asserted, and if they correspond, the judge¬
ment is true, and if not, false. We do not have to
think about other facts past or future. Moreover, if
we take seriously the claim that in judging the complex
of ideas is referred to reality, and also that reality
appears to me only in my "now", then non-categorical
judgements will have to be taken to refer to reality
through or with the aid of judgements which are true of
the given present, i.e.. categorical judgements. These
then are the most basic kind of judgement, upon which
the others depend, corresponding to the way all knowl¬
edge ultimately depends upon immediate experience.
That this rather astonishing view, some aspects of
which are "characteristic of the crudest and most unre-
generate empiricism or sensationalism," as Wollheim
puts it,"*" is representative of Bradley's thought, may
be seen in the following passages:
"H'/ollheim, F. H. Bradley, p. 52.
79
The real is that which is known in presentation or
intuitive knowledge. It is what we encounter in
feeling or perception. Again it is that which
appeal's in the series of events that occur in
space and tine. ... It is briefly what acts and
maintains itself in existence. . . . The real is
self-existent. And we may put this otherwise by
saying, The real is what is individual.!
Subsequently he asks whether "the real, which is
the ultimate subject, and which, as we said, appears in
perception, is identical with the merely momentary
2
appearance." The answer is no, for momentary appearance
is not individual. But it is natural to think that the
real must bo present:
Hothing in the end but what I feel can be real,
and I can not feel anything unless it touches me.
But nothing again can immediately encounter mo
save that which is present. . . . "The present is
real"; this seems indubitable.3 . . . [However,]
reality is not present in the sense of given in
one atomic moment. Uhat we mean, when we identify
presence with reality, is something different.
The real is that with which I come into immediate
contact, and the content of any part of time, any
section of tho continuous flow of change, is
present to mo if 1 directly encounter it. . . .
The present is the filling of that duration in
which the reality appears to me directly.1!
1
PL, p. 45, The use of "intuition" in this context
is very close to Kant's "Anschauung": "In whatever man¬
ner and by whatever means a node of knowledge may relate
to objects, intuition is that through "which it is in
immediate relation to them, and to -which all thought as
a means i3 directed. But intuition takes place only
in so far as the object is given to us." Critique of





To give us a more concrete idea of how what we
know is related to reality through the present, he
gives (rather grudgingly) the following elaborate
metaphor:
Let us fancy ourselves in total darkness hung over
a stream and looking down on it. The stream has
no banks, and its current is covered and filled
continuously with floating things. Eight under
our faces is a bright illuminated spot on the
water, which ceaselessly widens and narrows its
area, and shows us what passes away on the cur¬
rent. And this spot that is light is our now, our
present. . . . We have not only an illuminated
place: . . . there is a paler light which, both up
and down stream, is shed on what cones before and
after our now. And this paler light is the off¬
spring of the present. Behind our heads there is
something perhaps which reflects the rays from the
lit-up now, and throws them more dimly upon past
and future. Outside this reflection is utter
darkness; within it is gradual increase of bright¬
ness, until we reach the illumination immediately
below us. . . .
We shall perceive hereafter that tine and
space beyond here and now are not strictly existent
in the sense in which the present is. They are not
given directly but are inferred from the present.
And they are so inferred because the now and here,
on which the light falls, are the appearance of a
reality which for ever transcends them, and upon
which resting we go beyond them.l
Much of the position I described above can be found
in this epistemological model. The reflector behind
(in?) our heads which dimly lights up the area beyond
the little "hole" of our present is the analogue of
inference away from what we can say about the here and
now. Reflectors, obviously, depend for their operation
on light—in this caso from the brightly illuminated
1PL, pp. 54-55.
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spot; thus judgements not categorically and directly true
of the immediately given present depend on such judge¬
ments, through inference, for their connection with
reality.
This sets Bradley his task of trying to discover
just what class of judgements are categorical. To this
end he distinguishes various kinds of judgement and
investigates them severally.
3. Kinds of Judgement
A. universal judgements
B. existential judgements
a. subject is reality restricted to the
present
b. subject is reality not so restricted
C. singular judgements
I. analytic judgements
i. without grammatical subject or copula
a. subject is all reality
b. subject is part of reality
ii. with a grammatical subject
a. subject is all reality
b. subject is part of reality
II. synthetic judgements
III. non-event judgements
a. related to a temporal period
b. not related to time
Bradley also distinguishes negative judgements and
devotes a separate chapter to them; they would not be
simply appended above, but would constitute a different,
yet parallel, table. I shall not consider them here,
for the upshot of that chapter is that "nothing in the
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world can ever be denied except on the strength of posi¬
tive knowledge."In 'A is not B' the real fact is a
character x belonging to A, and which is incompatible
with B. The basis of negation is really the assertion
of a quality that excludes (x)." Thus, "the various
kinds of negative judgement follow closely the varieties
O
of affirmation." This being the case, I shall restrict
myself to affirmative judgements and refer the reader to
Bradley's chapter on negation for specific details of
negative judgement.
A. Concerning universal judgements, Bradley con¬
siders first a judgement such as "Animals are mortal",
which would appear to be categorical. It "seems at first
to keep close to reality; the junction of facto seems
quite the same as the junction of ideas."" But this is
a mistake, for although all the animals which exist are
indeed real, we do not limit ourselves to presently
existing animals -when we say "Animals are mortal"; we
are including future animals as well. Future animals,
however (that is to say, animals which do not as yet
exist}, can hardly be part of a collection of real
existing tilings. The animals which are mortal, there¬






Also, it is not usually the case, as it -would be
with a judgement such as "All my sisters are blonde",
that we are actually thinking of a complete collection,
and this for at least two reasons: a) usually the num¬
ber even of existing things, e.g., animals, is so great
that we could not think of them all, even were we to
know somehow about them all; b) perhaps more importantly,
we do not usually intend to think about a complete col¬
lection even if we could, for we usually want our judge¬
ment to be about animals (or whatever) yet to come.
Again, suppose "Animals are mortal" is true in a
categorical sense, i.e., of each real, existing animal,
it is the case that it is also mortal. Then were there
a time when there were no more anixaals, the judgement
would be false, for if there are no animals, there are
no mortal ones. But do we say that "Dodos are mortal"
is false and would become true only if dodos once again
evolved? Or do we say thai "All persons found tres¬
passing on this ground will be prosecuted"*** is false
until someone trespasses and is prosecuted? Surely not.
Only finding an immortal dodo would falsify the former
example, and taking no action against a trespasser, the
latter.
These arguments force the conclusion that universal
judgements are not categorical; when we use them we do
***PL, p. 48.
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not mean that thoy are true directly of each and every
(relevant) existing thing, let alone that they are true
of only those things given in immediate perception. In
judging "Animals are mortal" we mean not that our judge¬
ment refers to each actual mortal animal—"we mean,
•Whatever is on animal will die,' but that is the same
as 'If anything is an animal then it is mortal'." The
"if . . . then ..." form is appropriate because such
judgements are one and all hypothetical—they contain an
inference, a supposal.
The abstract universal, "A is B," means no more
than "given A, in that case B," or "if A, then
B." In short, such judgements are always hypo¬
thetical and can never be categorical.2
Bradley locates a problem concerning universal
judgements containing "all", centering upon this word's
ambiguity. In one sense it means "any", or "if . . .
then . . and is treated exactly the same as above—
that is to say, "all A is B" is simply "If A, then B",
and is clearly hypothetical. But it might be said that
"all" can be understood collectively, in such a way as
to mean a real collection of cases (not necessarily
restricted to the present). This, says Bradley, "would
be no more an universal judgement than 'A, B, and C are





with "all" simply reduces to a collection of singular
judgements: "'All A is B' will be an abbreviated method
of setting forth that this A is B, and that A is B, and
the other A is B, and so on until the lot is exhausted.
Such judgements fall clearly under the head of singular.
The part I have underlined is important, for it indi¬
cates that Bradley is thinking of a finite collection;
ho would probably say that any actual collection, if it
really is one, collects just so many things--there is
no such thing as an indefinite or infinite collection.
To say that a collection is infinite is only an extremely
misleading and devious way of saying that the meaning
of "All A is B" (understood collectively) cannot be
exhausted by "This A is B", etc., for one will never
reach an end; in that case the judgement must clearly
be more than categorical, if it means more than can be
said categorically,
Bradley has rejected the claim that universal judge¬
ments with "all" are categorical in the collective sense,
for if they are categorical, they are singular, not
universal. He sees this as an ambiguity only in the
word "all", not in the other generality words "if",
"whenever", etc. 1 think this is wrong, for the col¬
lective interpretation is a thesis about generality
itself, not just the word "all"; it can be made against
1PL, pp. 82-83.
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any universal judgement. For example, "If anything is
an animal, then it is mortal" could be said to mean of
this object, either it is mortal or not an animal, and
of that object, either etc., and so forth until the
objects there are, are exhausted. Bradley should object
to this attempt as well, and for the same reasons. Thus
his position is on anticipation and rejection of the
interpretation of quantifiers given by Wittgenstein.
Russoll described it thus:
Wittgenstein's method of dealing with general propo¬
sitions {i.e., (x).fx and (3x) .fx] differs from
previous methods by the fact that the generality
comes only in specifying the set of propositions
concerned, and when this has been done the building
up of truth-functions proceeds exactly as it would
in the case of a finite number of enumerated argu¬
ments p, q, r, . . .
Admittedly, it is difficult to tease this view out
of the Tractatus itself, but part of it con be inferred
from the following:
If £ has only one value, then II(£) = ~p (not p);
if it has two values, then II() ~ ~p . ~q (neither
1) nor q). If T- has as its values all the values
of a function fx for all values of x, then 11(1;) =
~(3 x) .fx.
Russell, Introduction, in Wittgenstein, Tractatus
Locjico-PIuIqgophicus, (tr. Pears and McGuinness), p. XV.
hereafter referred to as Tractatus.
^Wittgenstein, Tractatus. 5.51, 5.52. The expres¬
sion "II(/;)" could perhaps be a little more explicitly
elucidated; take a set of propositions p, q, r, . . . u,
and v, where these letters represent constants, i.e.,
symbols for specific propositions. Let £ be a variable
over those constants (just as x in <3?x is a variable
over the individuals named by the constants a, b, e,
etc.). Wittgenstein writes the column of a truth-table
which defines a particular logical constant as a row in
parentheses, followed by letters for the propositions
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Thus if £ has as its values those of fx for all x, its
values will be fa, fb, fc, etc., for each name of an
object. Then H(^) = ~( x).fx = ~fa . ~fb . ~fc ....
= (x).~fx. That is,
(1) (x)fx = fa . fb . fc . . . , and
(2) ( x)fx = fa v fb v fc v . . . .
Moore attributes this latter way of putting it to
Wittgenstein explicitly,^ and this is also how Anscombe
o
interprets him. But there seems to be no good evidence
for Russell's claim that the arguments must be finite.
Anscombe tries to slur over this point by saying that
"Wittgenstein did not think there was any essential dif-
ference between the finite and infinite case." He
nowhere says that there are only finitely many objects
and names (indeed, to say so -would be nonsense on his
it connects also in parentheses; thus "p . q" is "(TFFF)
(p • q)'W (5.101) The Sheffer-stroke "p/q51, equivalent
to . ~q", can lee written "( T)(p , q)", where the
false positions are indicated by blanks. Taking advan¬
tage of the associativity of conjunction, and using
the propositional variable g, Wittgenstein can write
"(...T)(£•••)" to symbolize the conjunction of an
indefinite number of negated propositions. • Letting ^
stand for all the propositions over which g ranges, and
writing "H" for M(...T)H (which only says that the
proposition which is a truth-function of all the proposi¬
tions ^ is true only when all the propositions are
false), "(...T)(£...)" can be written nN(c)". Thus if
£ ranges over five propositions, N(^) represents ~p .
™q . ~r . ~s . ~t. (5.501, 5.502).
1
Cited by Black, A Companion to .fittcrenstein's
'i'ractatus, p. 238.
2
Anscombe, wn Introduction to Wittgenstein's
Tractatus, p. 141T7
3
Anscoiabe, op. cit., p. 146.
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view); he allows for the possibility of infinitely many
states of affairs, says that there are infinitely many
facts and propositions (p, etc.), and sug*-
gests that bussell's axiom of infinity would be unneces¬
sary in a language with infinitely many names.However,
Anscoiabe is surely correct in saying that "in the
infinite case, Wittgenstein's theory can hardly be
o
explained at all." For if "everything is f" means
literally "a is f and b is f and c is f and . . . ."
ad infinitum, we would never, nay, could never know the
truth or falsity of it. "Everything is f" could only
be meaningful (true or false) on this theory if we
could eventually stop. That such a project of infinite
enumeration must be frustrated, and yet we are still
willing to say that "everything is f" may be true or
false, indicates that the generalisation is more than
a series of truth-functionally related categorical
singular* propositions when infinitely many things are
accepted,
Anscombe raises a technical difficulty for the case
where there are only finitely many objects- -whicli is
the only alternative for someone who holds (1) and (2).
1
Wittgenstein, Wractaius, 4.2211, 5.43, 5.535.
2
Anscombe, op. cit., p. 148,
3it might of course be shown to be true or false
by deriving it or its negation, but then the remark would
apply to the promises, and ultimately the axioms.
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The difficulty depends upon the requirement that a com¬
plete description of a state of affairs needs a way to
state conclusiveness or uniqueness. To do that, one
needs more variables than names, and then, for n names,
while
(3) (3s-,,... ,0^)1 (fx-^ v ~f ) • ... • (fzn v j
is a tautology,
(4) (3x-,,... #2L+i)C (fm-, v ~fz-j ) • ... • (fxn v ~fo^) •
(fxn+l v ~f:sn+l)]
would have to 1x5 a contradiction on pains of admitting
that a "complete description" would contain a part
answering to no atomic proposition. But Wittgenstein
might reply that uniqueness need not be stated: it
would Ixj shown. If only the first two of three toys,
a, b, and a, are in the box, then it is not necessary
to add to na is in the boz" and "b is in the box",
that "c is not in the boz", for by inspecting all true
atomic propositions and their "molecular" combinations,
one just would not find "c is in the box". Unfortunately
for this hypothetical reply, Wittgenstein does permit
statements of uniqueness of the form
(Ez)fz . ~(3x,y)(fx . fy),
which says that something is f, but it is not the case
that it is f and something else is f as well. Why ho
^Anscombe, op. ext., pp. 147, 148. But see immedi¬
ately below. Also, see the nezt footnote for an
explanation of the quantifier notation.
o
'"Wittgenstein, Tractatus. 8.8321. "(3z,y)" is
90
would permit this while not allowing the need for
uniqueness claims is unclear.
A more serious problem for Anscombe, however, is
her claim that (4) can be a contradiction. Her argument
is analogous to one by Ramsey: (3x,y)(x £ y) is a con¬
tradiction if there is only one (named) individual, and
otherwise a tautology. That is, by the conventions for
naming, a / b, a / c, b / c, etc., are necessarily true,
but on any convention a / a is necessarily false.
Extending this, for three names (3x,y,s) (x-^y^z)
would expand to a log-ical sum including the contra¬
dictory expression (a / b / a); but it would also
include the tautology (a / b / c), and any expression
equivalent to an alternation containing a tautology as
one disjunct, is itself a tautology. But for this
expression with only two names available, every dis¬
junct would contain one of the names at least twice, and
therefore they all would be contradictory, rendering
the original expression a contradiction. In general
then, for n names, any such expression as
(5) (3x-|_,... ,2^) (x-^ ^ x2 ^ ... / x^)
is necessarily true, while
(0) (3x-^, • •. »2^+i) (xi ^ x2 ^ """ ^ ""n+1^
simply an abbreviated form of the more usual "(3x)(3y)",
in which the scoxse of the symbol "3" for existential
quantification includes all the variables in the paren¬
theses; "(3x,y)" should not be confused with "For some
x, and for all y . . which would be written
" (3x) (y)".
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is necessarily false, since for each disjunct some name
will have to be substituted for at least two variables,
and so at least one expression of the form a J a trill
occur in each disjunct. Ramsey cheerfully accepted
this result as a substitute for Russell's axiom of
infinity, 3imply letting n be equal to the number of
items in the universe of discourse, equal oven to
•J
or higher if nood be, and assuming (5) as true.
But since Wittgenstein rejected any notation for
identity, rriscombe tries to reconstruct the argument
without it; the result is (4) which iinseorabe says
should become a contradiction for n names. But can it?
Ramsey got a contradiction by substituting the n names
available for the n+1 variables; this meant, as we saxj,
that for each disjunct of the expanded existential
generalisation, two distinct variables had to take the
same name. But although x and y might both upon sub¬
stitution become a, if x anywhere became a, it must
elsewhere within the scope of its quantifier as trail—
tills after all is the raison d'etre of variables. Hot;
then is a contradiction got from (4)? Its complete
expansion for n=*2 is
(7) ( x,y,s)[ (fx v x) . (fy v ~fy) . (fa v ~fs) ] 5
[(fa v ~fa) . (fa v ~fa) „ (fa v ~fa)3 v
[(fa v ~fa) . (fa v ~fa) . (fb v «-fb)] v
[(fa v 'vfa) . (fb v ~fb) . (fa v ~fa)3 v
[(fb v ~fb) . (fa v ~fa) . (fa v <vTa)] v
[ (fb v «*fb) . (fb v ~fb) . (fa v ~fa) ] v
~Ramooy, The Foiuidations of Hathematics, pp. 59-01.
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[(fb v ~fb) . (fa v ~fa) . (fb v ~fb) j v
[(fa v ~fa) . (fb v ~fb) . (fb ? «-fb)] v
[ (fb v <v£b) . (fb v 'vffo) . (fb v <vfb)].
As is obvious, riot only is it not the case that all
the disjuncts are contraclictory, but not even one is;
moreover, they are all tautologies--even every conjunct
within each disjunct is as well (it is this fact, of
course, which makes each disjunct necessarily true).
Just which parts will Anscombe look askance upon? The
extra n+1 clause at the end of (4) is the most likely
candidate, for some part of each disjunct of (7) must
be contradictory for the whole thing to be; also it is
that clause alone that makes (4) differ from (3). But
what is wrong with (fs v )? If we deny that different
variables can take the same name when we substitute,
we not only eraasculate Ramsey's argument, but we funda¬
mentally alter our own idea of what variables are. Even
so, we still are left with the following:
(8) (fa v "wfa) . (fb v ~fb) . (3s) (fs v "-fa).
How the last conjunct presents a problem of interpreta¬
tion. If (3x)fx simply means the disjunction of state¬
ments formed by attaching "f" to the names !!a", "b",
etc., of the things which f, then if a in (8) cannot
range over the things named "a" and "b", and if those
are the only things, then (3s)(fa v ~fz) is meaningless.
On the other hand we might, less heroically, say that
it is false; on either account (8) is not contradictory.
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IIor could it be construed as such without also saying
that "there is a golden uountain" is a contradiction,
Of course, oithor approach would work—ilnscodbo
does not really need (4) to be contradictory; either
falsity or meaninglessness, deriving from the restric¬
tion 'substitute different nones for different vari¬
ables ' together with the situation of having more vari¬
ables than names, is enough for ridding Wittgenstein of
general statements containing an element not obtainable
fron atonic propositions.
But the cost of obtaining this result is great; it
not only ruins Ramsey's argument, but prevents us from
arguing, say, from the arithmetic onion (::}{y)(r: + y «
y + s) to the instance 6+6=6+6, It may be
countered that this can be got as a substitution instance
of the identity anion (zz) (n = , but it soeos odd to
deny that it is an erranple also of the symmetry of addi¬
tion, Allowing different variables to take the same
naao is also useful in constructing interpretations to
show consistency, i'm ezraiajle from Suppes is for the
ardoas x)(y)(aQy), (as) (y) (sQy D yQz), and (zc) (y) (a)
(;aQy . yQs D raQs). Interpreting Q as =, and the domain
as one object named A, the instances of those anions are
the following truths of identity theory: A = A,
A = A D A m A, and A ~ A , A « A D A = A. Therefore the
. , .1
auroras are consistent:.
bjuggos, Introduction to Logic. >„ 74.
But those arc really Uittgoxistein'o problems, not
ours. Be can accept identity statements, substitution
of the same none for distinct variables, and the con¬
sequence drawn by komsey, which finally only amounts to
having at least as many names as variables. This being
so, .inscombe's rather technical objection to Wittgenstein
interpretation of the quantifiers loses its force. Who
objection which to ay mind is still good is the one
Bradley makes, and which is advocated by Quine as well»
Either a universal judgement is just a finite set of
singular judgements--in which case it is not really
universal, but only an abbreviation—or it is more than
a finite set, .i.e., an infinite set. Ilany ordinary
things we generalise about require this: the sot of all
men, including all to came, is indefinite, and possibly
(barring the Armageddon} infinite; atoms might be (loss
dubiously than men) infinite in number, and numbers
themselves are clearly infinite. But if -wo understand
'.' and fv® as is customary, that is, as defined in a
matrix: while flanked by two propositions, o.cp :
P v Q (a graphic way of saying "P v Q!I by defi-
T T W nition is true unless "P" is false and
T T F
F B B "Q" is false, in which case it is false.)
F F F
then an expression like "P v ..„ • is just undefined and
ill-formed—it means nothing. It is the job of quanti¬
fied statements to express explicitly the generality
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covertly assumed by "etc." If dots or "etc." or "ad
infinitum" is used, by that very fact the expression,
if it can be said to make any sense at all, is no longer
particular. As Quino says, "thus it is that quantifica¬
tion is hero to stay."
But here Bradley confronts a problem deriving from
his basic opistetiological assumption:
Judgement, uo saw, altjays meant to be true, and
truth must mean to be true of fact. But here we
encounter judgements which seem not to be about
fact. For a hypothetical judgement must deal with
a supposal. It appears to assert a necessary con¬
nection, which holds between ideas in my head but
not outside it. But, if so, it can not be a judge¬
ment at all; while on the other hand it plainly
does assert: and can be true or false. ^
iin assertion, if true, must bo true of some fact; to
discover this link with reality Bradley asks what a sup¬
posal is. Ho answers that "a supposition means thinking
O
for a particular end,in the respect of making an
"ideal experiment":
It is the application of a content to the real,
with a view to see what the consequence is, and
1
Quino, Ilothoda of Logic, p. G9. The tenor of
Quino's position is actually somewhat different: ho says
the Wittgenstein interpretation can be used for finite
universes, but since this is an intolerable limitation
in many cases, it cannot be adopted generally. I take
this as implying some such criticism like the one just
spelled out against making sense of infinite strings of
alternations or conjunctions.
2PL, p. Gr- u
3PL, o. 85.
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with a tacit reservation that no actual judgement
has taken place.-
It is the connection of the consequence with its condi¬
tion which is the fact asserted. This connection is
the "ground" of the consequence, what causes B, if A.
The fact which existed before the experiment, and
remains true after it, and in no way depends on
it, is neither the elements, nor the relation
between them, but it is a quality. It is the
ground of the consequence that is true of the ^
real, and it is this ground which exerts compulsion.'1'
q
But just what is this "latent quality"0 associated
with hypotheticals? In one of the few examples Bradley
gives, the ground asserted by "If the barometer were
not destroyed, it would forewarn us," is said to be
general laws of nature plus certain circumstances in
reality. This is vague enough, but when we ask whether
in general the qualities, which are the bases of our
syntheses, are ever fully explicit or not, Bradlej?' seems
to vacillate, hinting that they are occult in the end,
and to press the search for them amounts to asking for
"the limits of explanation."
I cannot help but reflect that Bradley has done
no more than simply claim that hypotheticals do have some
connection with reality, because this is what they must
do in ordor to be true or false, which they can be. The
"*"PL, p. 86.
^PL, p. 88.
3rThe words are Bradley's own; PL, pp. 87,88.
talk of grounds and latent qualities is just a smoke¬
screen for a mid counter-assertion to the claim that
hypothetical are not true or false of facts in reality
Alternatively, if we take occult properties seriously,
our powers of explanation are suddenly and dramatically
enriched, to the extent that we could probably explain
anything. Many, however, would not be happy over a
victory won with such medieval ease.
B. An existential judgement for Bradley is one
which is of the form "A exists" or "A is real"; in
short, it is one marked by an explicit existence claim.
The distinction between the two kinds of existentials
depicted in the table at the beginning of this section
is an idle one; Bradley draws the distinction, and then
moves on as if he had said nothing about it at all.
Bo exactly what its function is I cannot say.
Existential judgements buttress a claim we touched
upon earlier; they show, says Bradley, that judging
cannot consist in synthesiaing ideas—for neither "is
real" nor "exists" is a genuine predicate. If one
thinks of the "idea" of reality or existence, one pre¬
sumably has got hold of some element or character of
"that actual reality and actual existence which we
1
encounter directly." But the peculiarity of such an
"idea" is that it can only be predicated back from
"hpL, p. 81.
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whence it came--it can be applied only to the particular
given from which it was abstracted, quite unlike the
predicate "is a horse" (say) which can be predicated all
over the countryside. Thus the use of such an "idea"
as "real" is either false or useless; thus it is not
really an idea. Hence in "A exists" there is only one
idea, and "A exists" cannot therefore consist of a
synthesis of ideas.
This argument is a bit hasty, however. Why is an
idea a psuedo-idea just because its use results in
falsity or idleness? It may therefore be an odd idea,
but there is nothing in the general logical conception
of an idea which is affected by or which affects the
use to which any idea is put or the consequences there¬
from. If existence and reality do admit of psuedo-
ideas, they admit of ideas--albeit odd ones. Then in
"A exists" there are two ideas, a standard and an odd
one. On his own account, Bradley cannot mean by "the
idea of existence is never a true predicate," that
existence is never a predicate, but only that it is an
odd one.
An objection independent of the status of existence
is simply that "A" need not be one idea. Indeed, the
reason Bradley gives so little space to existential
judgements is that he does not consider them to be a
1PL, p. 81.
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unique kind. "We cannot say there is a class of
existential judgements, for all singular judgements have
1
by this time been shown to be existential." By this he
means that a judgement, if true, is true of reality, or
in short, its subject is real or exists. Thus "The
horse is near the tree" can be rendered "The horse near
the tree exists." "A" in this judgement is clearly a
complex of ideas. Of course, for Bradley's argument to
work, only one countorexample of unitary "A" need be
produced, and it is not sufficient in reply to show
that in some cases "A" is complex. So what kind of
example could be produced? Clearly only one containing
one idea, such as "Horses exist". But the idea of a
horse can be analysed into elements, ouch as quadruped,
vertebrate, hooved, etc., and thus the judgement could
be considered to contain a synthesis of ideas. The
only kind of idea Bradley might have recourse to would
be simple ideas, such as (one might think) colours:
"There is yellow". But Bradley does not adroit that
there are unanalysable ideas.
All judgement necessarily contains a relation; but
every relation, besides its pair of related ele¬
ments, presupposes an unity in which they subsist.
Hence the judgement, in so far as it is the synthe¬
sis of the elements, is just so far the analysis
of that whole to which they belong. And . . . we
may say that all judgement, however near to sense,




Two pages prior to this passage he explicitly con¬
siders the possibility of simple predicates, of cases
in -which there is ,5no synthesis within the ideal con¬
tent." I must say that I find his argument against such
a possibility unintelligible, but his conclusion is
clear enough:
VJe raay therefore say that, if we go back far
enough, all judgement does informally predicate a
connection which is synthetical, and which is the
analysis of that real of which it is predicated.-
Therefore, no example can be given by Bradley to sub¬
stantiate the argument given above based upon existential
judgements, without running afoul of his own position
on simple ideas.
To return more directly to existential judgements,
wo might wonder what Bradley says of "some" sentences,
e.g., "some A is 13". Contrary to what we might expect
(with half a century's hindsight), he does not discuss
these as existential judgements, but treats them piece¬
meal in his chapter on quantity. He is there disputing
the claim that judgements which are particular, i.e.,
a judgement whose "ostensible subject is a particular
phenomenon or collection of phenomena," cannot 3x3 taken
in intension (which means signifying the attributes, or
O




how they can be taken in intension, or in other words,
how they can be construed as about ideas, not indi¬
viduals; these easy cases are "some" sentences. There
seen to be two types:
(a) "In some diseases the patient should be secluded":
we mean here that, given a . . . disease of a
certain sort which we do not specify, then some¬
thing else in that case would follow. The judge¬
ment couples mere attributes with attributes. It
does not assert the existence of this or that . .
disease. It is hypothetical, and is naturally
read at once in intension.1
We night try to symbolise his example thus:
(1) (3x)[Dx . (y)((Py . Hyx) D Gy)j,
"something both is a disease and also is such that if
anything is a patient and lias it, he should be secluded
This would be true for diseases of one sort, while for
other sorts
(2) (3x)[Dx . (y) ~((Py . Hyx) D Gy)]
might be true. But this does not reflect the analysis
Bradley gives. To do this, unless we use second order
logic, we shall have to use a sortal logic--one whose
variables are restricted to certain universes of dis¬
course. Let d range over diseases, n over men; then
(3) (d)(m)[Fd D ((Pm . Hmd) D Gm)]
says that if any disease is of the F-sort, then if any¬
one is a patient and has it, he should be secluded.
1PL, p. 132.
2
Quantifying over predicates we could say (x)[(3D)
(Dx . $D) D (y)(Py . Hyx) D Gy)J, where "<3?" represents
the certain kind of disease; but this move has its own
difficulties.
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Here we do have a hypothetical statement (i.e., the
dominant connector is "D"), and the variable letters
are most naturally read as "disease" and "man", both
of which are universals, or ideas. Moreover "F"
represents the unspecified sort of disease, ana is
contained within the judgement, rather than being left
outside as in (1) and (2), where "F" is esctensionally
specified as just those cases such that (1) is true.
The other type of "some" sentences are those in
which an unspecified number rather than kind is meant:
(b) "Some English citizens will be hung next year"
may mean, not one sort, but one unspecified
quantity of English citizens will suffer this
fate. . . . When read in intension the judgement
runs thus, "Given certain conditions, part
unspecified, part specified as the attribute
English citizen and the attribute of amounting to
a certain number, then," etc.l
This explanation is curious, because only indi¬
viduals are Encrlish citizens, while only groups of
individuals have a certain number; also what the
unspecified conditions apply to is itself unspecified.
Ignoring these conditions we might write
(4) (m) (g) [ ((meg) . Em . Ng) D lira],
letting "m" range over men and "g" over groups of men.
Then (4) says that any men, if they are English and
members of any group numbering II, they will be hanged.
This cannot be correct, for it says in effect that any
Englishman will be hanged if he is in a group of II
XPL, p. 182.
103
individuals; since every Englishman can be placed in
such a group if N does not exceed the number of
Englishmen, (4) says that every Englishman will be
hanged. Obviously some "unspecified conditions" are
needed. But to write these in a symbolic way would
require something like
(5) (Rm v Sq) v (Tm , Ug)
conjoined to the expression on the left of the hook
in (4). But because of "asg" the variables are of
different type, and thus (5) requires the introduction
of either second order logic, or set theory; the latter
is needed anyway for "meg", since it is expressed with
the primitive constant of set theory. But what, after
all, is the rationale of (5)? It turns (4) into "any
men, if they are English and belong to any group of N
men, and either they have the px-operty R or the group
has the property S, or they have the property T and the
group has the property U (where T and U are not neces¬
sarily distinct from R and S respectively), then they
will be hanged," Clearly, the function of (5) is simply
to delimit in a certain unspecified way the group of
to-be-hanged Englishmen from all Englishmen (its com¬
plexity owing merely to an indeterminacy as to what the
restrictions apply to--the men, the group, or both).
In other words, it permits a univex'sally quantified
statement to be given in analysis, by conditionally
restricting the sort of Englishmen (using "K", "S",
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"T", or "U") to just tile group which will be hanged.
Thus Bradley's "unspecified conditions" are not only
necessary for (4), they are the very trick with which
he can get a universal, and hence a hypothetical. This
device is no different frora saying that "some horses
are white" is universal because what you are really
asserting is "all horses which -— are white", "where
the blank is (perhaps) filled by "have chromosome M".
All that is happening is that restrictions are placed
on the undistributed term which are sufficient to reduce
its extension to the same or less than that of the
predicate term, thus enabling the subject term to become
distributed.
Inclusion of these conditions into (4) almost reduces
type (b) "some" sentences to type (a). But not quite;
those of type (b) but not type (a) still contain the
predicate letter "H". How either this is a predicate
schema for a specific number, as "E" is specific for
English, or it is a variable. The former case, where
"IJ" stands for 12, say, would not bother Bradley;
It is an elementary mistake to suppose that number
confers particularity and destroys intension.
. . . how can the addition of an universal quality
force us to take a judgement merely in es±ension'?l
We can agree that numbers are properties, properties
of groups for that matter-, as indicated by "Hg" in (4).
But just because 12 (or 56, or whatever) is a universal
*h?L, pp. 102-103.
quality, vie cannot accept therefore that our original
"some" sentence was somehow about 12 (or 56, etc.) men
who will be hanged, as Bradley seems to think. It
must be a variable, and therefore quantified. Uni¬
versal quantification would render it false, so we are
left with the following result:
(6) (m) (g) [ ((ratg) . Em . (311)Hg . ((Em v Sg) v
(Tm . Ug))) D Ilm].
This is an extraordinarily complicated and obscure
alternative for
(7) (3x) (Ex . Hx),
merely to be able to make "some" sentences hypothetical;
it requires either set theory, sortal variables, and
second order logic, or third order logic. Worse still,
one could run through an argument similar to the one
for "N" for the "sort" of disease F in (3), and also
for "R", "S", etc. in (6). Each would have to be
quantified over, because they are "unspecified." And
to ascertain whether or not (3) and (G) thus quantified
were true or not in some interpretation, we would have
to know which sorts F^, Fj, etc., and E^, Rj, etc.,
were true or false for the relevant diseases, men, and
groups. In the same way, we would have to be able to
specify the number named by "II.. " which would make
"(3N)Ng" true or false for each group.
So much for Bradley's treatment of "some" sentences
as hypothetical and not as existentials. I shall now
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turn to the last and in some ways most interesting of
Ms categories „
C. Singular judgements are the most likely
candidates for being categorical; as mill be seen, all
three classes in some way or another ''attribute an idea
to the real which appears."''" The third class, which I
have called for want of a better name "non-event"
judgements, are simply judgements in which we "are
o
speaking of a subject which is not an event." I
understand this to mean that the reality referred to is
not confined to any "now" or "here". There are two ways
it may not 3x2 confined: one is the case where the
subject extends through a number of the series of "nows"
which constitute perception through time. In other
words, that of which one judges is an individual which
lasts longer than one's sense of the present—e.g., a
person or a nation. The other case is where the sub¬
ject is without time altogether--jg.g., God or the soul.
With regard to the first case, it is rather curious
that he should have not also included space; it would
seen that an individual could extend far enough so as
to be beyond any one "here"--it would consist of a
number of contiguous "here's" in the spatial series.




considers just such an example as this in his discussion
of synthetic judgements:
If we mean by phenomena the things we perceive, or
the facts or appearances that are given to us, then
the whole of England below our horison (to say
nothing at all of America and Asia), and every
event that is past or future arc not phenomena.
They are not perceived facts. They exist in our
minds as mere ideas, as the meaning of symbols.
. . . Events past and future, and all things not
perceived, exist for us only as ideal constructions
connected, by an inference through identity of
quality, with the real that appears in present
perception.!
This explanation as we shall see below, is typical
of synthetic judgements. But what about persons and
nations persevering through time then? Here Bradley
admits outright that it is hard to distinguish such
"non-event" judgements from synthetic ones.
Just as analytic judgements are always tending to
become synthetic, so here it is impossible to
separate sharply the first division of this class
from the synthetic judgement. 2
With regard to the question of whether or not they
are categorical, I think he treats them as he does
synthetic judgements; as a result I find it difficult
to see just what the difference between them is. For
although synthetic judgements are related to something
that appears in present perception, almost everything
which appears in the present endures as an individual




The other kind of "non-event" judgement is nore
deserving of that name, and is clearly different from
analytic and synthetic judgements. Is it categorical?
This is the very last thing he considers in the chapter
we are dealing with: "Can truth categorical be finally
discovered in some such judgement as 'The self is real'
or 'Phenomena are nothing beyond the appearance of soul
to soul'?"1 The answer is "either here or nowhere". A
footnote added later says "in the end nowhere", but
without any specific reasons. However, we shall see
that the general argument Bradley mounts against analysis
would apply here as well as to the other types of
singular judgement, and would justify his dour conclu-
2
sion.
a) The other two classes of singular judgements are
the analytic and the synthetic (which has nothing what¬
soever to do with ICant's distinction). Both kinds con¬
cern events or things, i,.e., something existing in space
and time, the difference being that on analytic judge¬
ment is about something given in perception simultaneous
with the judgement, while a synthetic one is not so
restricted: some part of it concerns something not per¬
ceived at the time of judging. It might seen that for
this distinction we need that aspect of judging Bradley
1PL, p. 107.
2
Bee section c) below, pp. 147-161, esp. pp. 148-
153.
109
has called the "act" of judging, and which I recommended
at the start of this chapter that we ignore; for it is
this act that is datable, whereas the propositional
content is "eternal" or "timeless". But propositions
are timeless in the relevant sense (are true or false
for all time) only if a time reference is somehow con¬
tained within it. This means taking tenses seriously;
but times indicated by tenses can be considered to be
part of the propositional content. They can be indi¬
cated by "now", "before" and "after", or alternatively
by naming specific times. Reichonbach lias pointed out
just how complicated our description of temporal rela¬
tions must Joe to be adequate for English tenses; we
need a basic 'now' of the proposition (II), the time of
the event judged about (E), and a third often
"TJuine argues not only that "tense, then, is to
give way to such temporal qualifiers as 'now', 'then',
'before t', 'at t', 'after t'," but also that "to finish
the job of eternalising the sentence ... we have to
supplant the 'now' by a date and clock reading or the
like". Uord and Object, pp. 172, 194. His reason for
eliminating indicator words such as 'now', 'I', 'here',
etc., is that they are indefinite in what they refer
to, and a sentence containing them can vary in truth
value, and is thus not eternal. The trouble with this
is ttiat dates and clock readings are names of particular
times, and if names are treated as definite descriptions
as Quine would have us do, then which particular time is
meant is again problematic: it is no use just claiming
by fiat that it is the one and only one which is so-and-
so, for it may not be that there is only one so-and-so.
(See the discussion below on uniqueness in descriptions,
pp. 377-391.) A description may be given that would
determine the time relatively within some series, but
no more. And indicator "words together with units of
distance and duration suffice for that as well.
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unspecified time of reference (H)For example, in
"lie will have paid you the money", the event of his
paying you at E is prior to some unspecified later time
K, and both are subsequent to the propositional 'now' H.
Letting loft-to-right order between letters separated by
a dash represent earlier-to-later temporal sequence, and
{unordered) juxtaposition represent simultaneity, then
the temporal relations in the example can bo schematised
as 1J-E-R. The propositions "He paid you", 'He has paid
you", and "He had paid you" will be, respectively, RE-H,
E-E1J, and E-E-Ii. Talcing the last example, wo could
write it out (using the infinitive without "to" for the
tonsoloss verb) as "He pay you before some then, which
be before not;." Barbaric English, maybe, but temporally
explicit. The continuous aspect can bo easily repre¬
sented by drawing a clash over E and anything justaposed
with it. Thus "He was running" and 'lie will have been
running" are schematised BE-II and 1J-E-R.
Bradley's distinction, then, can bo partially put
in the following way: only singular judgements with
the schema I1RE or USE can be analytic, all others
synthetic. This is not sufficient however, for some
judgements with one of those schema are synthetic. The
reason for this is that "present perception" means more
than just being in the temporal present. It includes
i
Reichenbach, Elements of Symbolic Logic, pp. 287-
290,
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also spatial presence and 'perceptual' presence. "This
p
road leads to London" and "This volume contains 3ml0
osygen molecules" are both WEE# but the former refers
to something not hero (London), and the latter refers
to something not perceived, even though present (mole¬
cules). This indicates that the implicit "now" of a
judgement content is not enough for Bradley's distinc¬
tion; it requires an epistemological fleshing-out. In
both of the counterexample MEE sjaithetic judgements, and
for synthetic judgements generally, there is a tine-lag
between the time of E and the time at which the applica¬
bility or non-applicability of the idea to the event
could be directly ascertained. Thus, although such a
judgement may be true or false now, this cannot be
verified immediately, but only through various investi¬
gations, inferentially connected, which toko time.
Analytic judgements, on the other hand, are judgements
not only whose "now" is the same as the time of the
event, but also whose verification or falsification
can be made at that same time.
This epistemological aspect of the distinction is
somewhat hidden in the account Bradley gives, when ho
says that "the essence of [analytic judgements] is to
hold only of the now, and not to transcend the given
perception."''' It might bo thought that ascertaining
1PL, p. GG.
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the applicability of an idea to reality is only an
added complication, that Bradley had in mind that me
merely inspect what is around us and abstract or
analyse out of it an idea, e.g., "that tree is green".
On such an account, the judgement mould 1x3 true, for
all me have done is to take the given and ignore some
of it—mhat is left mas certainly there to start with.
This is inadequate however, .because it cannot deal
with falso judgements: if in what is given no there is
only a green tree, 1 cannot "abstract out" a red tree.
ill! judgements got in this way would lee true. There¬
fore, "so do not get them this may, because some judge¬
ments are false. But then how do we know which are
true and which are false, if this can not follow
directly from the method of getting the judgements?
The answer is that wo must compare the content with the
given to see if it is an analysis of it: if it is, it
is true, if not, false. But this would render (if 1
am in Edinburgh) "Trafalgar Square is now foggy" false,
for there is nothing in my present perception that can
be abstracted from, so as to produce a foggy Trafalgar
Square. Even so it might be true. Therefore the con¬
tents of some judgements must be compared with past or
future givens (it would take some time to got to London
to inspect Trafalgar Square, and the relevant given
would be in the past). This business of comparing is
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simply what I meant above in speaking of verifying an
idea, or ascertaining its applicability to reality.
Bradley distinguishes two kinds of analytic judge¬
ments, those with and thoso without a grammatical sub¬
ject, and within each of these categories he distin¬
guishes those about the whole of the given and those
about only a part of it. Hero are some examples he
gives to illustrate these classes:
i, a. Wolf, Fire. Rain. Miserable,
b. Asleep, Running, Dovjn. Gone,
ii. a. IIow is the time. It's all so dreary. The
present is dark,
b. There is a wolf. This is a bird, Ilero is a
fire. This bird is yellow. The cow, which is
now being milked by the milk-maid, is standing
to the right of tho hawthorn troo yonder.~
Although I do not particularly wish to arguo that
one or more words without a grammatical subject cannot
express a judgement, some of these examples seem rather
lame. The cries "FireI" or "v/olf|", in the only
plausible situation I could imagine their being used,
would be referring to same part of the given, vis., a
fire or a wolf. Unfortunate indeed would be the person
the whole of whose given contained one of those. They
seem to me to be cases of (i.b.), and better ones than
the examples Bradley gives, for although one might
cryptically say of a wolf "running", one would much
more naturally say "It's running". Bradley claims that
1PL, 1^. 56-59.
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to say the grammatical subject is elided is "mere lin¬
guistic prejudice". His point is apposite to "Wolfl",
but my objection to s aying "running" is not that one
could not say it, but that one just would not. More¬
over, why does "running" refer to only a part of the
given, and "wolf" not?
Perhaps the most convincing example of reference
to the whole of given reality is "Rain" and its counter¬
part with a subject "It's raining". The former expres¬
sion is unusual (one would probably react to it as a
warning) because of the tendency of English to add
dummy subjects in the form of third person neuter pro¬
nouns—what Jespersen has called the unspecified, con¬
cept ional, or notional neuter,''* Some languages do not
have this need for a dummy subject to carry the unspeci¬
fied neuter--the verb alone does it; e.g., Juppiter
tonat (Jupiter, let it thunder),
(it killed father with a tree, or more idiomatically,
father was killed by a tree). But many languages
whether they require a subject or not, employ this
unspecified reference to "the whole situation of the
atmosphere"; it has been called "das grosse neutrum
o
der natur". Jespersen gives an extraordinary passage
from Hardy in which "the great neuter of nature" is
^"Jespersen, The Philosophy of Grammar, pp. 241,
243.
2
Jespersen, op. cit. The German quotation is
attributed to Spitaer.
115
completely explicit: "Why doth It so and so, and ever
so. This viewless, voiceless Turner or the Wheel?" The
"It" is described as the do-anthrapomorphised "First or
Fundamental Energy." Bradley's use of the unspecified
neuter is restricted to what is hero and now, and of
course none of the or-anplcs froan Jespersen would be
analytic judgements (the first is not even a judgement,
the second spooks of the past, and to "viewless, voice¬
less" in the third, one night just as -well add "timeless").
But in avowedly analytic judgements, such as "It's
raining", "It's all so dreary", and "It's dark", the
"it" is not just a cloud, some particular chore, or a
scrap of cloth, but the whole of given nature or reality
surrounding and perhaps including the user of the judge¬
ment. Admittedly, they could be used in the former way,
oven in some non-analytic way, but all I am concerned
to do is to try to make sense of them when they are used
to refer to the whole of the given present.
By far and away the most common kind of analytic
judgement is the last type, with a grammatical subject
and about only part of what is given. Each of Bradley's
eiiomplos contains demonstratives, either as a subject
or as modifying a noun. As may have boon noticed from
my discussion so far of the other kinds of analytic
judgement, there is no proper grammatical form or
"Jespcrsen, op. cit■. p. 242.
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criterion which guarantees that a sentence is of one
specific kind, or even that it is analytic. This is
true again here. One might think that either a sentence
has a subject or not, and this fact at least would
exhaustively divide analytic judgements asunder; but is
"here" a subject? Actually, we should be indifferent
to either answer to that question, for the form of a
judgement cannot determine its status as analytic,
synthetic, or neither. Because of this, the presence
of demonstratives in all of Bradley's examples for
(ii.b.) is misleading, because one might think that
words like "here", "now", "this", etc., are the sine
qua non of this kind of analytic judgement. But neither
are they necessary for this kind ("A cat is on the roof"
might well be a case of (ii.b.)), nor are they suffi¬
cient ("This sort of weather is frequently shortlived"
cannot be analytic at all). We cannot say from this,
however, that demonstratives had best be ignored in
connection with analytic judgements; this is a compli¬
cated matter, as might have already been surmised from
the discussion above on the propositional "now". I
1
shall return to them below.
Synthetic judgements, as we have seen, are ones
whose applicability to reality cannot be determined
within their own "now"; they require an inference away
"*"Bee pp. 145-146 below.
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from the given. Bradley night have given a little table
of kinds of synthetic judgements analogous to the one
for analytic judgements. That ho did not buttresses the
view that the distinctions into various kinds of analytic
judgements are relatively superfluous, at best a rather
clumsy and ad hoc way of dealing with some odd cases.
Bo that as it may, ho docs deal with synthetic judge¬
ments as a whole, rather than in several parcels.
One of the first questions to bother him is:
If the subject is the real that appears in percep¬
tion, how can events in the past and future, or
in a space outside the presentation, and how oven
can qualities not given to sense be referred to
the object and considered as its adjectives?-
The answer is that they are still true of reality, for
although reality appears only in the present, reality
is not confined to the present. However,
synthetic judgements are possible only by being
connected with what is given at this very instant.
The ideas of past and future events are projected
from the lease of present perception. It is only
in that point that they encounter the reality of
which they wish to be true.2
This is basically the answer wo already met at the
end of section two of this chapter, in the account of
Bradley's distinction of categorical and hypothetical.
Synthetic judgements, it seems, are hypothetical; they
derive their truth or falsity from their indirect con¬




this connection? Bradley describes it as an "ideal con¬
struction", an inference which, like all inferences,
"stands on the identity of indiscernibles.The idea
of a synthetic judgement, like that of an analytic one,
"must be the idea of something in space or some event
o
in time." The content or idea in the former is of the
same kind as in the latter, and therefore the content
of the former could be a content of the given. But it
is not. What then is the link between a content of the
given and one which could be but is not?
That link is found by establishing a point which
is the same in both, and is the same because its
quality is the same. The "this" contains a com¬
plex of detail, either times or spaces (or both)
in series, which we may call c.d.e.f. The idea,
on its side, contains a series of particulars
a.b.c.d. The identity of c.d. in each extends the
perception c.d.e.f. by the ideal spaces or times
a.b., and the whole is given by synthetical con¬
struction as a single fact a.b.c.d.e.f. The whole
series noxi? is referred to the real, and by connec¬
tion with unique presentation, has become a series
of events or spaces, itself unique and the same
as no other series in the world. It is thus by
inference that we transcend the given through
synthetic judgements. . . .3
Well, that is how it works. But if is very diffi¬
cult to understand what it means. Do the letters stand
for qualities, for segments of space-tirae in a spatio-
temporal series, or for facts in reality? If "c.d."





expect the letters to represent qualities, i,.e., parts
of the complex of ideas which constitute the content
of the synthetic judgement, and parts of the complex
of ideas constituting the content of a judgement about
the immediate present to which the synthetic judgement
is linked. Thus the present might contain "sunny",
"tree", "road", and various other details, and the point
of identity between the present and the judgement "This
road leads to London" would be the particular road. But
this is totally unilluminating, and anyway, does the
fact that there is truly a road here and now enable us
to infer that it is the same road as a road which leads
to London? And besides all that, why should these
qualities be ordered in a series?
On the other hand, the letters seem to represent
not qualities, but different times and/or places. But
how could they be contained within the "this", which
is what is given in the "now" of presentation? There¬
fore, "c.d.e.f." must be meant on this view to
represent not various times and/or places within the
"now", but a series of little "now's" or "here's"
which we might write as " . . . (xyst)-^, (xyat )-q, . .
But then mere identity of overlapping times and places
cannot permit the inference of much of anything, except
perhaps that there are times (or spaces) before or after
(in front of, next to, above, etc.) the series of suc¬
cessive givens being considered. A further point is why
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should spatial "here's" be ordered, as if in this
respect they were like temporally successive "now's"?
Yet the letters seem not to be qualities, times,
or spaces, but facts, for "a.b.c.d.e.f." is called a
single fact, and presumably the parts of a complex:
fact are themselves facts.
Let us try a different approach. First of all,
Bradley is considering descriptions (ideas) of what is
in a series of successive times and/or places. Suppose
we experience several successive moments and give an
analytic judgement for each, symbolising their contents
as "c", "d", "e", and "f". Mow suppose we have a judge¬
ment that refers to reality prior to the beginning of
our series of givens, say "a". This idea a can be
"grounded in reality" by showing that it is part of a
series "a,b,c,d", xdtere "c" and "d" are the same as
"c" and "d" in the former series. Because "c,d,e,f"
is a series of ideas referred to reality, then because
the same "c" and "d" are found in "a,b,c,d", this may
be joined to the first series, producing "a,b,c,d,e,f"
as a new series referring to reality. Therefore a
refers to reality. For example, I walk into a room at
a certain time; at that moment I judge "John is reading".
In successive moments I judge "John looks up", "John
smiles", "John lays down the book", "John rises",
"John says 'Hello1". Then an idea corresponding to the
synthetic judgement "John sat down" would refer to
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reality if I could make an "ideal construction", pro¬
ducing a series such as "John sat doxm", "John picks up
the book", "John is reading", "John looks up", the last
two being identical to the first two of the preceding
series.
There is something awry in the last paragraph. The
obvious objection is that there is no reason why I could
not have proposed a different series ending in several
events which were identical with those beginning the
former series, and on that basis inferring something
totally different from "John sat down", perhaps even
something incompatible with it. One way of avoiding
this would be to establish some sort of connection
(perhaps causal) between the elements of the series
which would block the inference of arbitrary series.
But this would be a rather different account from
Bradley's own. Another way would be to restrict the
proposed extensions of the original series to only true
judgements; but the method we are talking about is
intended to permit us to ascertain the truth of synthetic
judgements, using analytic ones directly about the
present, plus a sure-fire inference procedure. And it
is si ply circular to buttress the inference procedure
by restricting in advance the results it produces to
just those which it was designed to produce on its own.
However, the above account does not for other
reasons accurately reflect Bradley's view. He gives an
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illustration of a synthetic judgement by asking us to
consider a series of pictures such as Hogarth's The
hake's Progress, one of which is not a picture, but a
momentary glimpse of a real man in a real room. By
describing something we notice about the roan which we
see in that glimpse, we can utter an analytic judgement.
But also,
by virtue of the sameness in the quality of the
man, as he is in the room and is in the pictures,
we, neglecting the appearance in the particular
frarnes, arrange the whole series as his past and
future. We transcend in this way the visible
room and the presented scene, and view the real
life of the person extending itself as a series
in time.-*-
Presumably, a synthetic judgement would be got by
describing something about the man happening in one of
the pictures, and its contact with the reality given in
the glimpse would be via identity in "the quality of the
man". Thus the letters Bradley uses should not be
thought to represent successive ideas (complexes of
qualities) used for successive judgements, as in the
explanation above, but should be interpreted as repre¬
senting the qualities themselves which are combined
into complexes in a judgement. Then some particular
group of letters represents a judgement, and any other
group represents a different one. Let "c.d." rejoresent
this quality of the man; then an analytic judgement, say
"The rake is seated" is represented by "c.d.e.f." It is
^■PL, pp. 78-79.
extended by "a.b.c.d.", say "The rake is speaking", to
the synthetical construction "a.b.c.d.e.f." because the
rake is identified as the same rake by means of his
possession of identifying qualities. Is the result of
this "The rake is seated and speaking"? I am not sure.
If that is the result, there are problems, for the
judgement may well be false: he might never have
spoken while seated. Perhaps "The rake is seated and
was speaking" is what Bradley had in mind; but if so,
from where did the tense come? We are no longer thinking
in terms of the earlier explanation, where the letters
were contents of successive spatio-temporal bits: it
just makes no sense to say that "speaking" is prior to
"the rake" which is prior to "being seated". Maybe one
of the letters, which represent qualities or groups of
qualities discerned within some single given, somehow
assigns a temporal quality, so that "a.b.c.d." can be
seen to apply to a given prior to the given of "c.d.e.f."
In other words, "a" could represent the quality of
being at time tR, and "f" of being at t Something
along this line seems to me necessary if Bradley is to
avoid the difficulty noted above. There is no hint of
it in his example, however, and his other one about
schizophrenia is totally unilaminating.^ Most of his
discussion in his chapter called "Two Conditions of
XPL, p. 73.
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Inference" is equally so. But he does give there one
example which is worth considering. He has been trying
to show that the identity of indiscernibles is a condi¬
tion of inference, and to explain how it works. An
error some people make is to think that since Caesar is
the same in two contexts, one can infer that Caesar is
both twenty-nine and thirty years old. Bradley replies
that
what is true of Caesar in a certain context is true
of the same Caesar in any other context. But this
does not mean that on© contend: is the other or is
to be confused with the other. It means that
Caesar has two different contexts, and that the
truth of one can be no reason -whatever for the
falsehood of the other.1
What he means by "context" I take to be "spatio-
temporal context"; if it means anything else I do not
see how it avoids the absurdity. He then proceeds to
consider in more detail the related thesis: "That what
is true of B here is true of B everywhere, means that,
wherever B happens to be, you can say of it always what
you have said of it once. This B you assert of is the
self-same B that appears in the differences, but it is
not the B just as it appears in those differences."
He seems to have in mind that although it was once truly
said of Caesar (B) that he is in Italy (B-A), and at a
different time that he is in Gaul (B-C), wo cannot say
1PL, p. 290.
2PL, pp. 290-291.
that the Caesar-in-Italy is in Gaul; it is not the Caesar
as he appears in Italy or Gaul, but Caesar tout court.
of whom being in Italy or Gaul is true.
The B, of which what has once been said holds
good for ever, is not the B which is one thing with
A or one thing with C. It is the abstraction, the
idealised content B, which is different from its
contexts and yet connected with them. . . .-
Once again, the notion of "context" has entered;
its role here is to embrace all the qualities (including
spatial and temporal ones) of a thing which differ
between any two judgements about that same thing. That
is, if I judge that "The bos near the chair is in the
room", then later that "The .bom is in the next room",
then "being near the chair" is part of the contend;, for
clearly on the second I am not making an assertion about
the box-near-the-chair, for the box is no longer near
the chair, but is in the next room. What I asserted of
is simply the box. The illustration Bradley himself give
is of a shed (B-A) to which something happens (D)--
becomes tipped over, say. Then it burns down and another
(B-C) is rebuilt "not distinguishable in itself from the
first".2 Can we say of B-C that D happened to it? If
not, and if the sheds are indistinguishable (i,.e., are
the same shed), how can wo continue to claim that one




restates this objection and then comments upon it, and
in doing so gives his most explicit explanation of hoc;
inference is involved in synthetic judgements:
"The sheds and their environment are a certain
content, and that content is the sane. If, on the
strength of their content, we said of the shed
B-A 'D happened here yesterday,* why can we not
also upon this ground now say of the shed B-C
'D happened hero last year'? The content is what
we go from, and we have that in both cases." I
reply. By all means: the content is the same.
Let us try to carry out tho process you recommend.
We cannot of course connect I) with B-C unless we
establish a chain of relations through the identity
of their end-points. You cannot go direct from
the content B to the temporal event i), for that,
as wo have seen, is not predicated categorically.
You must start from the content as given in one
time. Well, starting from B-A, you got a chain of
events which tool: you bach to I). But, if you start
from B-C, you have a chain of events which talces
you back first to the origin of B-C, when B did
not exist, and then again through the destruction
of B-A, to the time when B once more existed and
was connected with D. Your process informs you
that D the event will not fall within the identity
of the ideal content B-C. That content has .been
qualified by a limitation in time, and qualified
again ley a definition of its component elements,
which excludes thoix- identity with the elements
of B-A. If you deny that these qualifications ai'o
objects of knowledge, then 1 admit D is true of
B-C, and why in the world should we not think it
true? But if you admit that these qualifications
arc distinctions, then the content of the sheds is
not indiscernible, and therefore by your admission
is not identical.*•
A certain curiosity will probably have been noticed:
why does Bradley use two distinguishable symbols, "B-A"
and "B-C", for the shod which, supposedly, is indis¬
tinguishable from itself? That is the key to his
answer. The shed, which ho sometimes calls simply "B",
1PL, pp. 291-292.
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is qualified by "time" and "a definition of its component
elements". Some things about the shed, e.g., that it is
green, seven feet tall, etc., are part of the context,
related to the shed rather like being in Italy is
related to Caesar. They are not part of "what is the
same", about which what is said holds always. But
certain other things about the shed are more intrinsi¬
cally related, in particular, the temporal period of
continuous existence, and its essential characteristics
as the shed. These latter I take to be represented by
"A" and "C". Admittedly, Bradley does not insist that
we include these within the ideal content of the shed,
but merely says that if you do, the sheds are discerni¬
ble, and D cannot be said of B-C because B-C is not
B-A; if you do not, D must be said of B-C as well. How¬
ever, in a footnote added in the second edition he says:
And even in the case of a single shed, where it
remains throughout one and the same, it is still
qualified by its temporal diversity, so as to be
also so far different, and, so far again, not
indiscernible.1
This is no longer equivocal, and is quite radical—
a thing is qualified not only by the duration of its
continuous existence, but by each moment therein. A
shed given now is discernible from an otherwise indis¬
cernible shed then just a moment ago, and hence not the
same shed. Instead of indicating this by double
1PL, p. 298 n. 8.
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hyphenated letters, I shall just attach subscripts for
successive moments.
To return finally to the account of synthetic
inference quoted above on page 118, we can understand
it in the light of this example of the shed as follows:
we experience a number of givens in temporal succession.
A judgement referred to the present given is analytic;
one referred to a past (or future) given is synthetic,
and it must be linked up with an analytic one in order
to establish its connection with reality, i.e., its
truth. To find this link, we proceed by inferences
from the present successively to moments in the past
(or future). It is all rather like reversing (or
speeding up) a film projector. Let our analytic judge¬
ment by i!cn^en£nn' an<^ "the synthetic judgement for
five moments (frames) earlier by
Suppose we have been talking about the shed before it
burnt, and "c.d." represents the shed. The link is
established by the presence of the identical content
of "c.d." in both, and we can say "The shed is tipped
and was upright". The tense difference derives from the
temporal indices. This view, I believe accurately
represents Bradley's own.
However, there is a serious difficulty: we do not
have the same symbols, but "cnd^" and which
are different, and might well have been written "X" and
"Y". And this is not a mere quibble about symbolic
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conventions either—without talking about symbols at
all Bradley himself forces this conclusion in the last
quotation above. We do not have the same symbols
because each moment permits distinctions and hence dis-
cernibility. If this is the case, where can identity
of content, upon which all inference depends, be found?
Bradley is forced to include time as a property or
relation of everything in order to cope with the tine-
lessness of assertions, but the way he does it wrecks
his account of the nature of inference for synthetic
judgements. Identity of content of part of two judge¬
ments can only be found between two judgements made of
the same one given, the same moment. As we saw earlier,
the inclusion of time into judgements is necessary, but
if we do it by counting time as a quality of a thing as
Bradley does here (and as he rather ambiguously some¬
times seemed to do when talking about the content of a
thing or fact--see chapter I above), we court disaster;
we end up with a wholly new set of objects each moment
and no way to connect them, since each connection
depends upon an identity which is not there.
An entirely separate difficulty, but one no less
serious, is that his account, and both illustrations of
it, require that the judgement of each preceding or
succeeding link in the chain of events be—for that
momentary given--an analytic judgement. From the cen¬
tral real room and man we look to the pictures and judge
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that in this particular one, say, the rake is speaking.
Or, starting from the present shed, we are taken back
first to the origin of the shed, through its destruction,
etc., where at any point the relation between what we
judge and what we see is simply that of analysis of the
given. The difficulty, then, is how do we understand
this process for synthetic judgements about events I
have not, shall not, can not, or even could not directly
experience, such as "Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo",
or "The Universe began with a gigantic explosion"? Some
events are not observed by me, some not by anyone, and
some are not observable, yet Bradley's description of
the way synthetic judgements are connected with reality
requires that they have been or will be given to me in
a present experience. This leaves a great number of
synthetic judgements hanging without explanation,
b) Analytic and synthetic judgements are singular
judgements because they either directly or indirectly
refer an idea to reality such that they are about single,
unique things or facts given either in a jjarticular
present, past, or future experience, or in several.
But the uniqueness of their subjects cannot be gotten
into the judgements themselves. Bradley recognizes at
this point that a special discussion is required on
proper names and demonstratives, for both of these kinds
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of expression have been thought to be somehow capable of
In connection with proper names, it is Mill's doc¬
trine of connotation and denotation which Bradley has in
mind. Mill distinguishes these two types of terras:
A non-connotative term is one which signifies a
subject only, or an attribute only. A connotative
tern is one which denotes a subject, and implies
an attribute. By a subject is here meant anything
which possesses attributes.2
Thus "John" and "whiteness" denote, while "white" con¬
notes, for it denotes all white things, and implies
the attribute of whiteness as well. As regards proper
names in general, "they are not connotative: they denote
the individuals who are called by them; but they do not
indicate or imply any attributes as belonging to those
3
individuals." What is the nature of denotation? Mill
says, "Proper names are attached to the objects themselves.
. . ." " And since the meanings of terms are found only
in what they connote, .i.e., in the attributes they imply,
and proper names connote nothing, "these have, strictly
. s
speaking, no signification.They merely denote, and
■'"I am using "demonstrative" loosely to refer to
all expressions of an "egocentric" or "token-reflexive"
type, including not only "this", "that", "those", etc.,
but also "me", "now", "there", etc.
bringing unigueness into judgements."''
%Iill, A System of Logic, p„ 19.
^Mill, op. cit., p. 20.
%lill, op. cit., p. 20. Underlines added.
21.
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Mill takes the idea of their being "attached" quite seri¬
ously: he recounts the tale of the robber who puts a
chalk nark on a house with booty, but is foiled when
someone narks all the houses similarly, thus obliterating
the difference.
"When we impose a proper name, we perform an opera¬
tion in some degree analogous to what the robber
intended in chalking the house. We put a mark,
not indeed upon the object itself, but, so to
speak, upon the idea of the object. A proper name
is but an unmeaning mark which we connect in our
minds with the idea of the object, in order that
whenever the mark meets our eyes or occurs to our
thoughts, we may think of that individual object.
Hot being attached to the thing itself, it does
not, like the chalk, enable us to distinguish the
object when we see it; but it enables us to dis¬
tinguish it when it is spoken of, either in the
records of our own experience, or in the discourse
of others; to know that what we find asserted in
any proposition of which it is the subject, is
asserted of the individual thing with which we
were previously acquainted.!
Although Mill earlier said that proper names are
attached to objects, when he considered his analogy, he
saw the absurdity of viewing names as chalk marks, and
quietly slipped in the "idea" of the object. This did
not escape Bradley, who replied: "If there is an idea
conveyed by the name, whenever it is used, then it surely
means something, or, in the language which pleases you,
p
it must be 'connotative®." For after all, a mark is a
sign, and
a sign can not possibly be destitute of meaning.
Originally imposed as an arbitrary nark, that very
*4lill, op. cit., p. 22.
2PL, p. 59.
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process, which makes it a sign and associates it
firmly with the thing it signifies, must associate
with it also some qualities and characters of that
which it stands for. If it did not to some extent
get to moan the thing, it never could get to stand
for it at all.-"-
Bradley's point rests upon his theory of signs which
I examined in chapter I, and found superfluous. This,
however, does not vitiate his objection to Mill. It
could be restated as follows: if a word enables us to
distinguish an object when it is spoken of, it does this
by virtue of the idea it empresses, i.e., the idea we
"connect in our minds" (as Mill puts it) with the mark,
or word. An idea of an object, as we saw earlier, is a
set of qualities and relations which is part of the
qualities and relations that constitute the content of
the object. It is those qualities and relations, which
are the idea of the thing, that are connected with the
word. But what is this connection, if not the "implica¬
tion of attributes" with which Mill characterizes conno¬
tation? Such a word, which stands for some thing, is a
proper name; it has meaning in the sense that it implies
certain attributes of the thing (or, is connected with
the idea of the thing), without which we could not know
what it names. "What connection, I would ask, would be
left between the bare name and the thing it stands for,
if every one of these ideas were removed? . . . You may
XPL, p. 60,
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have no idea what 'William® connotes, but if so you can
hardly know what it stands for."
In the first of these last two remarks Bradley puts
liis finger on the point at which Mill's analogy breaks
down. We can understand the connection between a chalk
mark and a house (particles of one adhere to particles
of the other), but how is a name, a word--which is not
identical with any of its occurrences—hooked up with
an object? Are names actually labels? Surely not;
neither are names concrete iteras, nor usually are their
concrete instances physically attached to what they name,
which is the point of labels. Any plausible account of
the connection between a name and what it names will be
on account similar in essentials to the connection of
general, or connotative, terms with what they name. In
particular, they will both involve meanings, in the sense
of an attribute or a complor: of attributes. I take the
second remark above as partially making this point: if
you do not know the meaning of "William", you no more
know who or what is spoken of than if the expression
"the quaigh" were used without your knowing what it
meant. The converse is trickier: one might think that
if I know the object spoken of, I know the meaning of
its proper name, while knowing the objects which are
guaighs does not guarantee that I know the meaning of
"PL, p. 60.
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"quaigh". For (suppose) all existing quaighs are wooden;
then I might think that -word noons "a wooden cup",
whereas it does not. But the difference is specious:
in 3x>th cases the meaning is got by appreciating the
sufficient characteristics, not just one or the other.
Concerning William, I might have noticed particularly
his dirty blond hair, his height of sin feet, and his
melancholy demeanor, and concluded, thus is William.
But other people might be like that as well. We do,
after all, have cases of mistaken identity. There are
difficulties associated with "sufficient" characteris¬
tics, I an quite aware, and I shall return to this later.
But for now, 1 only want to point out the similarity
between singular and general terms regarding their
meaning.
This sirailarity has also been stressed by Geach:
It has often been argued that it cannot be part of
the moaning of a proper name that its bearer should
be a man, because we cannot tell this just by
hearing the name, and because there is nothing to
stop us from giving the same name to a dog or a
mountain. You might as well argue that it cannot
bo part of the meaning of "beetle" that what it is
applied to must Ice an insect, because wo cannot
learn this meaning just from the sound of the word,
and because "beetle" is used for a sort of mallet.
In a given context, the sense of "beetle" does
include: being an insect, and the sense of
"Churchill" does include: being a non.l
Geach immediately goes on to argue that "for any proper
name there is some interpretation of such that we
^Goach, Ilontal Acts, p. 70.
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can truly say 'the continued application of this proper
name requires, as part of the sense of the name, that
it be always applied to the same X' , This is a case
of an oven more general thesis Geach holds, to the
effect that all identity statements are relative to some
o
general term or other. That is, x is never simply the
same as y, but rather is the same something as y (man,
insect, stone, etc,}, Bradley also assumes this thesis
in connection with proper names, and uses it in an
argument very similar to Geach8s; this passage, incident-
ly, brings out quite explicitly the view 1 sketched above,,
And, when we take the proper names of objects
which last and reappear, then the given is trans¬
cended in a still higher sense. The meaning of
such a name is universal, and its use implies a
real universality, an identity which transcends
particular moments. For, unless the person were
recognised as distinct, he would hardly get a name
of his own, and his recognition depends on his
remaining the same throughout change of context.
We could not recognise anything unless it possessed
an attribute, or attributes, which from time to
time we are able to identify. The individual
remains the same amid that change of appearance
which we predicate as its quality. And this implies
that it lias real identity. Its proper name is the
sign of a universal, of an ideal content which
actually is in the real world. 3
This passage also shows why Bradley considered judge¬
ments about individuals not to be "wholly analytic", but
to pass into the synthetic judgement. But is not every
"Geach, op. cit., p. 71.
2
See below, Part ii, oh. I, 2, B, iii, d.
3PL, p. CI.
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analytic judgement about none individual or other? Even
unique momentary events such as flashes "involve a
reference to a series from which [they are] excluded",
rendering judgements about them synthetic. But then
what lias become of our distinctions? With the- exception
of judgements like "The soul is real", the so-called non-
event singular judgements were seen to merge with
synthetic ones; and now analytic judgements seem to do
so as well. This seems to me to call into serious doubt
the value of distinguishing singular judgements into
various types to begin with.
iis a final remark on proper names for this section,
wo can see that Bradley's rejection of Hill's theory of
purely denoting terras, or what is now often called
simply the denotative theory; had the effect of removing
a putative source of particularity from within the
judgement itself. Proper names for Hill are unique
expressions, each one just as particular as the one
particular thing it names, and attached to it by some
mysterious, umbilical, and unexplained (except by faulty
analogy) relation. Such terms, by their very nature,
are supposed to guarantee in principle the exact and
unique place in reality which is said to be so-and-so
in any judgement containing one of them. But just what
the nature of such terms is, that they can in advance
carry this guarantee, is what pusslod Bradley and led
him to reject thorn; he suggested instead that proper
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names function by meaning (or implying) a set of uni¬
versal properties which is sufficient for the identifi¬
cation and re-identification of what is named. And
properties, of course, are general.
A similar motive is at work in Bradley's treatment
of demonstratives—it is quite explicit in his first
mention of them:
Ideas are universal, and, no matter what it is that
we try to say and dimly mean, what we really express
and succeed in asserting, is nothing individual.
For take the analytic judgement of sense. The fact
given us is singular, it is quite unique; but our
terms are all general, and state a truth which may
apply as well to many other cases. In "I have a
toothache" both the I and the toothache are mere
generalities. The actual toothache is not any other
toothache, and the actual I is myself as having this
very toothache. But the truth I assert lias been and
will be true of all other toothaches of my altering
self. Hay "I have a toothache," is as true of
another's toothache as of my own, and may be met
by the assertion, "Hot so, but I have one." It is
in vain that we add to the original assertion
"this," "here," and "now," for they are all uni-
versals. They are symbols whose meaning esctends to
and covers innumerable instances.3-
This is so plain as to hardly need any comment.
But somewhat later on his analysis of demonstratives
takes an odd turn, when he asks himself what kind of
ideas they are, what do they mean, and how are they
different from ordinary ideas. He concentrates on "this"
in particular, claiming afterwards that "what has been
said of 'this' will hold in the main of 'I', 'me', and
1PL, p. 49.
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'mine'."-* Presumably he would include the other typical
demonstratives as well.
He begins by disputing that space and time are
principles of individuation; merely adding a date and
location will not "confer uniqueness upon any event."""
Within a series (which 1 take to be a set of spatio-
temporal "volumes" for what is experienced, ordered with
respect to time), such a specification confers a relative
uniqueness, but beyond the series, in another part of
space-time not unified with it, a recurrence of the con¬
tent could not be distinguished from the original by
space and time. Even construing' the series as an
unbroken whole (extending uniformly to infinity in each
direction perhaps), we cannot escape relativity, for
nothing in such a series can guarantee that there are
no other series fitting the contents associated in our
series. The former situation envisaged here seems to
be what Strawson once described as "raassive reduplication
in the universe". The latter might be called raassive
reduplication of the universe. However, Bradley has in
mind an even more radical criticism than that: he is
not suggesting that our whole common spatio-temporal
universe might be somewhere replicated with another you,




has our own series corresponding each to our own experi¬
ence of the given. How can you, he asks,
determine or in any way characterize your series,
so as to get its difference from every possible
series within your description? It is idle to
say "this," for "this" does not exclude except in
this sphere, and it i3 idle to say "my", for it is
only in my element that yours and mine collide.
Outside if they are indifferent, and the expres¬
sion "my" will not distinguish one world from the
other.
Where then do we find uniqueness?
It is not by its quality as a temporal event or
phenomenon of space, that the given is unique. It
is unique, not because it has a certain character,
but because it is given. It is .by the reference
of our series to the real, as it appears directly
within the point of contact, or indirectly in the
element continuous with this point, that these
series become exclusive. We perhaps may be allowed
to express this otherwise by saying, it is only
the "this" which is real, and ideas will suffice,
so far as "thisness," but can never give "this",2
What is unique is what is given to me, and that is
"this"; when we judge of "this" we employ the idea of
"this", for which Bradley has coined the term "thisness".
If "thisness" is part of the content of a fact, how does
"this" stand to its existence? He avoids an unambiguous
answer to this, saying that he simply will not ask how
far "this" holds of reality as opposed to appearance,
o
how "far it is, or is only for me". i suspect that he





is unique", and "there are as many 'this's' as there are
e;q:>erienced series of the given", all of which seem to
issue from the passage above. He later added that "this"
falls neither within existence nor content, for these
are ultimately abstractions from the unified Absolute;
but that only renders its status more obscure,
"Thisness", however, falls within content, for it
is an idea--it is "the general character of every
appearance in space or tine. Thisness, if we like, we
may call particularity".Particularity is of course
a universal; it applies equally to any particular object
or fact. There is, however, a further meaning associ¬
ated with "thisness": "the idea of ay immediate sensible
relation to reality."2 It is an idea of presence which
we can abstract from direct presentation. But although
it remains the same throughout the variety of content,
Bradley regards the idea of presence as different from
ordinary ideas. And this is where his analysis becomes
curious indeed. He says that we call up the idea of
"this", i.e., "thisness" by talcing a given perception
and "attending to the aspect of presence within it."
So far so good. But then he says that if we try to





the idea "horse", we are stopped, "for any judgement so
made we discover must he false. The reason for this
is that "thisnees" does not mean merely particularity
and presence, but means on each occasion of its use the
particular particularity and uniqueness of that particu¬
lar fact which is given.
The presented instance of reality is unique. By
discrimination we are able to fix that uniqueness
in the shape of an idea. We thereupon try to make
it the idea of something else. But, for the idea
to be true of something else, that something else
must be present and unique. We have then either
two unique presentations, or one must disappear,
if the first one goes, the idea goes with it. If
the last one goes, there is now no fact for the
idea to be referred to. In either case there can
be no judgement. The idea, we see, is not the
true idea of anything other than its own reality,
it is a sign which, if we judge, can signify
nothing except itself.2
Bradley has argued himself into a peculiar corner:
judgements are made up of ideas, and ideas are general,
but the idea of "this" is particular. He seems to have
reintroduced a Hill-like doctrine for demonstratives,
and to have admitted that there are particular ideas,
i,.e., ideas of one and only one thing or fact, and this
necessarily, not just coincidentally. He then extricates
himself with the rather lame device of claiming that the
idea of "this" is hardly an idea at all—so much so that
it cannot ever be used as an idea in judgements (this




'idea' of "existence" and "reality" we noticed earlier
in this chapter). Jith one easy stroke generality is
preserved. But although we cannot use "thisness" in
judgements, we do use demonstratives, and we are left
with two incompatible descriptions of them:
(A) The real is inaccessible by way of ideas. In
attempting to become concrete and special, you
only succeed in becoming more abstract and wholly
indefinite. "This" "now" and "mine" are ail uni-
versals. And your helpless iteration, "not this
but this" will not get your expression any nearer
your meaning.^ ... In using "this" we do use an
idea, and that idea is and must be universal; but
what we mean, and fail to express, is our refer¬
ence to the object which is given as unique.2
(B) The idea of "this" would be falsely used,
unless what it marks were actually presented. . . .
What we mean by "this" is the exclusive focus of
presentation which lights up its content, and it
is of that singular content that ue use the idea.
And to treat" that idea as a meaning which could
be true elsewhere, would be to bring into our focus
another content.2
I think we can explain this incompatibility if we
notice that there are two distinct notions of "meaning"
involved here; 1) the meaning of an idea is one or more
universale implied by the idea, which are instantiated
together in certain things, and by virtue of that the
idea applies to those things. 2) The other sense of
meaning is what particular object or fact someone





I say "a horse is in the field" and there are innumerable
horses in many fields, but I mean or have in mind only
that particular horse which I see through the car window
in the field. This second sense is clearly what is
involved in the latter part of (A): you say "this cow"
and mean a certain one, but fail to express that because
your words are equally applicable to other cows. Meaning
in the first sense is also involved, but kept distinct.
The idea of "this" is universal; just as the idea of
"cow", it implies some properties, namely, particularity
and presence. But in (B) these senses of meaning become
confused--the meaning (sense 1) of "thisness" is con¬
flated with the very thing which is present and par¬
ticular, which is meant (sense 2) when "this" is used.
I think it is this confusion evident in (B) which led
Bradley to say that the idea of "this" is itself par¬
ticular, a unique sign for each unique given, and hence
not really an idea, but a plethora of unrelated, exclu¬
sive marks, one for each given or even for parts therein.
Had ho paid sufficient attention to this ambiguity, he
probably would have avoided its trap and its consequen¬
tial absurdity of an idea which is both particular and
not an idea.
By keeping in mind the two senses of meaning we can
unravel this dilemma, and give an account of demonstra¬
tives quite like that for proper names, and within the
spirit of Bradley's analysis. In using either kind of
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of term, we mean (2) to refer exclusively to some par¬
ticular object or fact, yet we fail to do so with our
judgement alone because the meanings (1) of these terms,
like all meanings, are universal (see the conclusion of
chapter I). The meaning (1) of a proper name is usually
sufficiently rich, especially if we are acquainted with
its bearer, to allow us to identify and reidentify and
hence to mean (2) that which it names—the properties
it implies are usually enough to exclude everything but
one thing. The properties implied by demonstratives,
to the contrary, are so general and abstract as to be
applicable to almost anything—"this53, for example,
means (1) "some particular thing present to the senses",
just that and nothing more. Terms so general in meaning
(1) can apply indiscriminately, and hence can be used
on various particular occasions to mean (2) various
particular objects or facts. The main difference
between proper names, general terms, and demonstratives
is the degree of decreasing specificness in their
meanings (1); on the other hand, all are or can be used
to mean (2) particulars. (English requires articles for
such a use of general terms, but some other languages
do not, e.g., Russian.)
We can now see why consideration of tenses and the
occurrence of "this" in analytic judgements are of some
importance.^ We saw that "this55 in a judgement was
"hjee above, pp. 108-111 and p. 116.
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neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for it
to be analytic. But if a judgement is analytic, then
its content is predicated directly of a particular fact
or thing given in present perception. With these quali¬
ties present, "this" could have been part of the judge¬
ment even were it not. Thus if "A cat is on the roof"
is analytic, I could have said "That cat is on the roof
there". That is why all of Bradley's examples of
analytic judgements whose grammatical subject applies
to part of the given reality (type ii.b.) contain
demonstratives.
"This" implies particularity and presence; the
former is appearance in space and time. Present space
and present time are usually indicated by "here" and
"now", which together might be considered an analysis
of sorts of "this". Thus analytic judgements carry
either explicitly or, more usually, implicitly a refer¬
ence to the propositional "now". Moreover, no part of
an analytic judgement can refer to anything outside the
same time reference of the propositional "now"—its
tense schema in Reichenbach's notation must be LIRE or
IfKE. Of course, some time afterwards, the presence of
that judgement is past, and the present time aspect of
"this" is no longer appropriate; "now" has changed to
"before now" or "then", and the tense schema to either
EE-H, E-R-H, or E-RN, or the respective continuous
aspects.
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c) It remains now only to consider what Bradley says
further of singular judgements. So far, singular judge¬
ments are found to be categorical, and abstract or
universal judgements are hypothetical. Existential
statements, as we understand that class of judgements,
are mixed. Some of them are hypothetical, but others
are categorical; indeed, Bradley says that all singular
judgements are existential: they assort the existence
of their subjects (in his special sense of that term).
One thing Bradley seems to have temporarily overlooked
when ho says, "Singular judgements we have already
discussed, and we found that, be they analytic or syn¬
thetic, they all at first sight seem categorical,""'" is
that synthetic judgement depends upon an inference.
Ignoring the difficulties associated with understanding
how such inferences work, we can see at least that since
synthetic judgements are true of reality only through
an inferential connection with the present, they are
therefore only indirectly true, jL.e., they are hypo¬
thetical. For categorical judgements, let us remember,
"content themselves with the analysis of the given, and
predicate of the real nothing but a content that is
directly presented." And synthetic judgements mani¬




by Bradley with the present, and synthetic judgerients
are predicated of reality, but they are so only
mediately, via our sole epistemological "window",
sensation of the present. They are therefore hypo¬
thetical. Remembering this himself, he tries to side¬
step it by saying that a synthetic judgement "becomes
categoric solely by relation to that which is given,
and hence the whole weight of the assertion rests on the
1
analytic judgement." How being related to what is given
makes it categorical, when these latter are directly of
the given, is beyond me. However, this is not too
important, for if the categoricality of synthetic judge¬
ments depends upon that of analytic ones, and the latter
are shown to be not categorical, then whether or not
synthetic judgements are categorical becomes otiose.
And Bradley proceeds to try to show that analytic judge¬
ments are not categorical after all.
There are at least two ways a judgement can be
false: it can go beyond the facts, or fall short of
them. The first way is the one we have assumed from
the beginning; for enampie, if I judge "That is a for"
when what is given contains not a fox, but a clog, I have
judged falsely. But had I said "That is a dog", I still




And it is evident at once that the idea we use can
not possibly e:diaust the full particulars of what
we have before us. A description, we all know, can
not ever reach to a complete account of the manifold
shades, and the sensuous wealth of one entire
moment of direct presentation. As soon as xjo judge,
we are forced to analyse, and forced to distinguish.^
The dog by itself was not given, "it was in the fact and
we have taken it out." In doing so "we have separated,
divided, abridged, dissected, we have mutilated the
given." But if the analytic judgement thus arbitrarily
selects from and thus alters the facts, "how can it any
longer lay claim to truth?"2
3The thesis is clear: analysis is falsification.
Bradlo37- has no real answer to the objection: So what
if all is not said? What was said was there. A judge¬
ment need not say everything to say something true. On
such a reply he merely heaps abuse and accusations of
prejudice, and petulantly threatens to end the discussion
if the thesis is not recognised. His one attempt to
argue the thesis involves his famous rejection of rela¬




Inasmuch as the non-event singular judgement does
not exhaust the full particulars of reality, it is
subject to this criticism also; those non-event singu¬
lar judgements limited by some duration of tine,
which we found difficult to distinguish from synthetic
judgements, are subject to the nest criticism as well,
for although the things they arc about extend through
tine, they do not extend through all time.
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must relate the parts you have distinguished; but then
what relates the relation to the parts—another relation,
and so on ad infinitum. The flaw in this argument--that
relations themselves are on all fours with what they
relate, and therefore require further relating to them—
is so well known that it need not Ixj laboured over here.
The way out of this dilemma, assuming that it is
one, is to render the analytic judgement dependent upon
all that has been left out, in other words, to include
what was omitted as a condition of the truth of the
judgement. Then "S is P" becomes
(1) (z) {Sx . Fx D Fx),
where "Fx" represents everything else about the thing
judged of. Unfortunately, this is no real way out, for
"F" is actually an infinite conjunction of properties,
so that (1) properly is
(2) (z) (Sx . Tx . Ux . Vx . ... D Pre),
which is ill-formed, and that is just another way of
saying that one cannot put an infinite number of condi¬
tions into the antecedent of a conditional--it will
not make sense.
Worse yet, Bradley says that
you can not assume (or I, at least, do not know
your right to assume) that the present exists
independent of the past, and that, taking up one
fragment of the whole extension, you may treat this
part as self-subsistent, as something that owes
nothing to its connection with the rest.-
XPL, p. 99.
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He not only does not acknowledge your right , but holds
tho assumption false. We sax; earlier that reality is
not to bo identified with the present;" but how do we
know that? How do we know merely from inspecting our
little "hole" of tho given,, from perceiving the light
which falls only upon a limited area of the stream, that
there is something lilce a stream? Earlier I quoted
Bradley as saying that space and time Ixjyond tho here
and now are inferred because they "are the appearance
of a reality which for over transcends then . . . ."
But how do we know that? His answer to this in tho
context of his attack on analysis, is rather cryptic:
The continuity of the element, the integrity of
the content, forbids us to say that this illuminated
section by itself is real. The reference of the
content to something other than itself lies deep
within its internal nature.2
Continuity, integrity, and deep internal natures
give mo, for one, little solace. I suspect that he lias
in mind that everything is hooked together in a vast
O
nemus of causal connections,° and that we can, nay, arc
1
Bee above, pp. 79-80.
^PL, p. 90.
O
°I should stress the tentative nature of the sug¬
gestion that these are causal connections. The following
considerations led mo to this: a) the difficulty of
understanding how criteria which are observational in
character (deriving from our inspection of the "illumi¬
nated section") could give rise to a priori connections
of a metaphysical character; b) the fact"that Bradley
descril^es the underlying grounds of hypotheticals as
scientific laws, if they arc not that already; c) the
fact that he sometimes uses metaphors such as " . . .
all in the end hanc;s together ..." (ETE, p. 32G),
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compelled to recognise this merely on the basis of our
successive g-ivens. This being the case, each fact is
conditional upon not only everything else given simul¬
taneously, but upon everything else past and future.
Our expansion of "F" must be doubly infinite, -which is
even more impossible than before. For the expansion of
"F" to be possible, the series of space and time must
have come to an end, which is itself impossible. So
there is no satisfactory way to construe the analytical
judgement by the method of including the conditions for
its truth within it.
"Nothing can really be quite loose from anything else
in the Universe" (ETR, p. 329), each fact "depends" on
a prior fact that "begets" it (PL, p. 100—I have added
all the underlines); and finally, d) the passage itself
from which the last metaphors are taken describes a
"chain" of facts, a word commonly and naturally associ¬
ated with causality. Against these considerations are
the following: a) Bradley frequently describes these
connections in very abstract terms, such as unity
amidst diversity, one and many, sameness and differ¬
ence, and ho often associates the issue that something
always refers to something- other than itself with the
dispute between Pluralism, with its independent, isolated
facts and things, and Monism, with its defense of the
internality of ail relations—and if this external
reference is merely a consequence of the necessary
interaality of relations, it is hard to see how they
must be causal; b) the object of science is hold to be
not "the ascertainment of ultimate truth, . . . [and
its ideas] are not intended to set out the true charac¬
ter of reality." (AR, pp. 250-251), "... science
keeps merely to the sphere of phenomena and the laws of
their occurrence ..." (AR, p. 252); c) causes them¬
selves cannot be real, but only appearances, because they
give rise to a contradiction: causation must be and
cannot be continuous (AR, pp. 46-52); and finally, d) he
attempts at one point to give a straightforward phenomen-
alistic account of why, in immediate experience, we want
to go beyond it. The description is entirely in terms
of feelings of agreement and unison, and the felt absence
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Bradley considers two objections to this conclusion.
The first is that even though the truth of A depends
upon that of 13, when B is true, A is also; both are
true simply, or categorically. This argument depends
upon the following: although the fact which makes A
true could not have existed without the existence of the
fact which makes D true, if the former fact does exist,
it is still fact and A is true of it categorically, even
if the fact of B, upon which it depends, is unknown or
itself dependent upon some further fact. Bradley's
answer is rather extraordinary—he denies that there are
facts. He does this by turning Aristotle's argument
for a first cause on its head, concluding not that there
must be a first fact, but that since a first fact is
something "which could not possibly 3xs real", our chain
of facts, conditioned (causally?) by what goes before,
cannot have any support, or fastening at the end.
And when the end is unsupported, all the rest is
unsupported. . . . [Our judgment] avowedly depends
upon what is not fact, and it is not categorically
true. Hot standing by itself, it hangs from a
supposition.^
Bradley's answer is inconclusive, as Wollheim lias
pointed out in his excellent exposition and criticism
of sensations of disturbance, etc., with no mention of
causal relations—in fact, relations in general produce
only "failure and a sense of defect". (ETR, p. 180)
Therefore, I consider ray claim that those connections
are really causal as tentative, though plausible.
1PL, p. 100.
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1of it. He confusoa connection of facts together in a
series,, with connection of the bits of knowledge about
then. Regarding the former, just why is a first fact
not possible? iind if there is no first fact, is not the
series infinite? If so, we shall never come to a fact
dependent on something outside the series which is not
there. We simply have no end, and so the question of
its support is irrelevant.
If the argument is about our knowlodgo of facts
rather than the facts themselves, it is more plausible,
for of all the facts wo know, some will depend, upon
facts about which we do not know. But for the conclu¬
sion that 'no facts are known' to follow because eventu¬
ally in the series we must cone to facts whose condi¬
tions are unknown, an assumption is required: "in
order to know a fact, it is necessary to know its prior
condition.
She other objection Bradley considers is that the
analytic judgement, while hypothetical, is so only in
the sense of being "subject to the condition of the
rest of the series"; subject to this condition, the
judgement still is an assertion of its content to he
fact, to exist. "his, says Bradley, is tantamount to
"Given something else, then a-b exists" (where "a-b" is
■H/ollheira, F. H, Bradley, pp. 94-104.
o
Wollheim, op. cit., p. 102.
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the analytic judgement in question). That is, it is a
suggestion to translate an existential judgement "P
exists" (all analytic judgements being existential) into
"If anything exists anywhere, then P exists.""'" He
attributes this viow to Drobisch and Herbert, and criti¬
cises it for covertly assuming that something exists,
and hence remaining categorical. His corrected transla¬
tion runs "If everything else exists, then P exists."
We might write these two versions thus:
(3) (3x)(x = A) D (3y)(y = P),
"if something, say A, exists, P exists"; and
(1) (x)(3y)(x = y) D (3s)(s = P),
"if everything exists, P exists" (I have omitted the
"else" from the antecedent, for it plays no role in
Bradley's argument). Bradley then objects that "(x)
(3y)(x = y)" must be false, for there is no such fact
as everything. That presupposes that "the infinite
process [of space and tineJ must have come to an end,
and be roalisod in a finite result. And this cannot
be. . . . it is metaphysically impossible," He recog¬
nises that falsity of the antecedent does not require
that the consequent be false; it does, however, if the
antecedent is the sole condition of the consequent.




the truth of the consequent and falsity of the antecedent,
or "(P D Q) . ~(Q . HP)"; but that is equivalent to
"P 3 Q", and thus Bradley is suggesting that (4) is
really the biconditional
(5) (x)(3y)(x = y) = (3z)(a = P).
He concludes from all this that an analytic judgement
"P exists" is false if categorical, and if hypothetical
in the way suggested here, is equivalent to an expres¬
sion that is false, namely, that everything exists.
The holes in this argument are so numerous as to
be almost painful. First of all, (3) neither asserts
nor assumes the existence of anything, anymore than (one
of his own examples) "If God is just the wicked will be
punished" says that "a just God exists.""*" Secondly,
assuming that (3) is not an adequate translation of
"P exists", what compels us to change it to (4)? Third,
what compels us to change (4) to (5) other than the
fact that (4) will not give Bradley the conclusion he
wants? Fourth, why does "(x)(3y)(x = y)" require space
and time to have come to an end? To advocate this is
to imply that the expressions of universality "all",
"every", "whenever", etc., can apply only to finite
groups. But Bradley has explicitly (and rightly)
rejected the "collective" or finitistic sense of "all"
as not expressing genuine universality. Fifth, if we
accept (5), instead of concluding that since
1PL, p. 89.
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" (x) (3y) (21 = y)" is false, "P exists" is false, why could
we not infer that since "P" is obviously true (just look
there before you.'), clearly everything must exist? Sixth,
there is something odd about a procedure which offers a
more perspicuous translation of an expression, but which
includes the expression itself. Not only is it odd, but
confusing. For example, could I not say that since a
categorical analytic judgement is false, and since "every¬
thing exists" is false then both sides of (4) and (5)
are false, and therefore both (4) and (5)—take your
pick--are true, while what they are translations of, or
definitions of, are false? Even for (3), if nothing
exists, P does not; but then (3) is true while "P
exists" is not. Seventh, if someone seriously suggests
(4) as a translation of "P exists", intending this sug¬
gestion to be an objection to Bradley's thesis that you
cannot get all past and future conditions into the judge¬
ment, Bradley cannot in reply merely trot out his thesis
again, for that is a petitio principii.
We need not pursue this any further. What is clear
enough is that Bradley thinks that analytical judgements
are false, because anything less than the whole truth
in a categorical judgement is not truth at all. The
whole truth in a categorical judgement is not truth at
all. The whole truth, moreover, cannot be expressed in
a categorical judgement merely by the expedient of
plugging into it more content, for such content can
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never be rich enough to correspond to the variety of all
givens, past and future, nor even to the infinite detail
of the present, which is only one of the elements in
the series of givens. What does Bradley then say about
analytic judgements? Should we stop using them? His
recommendation is almost as drastic: the singular
judgement
must cease to predicate its elements of the real,
and must confine itself to asserting their connec¬
tion as adjectives generally, and. apart from par¬
ticular escistence. Instead of meaning by "Here is
a wolf," or "This tree is green," that "wolf" and
"green tree" are real facts, it must affirm the
general connection of wolf with elements of the
environment, and of "green" with "tree." And it
must do this in an abstract sense, without any
reference to the particular fact. In a low and
rudimentary form it thus tends to become a scien¬
tific law. . . .1
Singular judgements are hypothetical in the same
way scientific laws are, and science, he says, "desires
to get a connection of content, to bo able to say, Given
this or that element, and something else universally
holds good." Thus singular judgements have the same
form as universal judgements. Is there any difference?
Suppose I have a "general connection" between "tree" and
"green"; how do I know that I have the judgement "this
tree is green" rather than "every tree is green"? In
both cases presumably I would have "Given the element




it difficult to extract a clear answer from Bradley on
this question. In one respect the difference between
them is a matter of degree: singular judgements are
more "rudimentary" than abstract generalisations, for
they are "immersed in natter". Which means, I think,
that the "latent quality" of which I was so suspicious
in the discussion of universal judgements--the ground
of the consequence said to exert the compulsion con¬
necting the elements of the judgement--is, in the singu¬
lar judgement, much more obscured by irrelevancies. For
example, whereas the ground (I would guess) is explicit
in "the force necessary to accelerate a body is propor¬
tional to its mass and the achieved acceleration," in
"this body putrefies" the fact in reality which compels
it to be true must be ferreted out. It involves not
only not some of this body's properties (that it is
organic), but also external properties (the action of
bacteria), neither of which are indicated by the judge¬
ment itself.
But Bradley also says that a judgement of percep¬
tion
involves a connection of adjectives which is true
without respect to "this" "here" and "now". If
you take it as asserting a synthesis inside that




We are reminded by this that "this tree is green"
contains not just the adjectives "green" and "tree",
but also a demonstrative. But having reached the present
stage in his analysis of singular judgements, Bradley
says no more about demonstratives and their role in
singular judgements than i/hat 1 have just quoted, and
it is difficult to figure out just what he means. Is
he rejecting the possibility of ascribing an ideal con¬
tent to this reality, i.e., to a particular given, or
is he saying that this is how one uses a universal
synthesis to talk about particular things and facts,
i.e., by using a content together with a demonstrative?
Although his handling of "this tree is green" seems to
point to the former, I think it is absurd to suggest
that we have no way of judging about immediately given
particular things, that we cannot ascribe a content,
even though universal, to this reality. Perhaps omis¬
sion of the demonstrative in his explanation of that
example was just an oversight; in the other one, "wolf"
is said to be connected with "elements of the environ¬
ment", and where would those come from if not from
"here"? Analogously, "this tree is green" should con¬
nect not just "green" and "tree", but also "thisness",
and would therefore be different from the corresponding
"all trees are green"--its content would not be ezxpressed
by "if anything is a tree, it is green", but by something
like "if any present particular is a tree, then it is
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green". It is still hypothetical in the sense of:
suppose one thing, another follows, but what is supposed
is severely restricted to only one particular present
thing at a tine; it is (in one sense) more "immersed in
raatter".
Only one further point remains to couplete the pre¬
sentation of Bradley's claim that all judgements are
general. So far Bradley has attempted explicitly to
argue that all judgements are hypothetical, not that
they are general; the reader cannot but have noticed,
especially in these recent pages, that there has been
a tendency to slip from calling judgements hypothetical
to calling them universal, or general. What justifies
that? Clearly, only the thesis that all hypothetical
judgements are universal. Bradley of course holds
this thesis, but his only argument for it is of a rather
weak, inductive character; to this he adds a diagnosis
of the error which cause some to deny it. He lists
several examples of hypotheticals which seem not to be
universal, lout about particular things:
"If God is just the wicked will be punished,!I
"Had I a toothache I should be wretched,"...
"If it is now six o'clock we shall have dinner
in an hour," "If this man has taken that dose,
he will be dead in twenty minutes.
We do not assert in these that God is just, or even
exists, that I have a toothache, etc., but only suppose
1PL, p. 89.
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then. We are asserting hypothetical connections between
propositions, or ideal contents. In none of these cases
do I, or this or that individual thing "pass into the
supposition". You, instead of mo could have said "Had
I a toothache," etc.; so could have anyone else. It
is applicable to a wide variety of situations, and
therefore it is universal. Likewise for the other
examples, and likewise upon reflection for all hypo-
theticals.
The reason why this is sometimes doubted, Bradley
says, is because the true connections of ideas under¬
lying roany judgements are not explicit--the judgements
are ambiguous. The last assertion quoted above, for
example, is completely vague as to whether it follows
because the dose is poison and would kill anyone, or it
would kill only the sore of man ho is (perhaps he is
allergic), or because some special circumstances obtain
(perhaps ho just previously had a maximal dose).
But, because we are not clear what that content is,
and because we know it is to be found in the indi¬
vidual as supposed, we fire, so to speaE, a charge
of shot instead of a bullet, and take the indi¬
vidual a3 the point of reality to which our sup¬
position is to be confined. In this way we give
rise to the erroneous idea that the reality itself
passes into the supposal.1
If we rid ourselves of this error, we see at once that
the real judgement is concerned with nothing but
the individual's qualities, and assorts no more than
•'•PL, p. 90.
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a connection of adjectives. In every case it is
strictly universal as well as hypothetical.~
Thus we can now see the way to Bradley's conclusion:
All judgements, universal, existential, and singular,
are hypothetical, for they assert of reality only through
a mediating inference. Such inferences are connections
of properties of the form "if A, then B", and these
properties are all universal. All hypothetical judge¬





Admittedly, the patness of this conclusion is some¬
what marred by Bradley's summary at the end of chapter
II (PL, p. 106). He says there not only that all judge¬
ments are universal, but concrete, categorical, hypo¬
thetical, individual, and abstract as well. That they
are hypothetical is all right, for that is why they are
universal. They are all categorical, however, "for they
all do affirm about the reality, and assert the existence
of a quality in that." But this is not the moaning of
categorical he began with: we saw that it meant being
predicated directly of the given, and he argued that
reality cannot be identifiedwith the given. So if they
are categorical, they aro so in a sense we have not been
concerned with. Also, what in this sense is categorical
is not the content of the judgement, but an occult
ground which is quite different from the content, yet
which is supposed to be what is "really" asserted. All
judgements aro concrete because they are only true of
the "individual reality which appoars in the sensuous
wealth of presentation." Just what is being claimed
here beyond the observation that true judgements are
true of reality, and reality appears in the given, i
do not know. The latter lias nothing to do with judge¬
ment per se, but is a thesis of Bradley's epistenology,
and the former would be correct no matter how you con¬
strued judgement; so the claim that all judgements aro
concrete seems to me vacuous. All judgements aro
individual because the roality of which they assert is
individual. This follows trivially from the metaphysics
of the Absolute; but unless we grant that everything is
one, it is false to suggest that each judgement is
4. Comments and Criticisms
The thesis that all judgement is general is, I
think, an interesting one. The main objective of this
chapter lias boon to show what Bradley meant Iay it, and
how he arrived at it. Of the criticisms I offered at
various points, some are perhaps not so serious. If,
for example, the distinctions between the types of
singular judgements breaks down, and they all merge into
synthetic judgements (pp. 136-137), then his conclu¬
sion is only more quickly reached, for synthetic judge¬
ments are already hypothetical. Just how they are
hypothetical is another matter, and the inadequacy of
his account of the inference involved in such judgements
cannot be overlooked (pp. 128-130). The inclusion of
time as a property of things prevents their being identi¬
cal, regardless of any other or even otherwise complete
similarity, and hence the only basis for the inference
does not exist. But also, the analogy?- of Hogarth's
pictures or a film projector tends to obscure the fact
that most past events were not ever experienced by me,
and of courso no future ones have been either. So where
individual in the sense of being about one and only one
particular thing or fact, let alone that they are all
about the same thing. Are all judgements abstract?
That merely means that they do not say everything, "for
they disregard context, they leave out the environment
of the sensible complex". That, i should think, beyond
being- conpatible with their all being universal, is a
necessary corollary of it. Therefore universality still
remains after the woeding-out as the principal character
of judgement.
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do the pictures or individual frames come from? The
only thing in experience which corresponds to my being
able to rummage through a set of pictures is my own
memory of past perception, and if some event is beyond
my ken, how can I infer about it as Bradley describes?
Supposing the pictures to the left represent successive
memories of the past (ignoring how I came about those
on the right), and I an interested in some assertion about
a lady in the jrLcture which is next to the centre "real"
one; I follow her "regress" back through the pictures
until I come to one into which she is just entering.
But the event asserted of preceded that. Now what do I
do? The xjhole metaphor collapses. The difficulty lies
I think at the very heart of the notion of synthetic
judgements. In trying to make more clear the difference
between them and analytic judgements, I found it neces¬
sary to emphasise the time-lag between the "now" of the
judgement and when its application to reality could be
ascertained (pp. 111-113). But if I set out from Edinburgh
to London to check someone's assertion "It is now foggy
in Trafalgar Square", I cannot possibly get there fast
enough; for when I arrive, the "now" will have disap¬
peared, and the relevant fact can never be part of my
series--! cannot just peer more intently to inspect the
past. And what sort of series of givens would it be
which would get me from "now" to the perception of a
molecule? The trouble is that Bradley wants it several
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ways: synthetic judgements are about datable events
past, present, and future, yet they are about individuals
which persist through time; they are about things not
now perceived, yet must be connected with such things
through my series of experiences, and hence must have
been or xjill have been experienced—but past and future
events cannot be perceived; however, individuals with
a past and future can be perceived, yet there are no
such individuals—each moment brings a fresh distinction,
and with it, loss of identity. It could hardly be
expected that a coherent idea of the synthetic judgement
could be extracted from all that.
Another serious matter is the objection against
treating "some" judgements as really hypothetical. lie
does not make the elementary mistalee of saying that "some
tr-ee is green" is simply "there is something, which, if
it is a tree, then it is green", or
(1) (3x)(Tx D Gx).
That is true if anything is not a tree, or if anything
is green, or in other words, it is true only unless
everything is a tree and nothing is green. And since
this page is not a tree, there is a green tree, which
is absurd.
Bradley erred in a subtler way—he converted (1)
into a universal generalisation, and then tried to retain
the force of the original by adding "certain unspecified
conditions" to the antecedent. We sow earlier the
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technical difficulties of this (pp. 100-6), but what I
wish to question here is the very move itself, which
consists in telling us that we do not actually mean
what we say, but rather we mean something we had not
even suspected—we meant (confusedly) to assert some
general scientific principle which expresses the natural
regularity (or necessary connection, to 3ee more strictly
faithful to Bradley) of which the present item being
judged alxmt is a case, complicated also with irrele-
vancies. This is the same maneuver which we found in
his attempt to describe the connection with reality of
universal judgements themselves. What we really were
asserting was some other judgement or judgements which
described principles working in nature and which had as
one of their consequences the judgement we mistakenly
thought we were uttering. Who then knows what he says?
Only scientists, and they only part of the time, and
no one before, say, Galileo? Bradley's answer is even
harsher: there is always an unknown element at the
1
basis of our universal syntheses. To some extent then,
no one ever knows what he is saying. Any argument with
this conclusion constitutes its own refutation, in my
opinion, as a reductio ad absurdum.
If we do not accept that the distinction between
analytic and synthetic judgements cannot 3se made out,
then certain other criticisms are relevant; the
"h?L, p. 112n45.
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preceding absurd conclusion, for example, holds for
analytic judgements as -yell (pp. 162-163)—they are so
"immersed in matter" that they are ambiguous: ye can¬
not tell uhat are the correct underlying causes yhich
make what we say be the case or not, and so ye do not
really know what ye are asserting.
iiore trivial, perhaps, is the doubt I cast on
Bradley's classification of the kinds of analytic judge¬
ment (pp. 113-116); it is not very intrinsic to his over¬
all argument for the generality of the judgement. But
what is of major consequence for this argument is the
doctrine of the falsification of analysis. And this,
as we sat/, was given meagre defense (pp. 149-150). The
inadequacy of Bradley's objections to the two replies
he considers (which attempt (1) to maintain that a
judgement about a fact is still a3x>ut it even if the
fact is dependent upon another, and (2) to insert the
conditions for an analytic judgement's truth into the
antecedent of a conditional having the judgement as a
consequence—pp. 150-157) pales into insignificance next
to the inadequacy of his support for rejecting analysis
itself. The scope of the thesis that analysis is
1 do not regard this as a special case of Bradley's
attack on Pluralism, as does Wollheim, op. cit., ch. 3,
esp. pp. 93-94. The principal argument against
Pluralism which Wollheim cites is Bradley's theory of
internal relations; but one might accept that and still
argue that "There is a wolf" can be true even though its
myriad properties and relations wore not mentioned.
The issues are independent.
1G9
falsification is much broader than analytic judgements
alone, a fact which even Bradley did not seen to notice;
it would apply to all judgements, including universal
ones. "If anything is a man, then it is mortal" would
be false for neglecting that it also was born, that it
inhabits Earth, that it has a heart, etc. Even the
"occult ground" which is really asserted, would cut,
divide, and mutilate. Science, after all, as Bradley
himself emphasizes, abstracts the most; it invariably
selects only a few of the properties and relations of
things as being relevant for the explanation of those
forms of behavior of things in the world which interest
it. iind this seems to me to be the strongest argument
against the falsity of analysis. It was one of the
major achievements of intellectual progress when men
discovered that knowledge of nature advanced not in the
attempt to record everything, creating a cluttered
replica of reality, but in the drawing of distinctions
and discovering which of these is most relevant. It
was not, for example, particularly interesting to know
that a feather and a stone were dropped, and they fell;
but it was of the utmost moment to learn that their rate
of descent depended only upon their mass (after cor¬
recting for the friction of air), and not upon their
shape, size, who dropped them, their material, or what
have you. It was difficult and laborious even to
realize the importance of looking- for relevant distinc-
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lions, let alone to set about finding them, as is well
attested by the amount of inconsequential curios and
worthless freaks amassed in a museum of the early Royal
1
Society. To say that any judgement leaves out some¬
thing is one thing, and a commonplace; but it is quite
another to say that it is thereby false, implying that
the activity -which characteristically produces the
soundest empirical truths is from top to bottom
methodologically wrong and creates nothing but lies.
If this foe so, then the requirements for truth are so
stringent as to be never fulfilled, and then 1 am
afraid I have no idea what is meant by the word, used
in this way. Hot that X am so confident that I know
what it ordinarily means in any precise way, but I con
at least apply it with confidence to some judgements,
and hence I have some understanding of it.
Bradley is of course aware that his position
requires that ho cannot say that any judgement is true,
but when this conclusion is finally made explicit, it
is tempered with the claim that no judgement is false
either--"it will be a question of amount, and will be
2
a matter of more or less." However, accepting a doc¬
trine of degrees of truth presents Bradley with a
dilemma: if it is true, then judgements cannot be false
Veyerabend, "Problems of Empiricism", Boyond the
Edge of Certainty, v. 2, (ed. Colodny), pp. 156-157.
2AR, p. 321.
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by analysis and omission, but only less true than
others. But if analytic judgements are not false, they
need not be construed as non-categorical, and the con¬
clusion that all judgements are general is thwarted.
In my opinion this results anyway, for the falsification
of analysis is no more plausible than degrees of truth
is understandable.
A further serious and fundamental problem for
Bradley is one barely hinted at above (pp. 73-79). It
concerns the basic epistemology which he introduces at
the beginning. The main thrust of his second chapter was
to discover which judgements are categorical and which
hypothetical—with what results we are now familiar; the
reason he was so concerned with this is that he thought
that we can only know directly those things which we
experience in some "now", as it were, right before our
eyes. There are at least two kinds of objection to
this, one being that we know intuitively, i.e., directly,
quite a few things which are not ever, or not now being
experienced, such as various items from our memory, or
that, for example, 2+2=4, that artifacts are made,
and that ~(P . ~P). The a priori examples may be said
to depend upon inferences deriving from conventions, and
these arc learned only through contacts with reality
via immediate experience. That no doubt is true, but
as an objection it confuses the source of our first
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acquaintance with examples of the truths—no one knows
that ~(P . ~P) because of several cases he lias observed.
The other ©sample—memory--Bradley duly insists is
dependent upon inference; "we are aware of and think of
the past as past always by an ideal construction from
the present, and the immediate presentation of the past
as such would be a gratuitous miracle." What 1 can
understand of his argument for this seems to require an
inference procedure similar to that used in synthetic
judgements--in fact it seems that he is simply reducing
memory judgements to synthetic ones. If so, his account
is subject to all of their difficulties. Regardless of
that, remembering is something which I do in some
present, just as much as perceiving; but this does not
make plausible the claim that my past experience 1 am
now remembering must be connected inferentially with my
present perceptual experience. The paradigm Bradley uses
at one point is my present perception of a stone at my
feet, and my memory of it having just been thrown there;
the inference moves in the series starting with the
stone in someone's hand, through the various positions
p
in its flight, and finally ending at my feet. But most
memories are not oven remotely like that, and have




We simply remember earlier experiences directly and
independently of what we are not? experiencing. It would
indeed be miraculous if by this were meant that we
directly experience again the past experience itself;
but no one who advocates the immediacy of memory means
that.
If these objections are allowed any force, then
the distinction between categorical and hypothetical--
at least as Bradley draws it, between direct and indirect
application of a content to reality—breaks down. For
first of all there is no independent reality of which wo
can be directly aware, and secondly, all present aware¬
ness is in some sense affected by "inferences". This,
then, casts doubt both upon the whole project of trying
to find categorical judgements, and upon the notion of
truth that underlay and impelled it.
This notion of truth is independently dubious
anyway: even if wo grant that all knowledge ultimately
must depend on or be derived from contact with reality
through present perception, why should we so canalise
truth? Why, that is, should we think that the truth of
a judgement must depend on some immediate, direct con¬
tact with reality through present perception? This
question is meant to suggest that the truth or falsity
of a judgement con bo for cex-iain purposes detached
from the issue of how that truth or falsity is attained
or verified. With regard to universal judgements in
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particular this distinction is necessarsr for even getting
logic off the gound, for logic--whatever else it nay be—
is the examination of possible truth combinations, and
the truth of empirical universal judgements is always
indeterminate if we require that each of their infinitely
many cases be verified through having been experienced.
If their truth is indeterminate, how can we discover
their consequences? The point is that truth can be
ascribed to a judgement, and the consequences of com¬
bining it with other judgements studied, without any
consideration of how that judgement is connected with
this or any other "now". This point is ignored by
Bradley because of an ambiguity in his use of "cate¬
gorical assertion of the real". In the main sense,
which I have used in this chapter, it means a direct
connection with realitj^ through the present; it is
particularly the element of "now" which is one of the
principal things distinguishing the categorical from
the hypothetical judgements. But Bradley also says that
the "latent quality" which is the ground of a hypotheti¬
cal judgement asserts of the real, and is therefore
categorical (p. 163 n. 2). But what this means is
left unsaid. These latent qualities are, after all,
highly abstract and hypothetical (they are scientific
laws), and I simply cannot imagine what possible analogy
there might be between their relationship to the world
and the relationship "That is a dog" has to the world,
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which would justify describing both as categorical, i.e.,
true directly of the present given. Therefore I do not
know what it means to say that universal judgements are
finally categorical, nor how saying that explains how
they are true in the sense of "true" required by Bradley.
But we have to be able to talk of their truth and falsity,
and so we must dissociate the notion of truth from the
epistemology of immediate given experience.
There are further xoatters which could be taken up--
e.g., the artificiality of trying to show all judgements
to be hypothetical in order to conclude that they are
all general, the weakness of Bradley's argument that all
hypothetical judgments are general, etc.--but what has
already been said in this section should be sufficient
to make us deeply suspicious of this main conclusion,
that all judgements are general. However, I think that
would be a mistake, for the claim is an interesting one
independently of all the errors leading up to it. If
we disregard the categorical/hypothetical distinction,
l
and all the blind alleys and xoitfalls issuing from it,
That is not to say that the distinction cannot be
made at all. We can say that simple propositions (those
containing no truth-functional connectives) are cate¬
gorical, and complex ones whose dominant connector (the
one with the largest scope) is "D" are hypothetical.
What about the other connectives: ".", "v", and
"="? Since "D" and are sufficient for defining the
other fifteen two-place connectives, we might be tempted
to say that any connective, when converted into an
expression with only "D" ana is categorical if !U,!I
dominates, and hypothetical if "D" does. But this will
not work, for "~P" is equivalent to "P>-P", and "p D Q"
is equivalent to !U™(P D Q)". Thus any expression, say
176
we can extract from Bradley an implicit, but more per¬
suasive and simple picture. It is, in fact, the picture
given at the end of the first section of this chapter:
a judgement consists of a complex of ideas; ideas are
universal--they express properties and relations found
in and amongst things. Since they can apply to a variety
"P . Q", can be expressed categorically. "~(P D ~Q)n,
or hypothetically, "(P D ~Q) D ~(P D ~Q;", at will.
Apart from simple propositions, whether a proposition
is hypothetical or categorical cannot be stated abso¬
lutely, for it can always be expressed both with "3"
dominating, or with it not. The notion of hypothetical
must therefore apply to propositional forms, not to
propositions, and must be restricted to those particular
forms of a proposition which contain a dominate "D".
Thus propositions cannot be called hypothetical, but
only certain ways of analysing them, and not other ways.
But what use such a distinction might lee is far from
obvious. One might use it to say that all universal
judgements are hypothetical, as Bradley did, and as
Russell--who acknowledged that he was following Bradley's
lead (Wollheim, op. cit.. p. 50n; Russell, "The Philo¬
sophy of Logical Atomism", Logic and Knowledge. p. 237)—
also did. This claim is supposedly enshrined in the
analysis of "All F is G" as "(x)(Fx D Gx)"; but this is
equivalent to the non-hypotheticals "(xJ^CFx D Gx)" and
n(x)~(Fx . ~Gx)", which are equally analyses of the
universal judgement. So what is the point in calling it
hypothetical? This argument might be weakened somewhat
by saying that a propositional form is hypothetical only
(1) if it is the form "P D Q", or (2) if it is that form
dominated only by any number of iterated double negrations.
But to deal with the last counterexample, one would have
to add: or (3) if it can be converted truth-functionally
so that (1) or (2) applies. And this third condition
makes all forms hypothetical in view of the fact that
any form can be translated into another which contains
no connectives other than "D" and which is dominated
by one or the other, and which, if dominated by can
be translated into one dominated by "D" from the equiva¬
lence of !KP" and "P D ~P". So I still do not see the
utility of the distinction, and concur with the general
tendency to abandon it in modern logic.
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of cases,, they are general. There is nothing in words,
or the ideas they are connected with, which can cause
them to fasten on to one particular unique thing in
the world. Vie do, of course, talk about particular
things, and use words and their ideas to do so. But no
combination of ideas can on its o\m succeed in doing
this absolutely, i.e., can necessarily be applied only
once or to only one object.
The immediate rejoinder to this is that there is
one class of terms whose function is just what Bradley
denies of any term: they are singular terms, so called
because they pick out one and only one thing in the
world. Ryle affords a convenient illustration of this
position (although in this context he is arguing not
that some words denote one thing, which he accepts, but
that not all words do that):
First, it is obvious that the vast majority of
words are unlike the words 'Fido' and 'London1 in
this respect, that they are general. 'Fido' stands
for a particular dog, but the noun 'dog' covers
this dog Fido, and all other dogs past, present and
future, dogs in novels, dogs in breeders' plans
for the future, and so on indefinitely.i
A few pages later he says.
There is not one basic mould, such as the 'Fido'-
Fido mould, into which all significant expressions
are to he forced. . . . The notion of denotation,
so far from providing the final explanation of the
notion of meaning, turns out itself to be just one
special branch or twig on the tree of significa¬
tion. 2
•*-Ryle, "The Theory of Meaning", Philosophy and
Ordinary Language (ed. Caton), p. 139.
2
Ryle, ibid., p. 145.
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But denotation is still included, as explaining proper
names; its diminished stature derives from its preten¬
tions among some followers of Mill (who ignored his
"connotation") to account first for the meanings of
all words, then merely for singular terms, and finally,
after Russell's theory of descriptions, to be demoted
to only proper names. Bradley was never misled about
Hill as Ryle argues some philosophers were; but he did
recognise that the doctrine of pure denotation for
proper names was a threat to the full generality of
judgements, and attacked it correspondingly. He also,
interestingly enough, anticipated the similar account
of demonstratives which Russell was later to advocate
for a while, and rejected it as well, although not
without the curious and uncharacteristic twist we
noticed above (pp. 141-145).
Bradley's attack on purely denotative proper names
and demonstratives furnishes evidence that he was at
least sometimes thinking of the generality of judgements
along the lines I have just sketched--for if he was not,
it is difficult to understand why he bothered himself
particularly about them. A hypothetical containing a
word which picks out some one thing in the world is
none the less hypothetical for all that. Suppose, for
example, that "Ernest" denotes one and only one thing;
then my saying "If Earnest lias a moustache, his kisses
must tickle the ladies" does not commit mo to the
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categoricals "Ernest has a moustache", "Ernest kisses
the ladies", etc. He may well, for anything I have said,
bo clean shaven. However, it might be said that if
"Ernest" does denote, the existence of Ernest is cate¬
gorically presupposed (unlike unicorns in "If anything
is a unicorn, it has a horn"), and this threatens the
pure hypothetical nature of my judgement. I shall take
up these matters connected with existence later, but
for the moment I can see no grounds for supposing that
such an argument had ever occurred to Bradley. There¬
fore, if the generality of judgements results merely
from their being hypothetical, and not also from the
basic fact that, as complexes of ideas, they are
already general, then I cannot see why he was worried
about proper names and demonstratives at all.
But, of course, he did concern himself about them,
and the account he gives of them (once we straighten out
the ambiguity over the moaning of a demonstrative, and
the thing intended) is I think substantially correct.
In Part II I shall look at them more closely, along with
unique descriptions (those with the definite article,
or some other device implying uniqueness), and shall
examine what various logicians since Bradley have said
and what their notational conventions embody with regard
to singular teres. For as Bradley correctly realised,
what we say about singular terms is finally the crux for
the claim that judgements are general. This can easily
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bo seen by considering what lias become the fairly
standard representation of propositional form in modern
predicate logic: "Fa". The upper case letter is a
predicate, and the lower case letter is an individual
or singular term. The predicate is general—it can be
considered to be an expression for a more or less com¬
plex: property, depending upon the needs of the contest;
but however complex: or simple it is, it is a general
term because the property it expresses is or can be
found in many things. The lower case letter is supposed
to name one thing. The form "Fa" embodies, among other
things, the fact that these two types are mutually
exclusive categories, which together exhaust the proposi¬
tion. If we locate the singular term in a proposition
and remove it, what is left is the predicate, a general
term. Hence the singular term is the only non-general
element, the only obstacle to full generality.
Immediate difficulties arise for such a simple
account, however: what if there are more than one
singular term, what if there is a connective such as
"or", and what if thoro are no singular terms, but
instead words like "some", "any", etc.? This last
situation brings in the theory of quantification, with
attendant problems about vax-ioblos, existence, reference,
and others. I shall now turn to the treatment of these
topics by certain modern logicians, keeping in view all
the while Bradley's thesis that all judgement is general.
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PART II. GENERALITY AMD SINGULAR TERMS
CHAPTER I. PROPER NAMES
Russell's Logically Proper Names
Given the fact that we often use words to pick out
particular things in the world, there are two questions
I wish to ask about the expressions whose function it is
to do this: how do they (i.e., singular terms) work,
or in other words, what is the nature of the relationship
of reference which they have to things, and does the
relationship of reference itself require the existence
of what is purportedly being referred to? That a singu¬
lar term picks out a unique particular thing, and the
same thing on each occasion of its use, and also that
the referring relation it has to the thing is such that
it requires that the thing actually exist, are necessary
and together sufficient conditions for a term being non-
general. Thus the question of the generality of proposi¬
tions revolves around the question as to whether there
are such terras.
Historically, an unambiguous, if not exactly clear
answer was given by Mill as to the existence and nature
of singular terms. I shall, hoxi;ever, concern myself
raainly with Russell, since I have already had some occa¬
sion to discuss Hill, and Russell's early views represent
to some extent a refinement of Mill's. Also, Russell
was quite directly connected with the revolt against
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Bradley's idealism, and I think that this perspective
is instructive with regard to the emergent doctrine of
logically proper names. This revolt took many forms,
but what is of most interest for sing-ular terms is the
conception of the propositions in which they are used.
Russell Xi?anted to get as much reality as he could into
philosophy, and in his haste to cast ideas out of the
proposition, he brought in reality literally--among the
constituents of a proposition are things themselves.
Consequently, he is unable to distinguish facts from
propositions, except under extreme duress. The confu¬
sion occurs in many places; a very early example can be
seen in the following passage from Principles of
Mathematics:
A proper name, when it occurs in a proposition, is
always, at least according to one of the possible
ways of analysis (where there are several), the
subject that the proposition or some subordinate
constituent proposition is about, and not what is
said about the subject .... tfhatever may be an
object of thought, or may occur in any true or
false proposition, or can be counted as one. I call
a term .... Every term, to begin with, is a
logical subject .... Among terms, it is possible
to distinguish two kinds, which I shall call
respectively things and concepts. The former are
the terms indicated by proper names, the latter
those indicated by all other words.^
Thus proper names occur in propositions as their
subjects, but on the other hand, things--which are
"indicated" by proper names--are the subjects of proposi¬
tions and occur in them. That this desire to get things
1
Russell, Princi'ples of ilathematics. pp. 43-44.
103
into propositions is a reaction to Bradley is a point
Russell himself explicitly makes only a few pages later,
where he rejects a view he attributes to Bradley, which
says that words stand for ideas having meaning. "Uords".
he says,
all have meaning, in the simple sense that they
arc symbols which stand for something other than
themselves. But a proposition, unless it happens
to be linguistic, does not itself contain words:
it contains the entities indicated by the words.1
Unfortunately, he nowhere says what the difference
between a proposition and a linguistic proposition is,
nor how they are related. It is therefore doubtful that
this qualification was meant to imply a distinction of
any importance, and we are still left wondering how
both words (e.g., proper names) and things can be parts
or constituents of propositions.
Although Russell was later to abandon the terrai-
nology of thine and concept, he did not give up the
distinction itself, nor the tendency to conflate words
and objects in the proposition. Five years after the
passages above he wrote in "On Denoting",
The [denoting] phrase per se has no meaning,
because in any proposition in which it occurs the
proposition, fully expressed, does not contain the
phrase, which has been broken up.3
1lbid., p. 47.
o
Russell, "On the Relations of Particulars and
Universals", Logic and Knowledge, p. 107n.
^Russell, "On Denoting", Logic and Knowledge, p. 51.
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One interesting result of the above theory of
denoting is this: when there is anything with
which we do not have immediate acquaintance, but
only definition by denoting phrases, then the
propositions in which this thing is introduced by
means of a denoting phrase do not really contain
this thing as a constituent, but contain instead
the constituents expressed by the several words
of the denoting phrase.1
There is here an uneasy distinction between words
and the things they express, but both are contained in
or occur as constituents in propositions. Again, from
Principia Ilathematica.
we will use such letters as a, b, c, x, y, s, w,
to denote objects which are neither propositions
nor functions. Such objects we shall call indi¬
viduals . Such objects will be constituents of
propositions or functions, and will be genuine con¬
stituents, in the sense that they do not disappear
on analysis, as (for example) classes do, or phrases
of the form "the so-and-so^p
Perhaps phrases of the form "the so-and-so" are
not genuine constituents of propositions; but that would
not be because they are phrases, but for other reasons
(the possibility that such phrases might not denote any¬
thing) . Phrases of any Icind are not analysed away into
objects, but only into other phrases, and if analysis
leads from pseudo-constituents to genuine constituents,
the phrases got by analysis from definite descriptions
will be genuine constituents. So practically in one
breath we again have both words and objects in proposi¬
tions .
"^Ibid., pp. 55-56.
2Whitehead and Russell, Principia liatheaatica. p. 51.
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I hope that these passages (which could be multi¬
plied) suffice to show that this confusion of facts and
propositions was endemic to Russell's way of thinking,
and not just a minor slip. When he began to be influ¬
enced by Wittgenstein, whose apparatus of objects, facts,
names, and propositions forced a sharp distinction,
Russell did separate facts and propositions. In the
first lecture of "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism",
called "Facts and Propositions", he says,
When I speak of a fact ... I mean the kind of
thing that makes a proposition true or false.l
"Facts", he says a few paragraphs later,
which are the sort of things that you express by
a sentence, . . . just as much as particular
chairs and tables, are part of the real world.2
He has shifted from "propositions" to "sentences", and
he uses "statements" just as readily in the sane pages.
The reason for this is that he makes no important dis¬
tinction between them:
A proposition, one may say, is a sentence in the
indicative, a sentence asserting something, not
cjuestioning, or commanding, or wishing. 3
A sentence or projxjsition "expresses" a fact because it
is a symbol, and its parts, i.e., words, are symbols
too (although not all in the same way).
"'"Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism",




When I speak of a symbol I simply moan something
that 'moans' something else. . . . As to what ono
moans by 'moaning* I mil give a few illustrations.
For instance, tho word 'Socrates', you will say,
means a certain man; the word 'mortal' means a
certain quality; and tho sentence 'Socrates is
mortal' means a certain fact.1
But later on even in these lectures his earlier
tendency to run propositions and facts together reasserts
itself, and he forgets the distinctions I have just
quoted. By the fifth lecture, for example, ho can say.
If you want a different definition of the form of
a proposition, you might be inclined to define it
as a class of all those propositions that you can
obtain from a given ono by substituting other con¬
stituents for ono or more of the constituents the
proposition contains. E.g., in 'Socrates loves
Plato', you can substitute somebody else for
Socrates, somebody else for Plato, and some other
verb for 'loves'.2
Thus the constituents of that particular proposition are
two people and a verb. On the next page 'Socrates', not
Socrates, has returned as a constituent of the proposi¬
tion, but somewhat later he says,
You cannot have a constituent of a proposition
which is nothing at all. Every constituent lias
got to be there as one of the things in the world,
and therefore if Romulus himself entered into the
propositions that he existed or that ho did not
exist, both these propositions could not only not
be true, but could not be even significant, unless
he existed.3
In yet a different context we meet something familiar:
So if I say 'Scott is Sir Walter', using these two
names as names, neither 'Scott' nor 'Sir Walter'
1lbid., p. 186.
^Ibid., p. 238.
°Lbid., p. 242 .
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occurs in what I an assorting, but only the person
who has those nanes, and thus what I an assorting
is a pure tautology.1
She point ho is making in this last passage is the
now familiar one about the need to distinguish use and
mention; but the way ho puts it requires that the objects
our propositions aro about occur in the proposition.
And the cat is really out of the bag when he says that
unicorns cannot bo constituents of propositions,
because the constituents of propositions, of course,
aro the same as the constituents of the corres¬
ponding facts. . . .2
True, he still makes a show of propositions being
different from but corresponding to facts, but if they
have erectly the same elements, wherein lies the differ¬
ence? I shall not draw out the absurdity of ray uttering
a proposition which contains (is made up of) people,
relations, and what-not, for the falsity of such a view
seems to me patent.
But it is this view, seldom quite so explicit as in
the last quotation, which caused Russell to identify the
meaning of a name with what it stands for. He even
accepted for a while the account he attributes to
Heinong, which would have all expressions meaning what
they name, even such expressions as '3', 'the golden




■was able to free himself of this with his theory of
definite descriptions; but the effect of this theory was
not the abandonment of the idea of words meaning what
they stand for. Rather it eliminated awkward cases which
seemed to contradict it by substituting new, less naive
propositions in which the offending expressions do not
occur. Those which do remain however, still do mean
what they stand for (mostly properties, in fact). I
shall defer discussion of descriptions until later, and
confine myself to names here. I shall also ignore com¬
pletely the contention that words other than names also
mean what they stand for, that a common noun, say, means
a property or a concept. For what I am interested in
is particularity, and however we understand naming,
properties are general.
Russell was aware that most ordinary names cannot
be treated as simply "standing for" an object, and his
account of them requires his theory of definite descrip¬
tions; so that too will be postponed. But what lead
Russell to this conclusion was a particular epistemo-
logical assumption, rather like Bradley's emphasis on
immediate experience, which stipulated that wo could
only know the meaning of a proper name if we were
directly acquainted with what it names. ^ Proper names
which satisfy this requirement he called logically proper
"Ibid., pp. 56, 130, 194, 200-202; Problems of
Philosbplvy', p. 58.
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names. It is on this category of names that I wish to
concentrate, for on Russell's account, it is only through
such names that any proposition, once if has been ana¬
lysed, can be about a particular item in the world.
How if a fact, say that Socrates is mortal, con¬
sists of the person Socrates and a property of being
mortal which belongs to him, and if the proposition
'Socrates is mortal' lias Socrates the person as a con¬
stituent, and if I am now directly acquainted with the
said Socrates, what could be more natural than to
identify that very person Socrates standing in front of
me, with the element in my proposition which is a thing
{.i.e., which is not a property)? In other words,
'Socrates' is Socrates. Of course, Russell never made
3uch an extreme claim, even though he did say both that
'Socrates' and that Socrates is one of the two constitu¬
ents of that proposition. For when he was thinking
about names—which clearly are words--as opposed to
propositions, he was usually quite conscious of the
distinction between words and things. So he said the
next best thing: 'Socrates' means Socrates. It means
Socrates by simply standing for Socrates. I am sug¬
gesting that this account arose out of a combination of
confusing words in a proposition with things in the fact
which makes it true or false, together with the epistemo-
logical requirement of the compresenco of the name used
and one's experience (or memory of that experience) of
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the thing named. The final result is got be retreating
from full identification ('is') to a fully determinate
relation ('is a xjord for'}, probably conceived of as
somewhat analogous to 'stands on', in the sense that a
determinate fixed (in this case spatial) relationship
is implied as holding between two existing things. The
way is clear for the metaphor 'label' which sometimes
crops up in explanations of proper names similar to
Russell's, In his own words,
The only kind of word that is theoretically
capable of standing for a particular is a proper
name. . . . Proper names - words for particu¬
lars . Df. 1
When you are given a logically proper name, you are
given, as it were, the very object itself, in your propo¬
sition and right before your eyes (or in your mind if
you are remembering): that is what your name means and
stands for. I shall not dispute this account of proper
names for the moment, but rather try to determine more
exactly what is meant by it. Russell never tried to do
this, perhaps because he thought that the idea of naming
was obvious, or that it was primitive. He did not, for
example, say like Ilill that a name is a mark; to see that
logically proper names are like Hill's purely denoting
names requires a bit of looking.
First of all, we have seen enough to suggest that
a logically proper name and a thing are connected by a
"Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism",
op■ cit.. p. 200.
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relation, and that Russell refers to this relation by
"stands for" and "is a word for". In some of the earlier
passages I quoted he used "indicates" and "denotes".
1
Elsewhere he says that a name "designates", "applies
2 3 4
to", "espressos", and "signifies" an object. We
night call this relation the 'naming relation'; but if
we are in the dark about this naming relation to begin
with, being given a number of alternative terras for it
is no help. And just being told that it is a relation
is not to be told much either. Mill was more helpful--
he said that the relation a name had to what it names
is like a chalk-mark on a house. Regardless of the
difficulties in that, already pointed out by Bradley,
such a comparison does at least enable us to infer some
properties of the name relation. In particular, chalk-
narks are always on something, they mark something which
enists; also, each mark is on ono thing only (let us not
worry about parts, atoms, and such)—it cannot be on two
houses, for that would be two marks. These are the
criteria for non-general terms with which I opened this
section. Can we discover such properties in Russell's





"Whitehead and Russell, Princimia ilathematica. p.
15; this appears to be quite rare.
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thinking hard about the various terras he uses: stands
for, designates, etc. What we need are passages in
which such properties of the name relation are explicitly
mentioned.
To begin with, we can notice how he uses the notion
of meaning. Meaning is not for Russell something
involving universals which are implied by a word, and
which constitute necessary conditions for identifying
some object as something to which the word can be
applied; to the contrary, the meaning of a word or
expression, as we saw a few pages back, is simply what¬
ever the word or expression stands for, i,.e., whatever
it names. The theory of meaning is reduced neatly and
exactly to the theory of naming. 'Socrates' means (or
names, take your pick) a particular individual person--
Socrates; 'white' means (names) a particular individual
property--whiteness. The general thesis can be found
in the following:
the components of the fact which makes a proposi¬
tion true or false, as the case Eiay be, are the
meanincrs of the symbols which we must understand
in order to understand the proposition.1
Also,
the only thing you can really understand (in the
strict sense of the word) is a symbol, and to
understand a symbol is to know what it stands
for. 2
^"Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism",
op. cit., p. 196.
2Jbid., p. 205.
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But since wo are not particularly interested here in the
application of this thesis to general terras,™ let us look
at what he says directly of proper names in connection
In fact, just after the passage last quoted Russell
goes on to say that we understand a predicate (which is
a "word that is used to designate a quality such as rod,
white, square, round," etc.) in a way different froxa tho
way we understand a name. But that does not imply that
Russell is giving for predicates a different account of
meaning; 'red5 still desioxnates red. Apparently, under¬
standing a symbol involves not only knowing the meaning
of it, but also knowing that it functions as a symbol
for a thing of some particular logical type; an indi¬
vidual, a property, a property of a property, etc.
Hence, understanding a none differs; from understanding
a predicate. But ignoring these epistemological differ¬
ences, both kinds of symbol mean in the same way--they
designate, or stand for something. Some years later,
however, Russell gave what he thought to be on illustra¬
tion of "how meaning is a different relation for differ¬
ent types [;J The way to mean a fact is to assert it;
the way to mean a simple is to name it." ("Logical
Atomism", Logic and knowledge, p. 336.) Ignoring the
absurdity of literally asserting a fact rather than a
proposition (that old confusion still lingering on), we
must acknowledge that propositions cannot for Russell
have significance in the same way names do; however,
this follows not from the type difference between a name
and a proposition, but from the consideration that to a
fact there does not correspond just one proposition,
(dee further below in tho texrt; this can also be seen
quite clearly where Russell made the same point in a
discussion after one of the lectures on "The Philosophy
of Logical Atomism", op, cit., pp. 268-269.)
A more serious difficulty for my claim is that near¬
by Russell explicitly and emphatically states that "when
two words have meanings of different types, the relations
of the words to what they mean are of different types;
that is to say, there is not one relation of meaning
between words and what they stand for, but as many rela¬
tions of meaning, each of different logical typo, as
there are logical types among the objects for which there
are words" (Ibid., pp. 332-333.) Here he is clearly
talking about objects and names, properties and predi¬
cates, etc., and his position seems to flatly contradict
what I said alcove. But his emphasis upon the differ¬
ences is an exaggeration to the point of distortion:
the various relations differ only in the types of their
relata, and consequently in their own type, but in
nothing else. Thoy differ from one another no more than
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with meaning. As we would expect (and indeed, have
already anticipated),
•Scott' taken as a narae has a meaning all by itself.
It stands for a certain person, and there it is.3.
do far we have not gotten much further than that
the meaning of a name is what it names, and a reiteration
"is a member of", for example, differs when it connects
individuals and classes from when it connects classes
and classes of classes. Shis very fact enables Russell
in general to use the same letter with only different
subscripts to represent "systematically ambiguous" rela¬
tions; they raay be ambiguous, bait they are not said to
be systematically so for no reason at all. Along this
line, I might point out that the Polish logician
Lesniewski further emphasises the sameness amidst
diversity (i.e., the analogical character) of a rela¬
tion at different type levels (or "semantic categories"
as he calls them) by not using subscripts at all, but
only differently shaped parentheses: 'Words of any
semantical category can Yjg eguifora with one another,
even within the scope of any one thesis belonging to the
system". ("Grundsllge eines neuen Systems der Grundlagen
der Mathematik", p. 76. The parenthesis conventions
for types is in T. E. XXIII, ibid., p. 66; see also
Luschei, The Logical Systems of Lesniewski. pp. 175-176,
194.) Also, Quine goes so far as to eliminate all dis¬
tinguishing marks, and with them, type differences as
well, by stipulating a procedure for effectively deciding
when an expression is "stratified"; although stratifica¬
tion levels can be made to correspond to type levels,
the correspondence is not exact, for unstratified
expressions are not meaningless as are Eussellian type
violations, and notational regimentation is superfluous.
(Quine, Iiathematical Logic, sections 20 and 29.) The
possibility of using a completely univocal expression
in situations where Russell demands that such expressions
be equivocal, casts doubt not only on his extreme claim
that the meaning relationships are totally different for
different types, but even on the milder claim--which is
more in conformity with his own practice~-that they are
only ambiguous (i.e., much the some, yet obscurely dif¬
ferent ).
^Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism",
op. cit., p. 253.
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that what it names is what it stands for- Let us ask,
then, how on Russell's account might on expression be
meaningless? One way is for it to be of the form "a
so-and-so", or "the so-and-so". The former does not
designate a certain thing, and so it is analysed into
"something which so-and-so's," which does not purport
to designate; the original form, as a unit, has no
meaning, and its analysis shows how the proposition in
which it occurs can be significant in spite of that.
The latter form purports to designate something specific,
but night not for lack of either uniqueness or the exist¬
ence of the thing supposedly named. Thus the move
Russell makes is to say that expressions of such a form
do not designate at all, they have no meaning on their
own and as a unit, but like the former type of expres¬
sion, must be analysed away. How it might appear that
names also can bo meaningless for the sane reasons which
led Russell to argue that definite descriptions cannot
have meanings. Bui rather than saying that therefore
no name lias meaning and all such expressions must be
analysed away, he says that any name without a meaning
1
is not a name at all:
*4 lad Russell token a similar course with definite
descriptions, saying that they all have to have a
meaning, he would have obtained—had he arbitrarily
provided a meaning for those descriptions which fail to
describe exactly one thing—a theory of definite
descriptions tantamount to Frege's, whoso method was to
say that descriptions of one and only one object desig¬
nate those objects (respectively), and any other desig¬
nates a certain class of pairs specifiable for any given
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If "a" is a nana, it must name something: what
does not name anything is not a name, and there¬
fore, if intended to be a name, is a symbol devoid
of meaning, „ . .1
Thus names cannot be meaningless; in particular, they
cannot fail to designate through the non-existence of
what they are supposed to name:
Supposing he [Socrates] had never lived, the sound
'Socrates8 would not he a name at all.2
The fact that you can discuss the proposition 'God
exists' is a proof that 'God', as used in that
proposition, is a description and not a name. If
'God' were a^naxae, no question as to existence
could arise.2
Speaking generally, Russell says that
a name cannot occur significantly in a proposition
unless there is something that it names. . . . -
ilaraes are such, then, as to require the existence
of what they purport to name. What about the requirement
of uniqueness, what Carnap has called "the principle of
description (and that in effect is how Froge defines them
in general). (Froge, The Basic hams of Arithmetic, tr.
Furth, pp. 49-51. See also below, p, 371 n. 1.
Frege's treatment of descriptions suggests for proper
names an alternative to Russell's striking-off of non-
designating names as meaningless marks: why not assign
them a designation? I am, however, personally unsym¬
pathetic to such an approach, as will be seen below.
"'"Russell, Introduction to Ilathomatical Philosophy,
p. 179.
p
Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism",
op. ext., p. 189.
3Ibid., p. 250.
"Russell, |fy Philosophioal Development, p. 84.
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univocality" ("every expression used as a narae ... is
a name of exactly one entity""*")? Descriptions are said
to have no meaning because of the possibility of their
not describing at most one thing; are names likewise
meaningless in such a case? Again the answer is, as
we would expect, even stronger—such symbols are not
merely meaningless, they are not even names:
A name can just narae a particular, or, if it does
not, it is not a name at all, it is a noise. It
cannot be a name without having just that one
particular relation of naming a certain thing.
o o a
Russell even goes further by claiming that the
uniqueness requirement also works in the other direction;
he argues that propositions cannot be thought of as
names for facts. This is perfectly evident "from the
mere circumstance that there are two propositions
3
corresponding to each fact." The required assumption,
of course, is that there cannot be two, but only one
name corresponding to each object. Thus a name can
designate only one object, and any object can have only
one name. The name relation for Russell requires both
the existence of what is supposed to be named (a neces¬
sary condition anyway for naming to be a relation), and
^Carnap, ..leaning and necessity, p. 98.
^Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism",
op. cit.. p. 137.
3Ibid., p. 187.
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a one-to-one correspondence between tilings and their
names. All this, plus the fact that Russell is stipu¬
lating conventions for proper names, is rather neatly
expressed in the following:
In a logically perfect language the words in a
proposition would correspond one by one with the
components of the corresponding fact, with the
exception of such words as 'or', 'not', 'if,
'then', which have a different function. In a
logically perfect language, there will be one ^
word and no more for every simple object. . . .
It has now become abundantly clear that Russell has
adopted a straight-forward Millian doctrine of proper
names, with minor differences (for example, they are not
meaningless, as for Mill, but their meaning is simply
what they name; but since they do nothing but designate,
or denote an object, this change is trivial). One major
departure from Mill, which I have not yet sufficiently
emphasised, is that whereas Mill considered his account
of proper names to apply to what we normally consider
to be proper names, e.g., 'Dartmouth', 'London', 'John',
•Socrates', etc., Russell severely restricted the class
of proper names to which the above Millian theory would
apply, and he gave a totally different account of names
such as those just listed. He was led to do this because
he thought for epistemoiogical reasons that the one-to-
one relation between a name and an object had to be
somehow channeled through a person who, when using the
"'"Ibid., p. 197.
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name, was or had been directly acquainted with what is
named. This requirement by itself rules out many names
as being logically proper names, and if it is combined
with the further thesis that one cannot be acquainted
1with a person unless one is that person, very little
remains--nothing, in fact, but my own name, place names
of places I have been to, and a few other odds and ends.
When Russell rejected mental substances, and advanced
o
sense-data as the only objects of acquaintance, even
names of those few remnants dissolved into descriptions
of classes or series. What then is left to be a logi¬
cally proper name? To answer this Russell turns to
demonstratives; with the air of pulling a rabbit out
of a hat he announces:
The only words one does use as names in the logi¬
cal sense are words like 'this' or 'that'. . . .
it is only when you use 'this' quite strictly, to
stand for an actual object of sense, that it is
really a proper name. And in that it has a very
odd property for a proper name, namely that it
seldom means the same thing two moments running
and does not mean the same thing to the speaker
and to the hearer. It is an ambiguous proper name,
but it is really a proper name all tlie same, and
it is almost the only thing I can think of that is
used properly and logically in the sense that i
was talking of for a proper name.3
Russell, "On Denoting", op. cit., p. 56; "Knowl¬
edge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description",
Problems of Philosophy, pp. 54-55.
o
Russell, "On the Mature of Acquaintance", Logic
and Knowledge, p. 164; "The Philosophy of Logical
Atomism", op. cit., pp. 191, 274-277.
3
Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism",
op. cit., p. 201.
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He seems not to have noticed the incompatibility
between his requirements for proper names--in particular
the requirement of univocality—and the "very odd
property" he correctly notices demonstratives to possess:
ambiguity. (Correct, that is, in the sense that they
apply to different things at different times and places;
but I shall argue later that they do each have an unam¬
biguous meaning in a different sense of "meaning".) The
only -way to resolve this conflict while holding on to
both the univocality of names and the namehood of
demonstratives, is to say that we really have within
such a word as 'this 11 a myriad of separate names, each
like nothing so much as numerals, which fact suggests
that we might symbolise these differences by 'this-^',
'thd^'# 'this2', etc. This ploy is of course no
analysis, but merely drawing out the consequences of a
dogma (univocality). Since demonstratives change their
meaning rather quickly ("you can keep 'this' going for
about a minute or two. ... If you argue quickly, you
can get some little way before it is finished.Do
minds not so nimble, by the way, unavoidably commit
fallacies of equivocation?), we are presented with the
spectacle of Russell subsequently doing exactly what he
sternly warns us against: "attributing to the thing
o




For if the meaning of a proper name varies quickly, that
must be (he seems to have thought) because the thing
varies, or becomes something else, in a very short time.
Why else would he say that a particular
is completely self-subsistent. It has that sort
of self-subsistence that used to belong to sub¬
stance, except that it usually only persists
through a very short time, so far as our experi¬
ence goes. ... I think things last for a finite
time, a matter of some seconds or minutes or what¬
ever it may happen to be.1?
It is interesting to speculate about the extent to
which Russell's advocacy of sense-data as the only
objects of acquaintance was motivated by his analysis
of proper names, and the brevity of their possession of
a univocal meaning. But regardless of that issue, it
is clear that the notions of sense-data and logically
proper names were closely connected and interdependent
for Russell, for not only does he usually give sense-
datum statements (e.g., 'this is red') as paradigms for
atomic propositions, but also he says implicitly that a
change in the meaning of a name need not accompany any
change in the properties or relations of the particular
it names, but only such changes as bring about an
altered sense-datura. This view has far-reaching conse¬
quences, one of which Russell immediately draws, to the
effect that monism, which depends upon the doctrine of
internal relations, is false. For those properties and
1Ibid.. pp. 201-202, 203.
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relations of a particular which, do not affect its
appearance can be distinguished as external to it, and
inessential for "knowing" it in the sense of being
acquainted with it, and this latter state of affairs is
all that is necessary for understanding its name and
any proposition in which it occurs (assuming the rest
of the proposition to be understood, of course).
The doctrine of logically proper names is also
important for Russell independently of its connection
with the epistemology of sense-data; for although he
counts practically nothing as an example of such a name,
and although the examples he does give are very i->eculiar
indeed, logically proper names are a fundamental cate¬
gory in his logical analysis. If we are given a
Russellian language, like that of Principia llathematica.
and interpret it by assigning a vocabulary so that it
can be used to speak of the world, tho language will
contain apart from its elements of syntax, nothing
beyond this vocabulary which will consist only of words
corresponding one-for-one with simple things. In short,
it will contain only the syntax plus a supply of logi¬
cally proper names.With regard to pure log-ic itself
(what 1 have called the 'syntax' just above), Russell
held a very Bradlian view: "It is part of the definition
of logic (but not the whole definition) that all its
^*Ibid., pp. 197-198.
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propositions are completely general. i.e., they all con¬
sist of the assertion that some prepositional function
containing no constant terms is always true.""'* But in
an interpreted logic, jL.e., a language about the world,
constant terms are used, and these are going to be
logically proper names. Thus logically proper names (in
particular, for Russell, demonstratives) are the vehicle
of reference to the world. They constitute the element
through which particularity is got into propositions,
and they enable Russell to draw back from the full
Bradlian thesis of generality in propositions. They
represent an emasculated version of the Millian theory
of pure denotation attacked by Bradley, and rest ulti¬
mately upon a theory of demonstratives which we saw
Bradley himself veering towards, but which wo were able
to eliminate by straightening out a confusion between
two senses of meaning.
Russell does not fall prey to the same ambiguity,
but simply says that the meaning of demonstratives, like
that of all words (except the syncatecorimatic 'logical'
words) left after analysis, is what they designate.
There is for him no such thing as meaning in sense (1),
o
to revert to terminology of Part I. Thus the category
^"Russell, Introduction to llathenatical Philosophy,
p. 159 (underline added); see also "The Philosophy of
logical Atomism", op. cit., pp. 237-241.
2
"boo p. 143 above, from what little I understand
of it, this seems to be the main point of his attack upon
Frege in "On Denoting", op. cit., pp. 40-51.
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of logically proper names, though sparsely populated,
occupies a basic and crucial, if somewhat devious, place
in Russell's view of language.
I shall now argue that there are no words which
satisfy the conditions mentioned at the beginning of
this chapter, and which are therefore necessarily non-
general. I shall, in this respect, be supporting
Bradley's rejection of Mill, and rejecting Russell's
logically proper names as a fiction. I shall use among
other things considerations deriving from ordinary
proper names, even though these are not logically proper
names for Russell, because I want to show that they
cannot be thought of as purely denoting terns for reasons
independent of Russell's epistemology. Also, besides
criticising the theory of logically proper names, I am
interested in coming closer to an adequate account of
ordinary proper names, and in showing in what sense they
have meaning as Bradley claims they do,
2. Proper Hames
A. Referring
To start with we can notice sorae obvious cases which
do not fit the description of naming as a one-to-one
relation between a word and a thing: a look in the
telephone directory of probably any city in England will
produce at least two entries of "John Smith". Here, then,
is a double-word expression which is as good a name as
any, and which is correlated with more than one thing.
Only a bit less obvious is the consideration that an
individual, named "John" say, changes from time to time,
and we find perfectly ordinary sentences such as "John
is not the same irascible John I knew years ago". This
led Bradley to say that judgements with proper names
are synthetic. Although I am inclined to say that the
same thing is named by each occurrence of the name,
someone who holds with Russell that the identity of an
object is determined by the identity of its appearances,
must admit that there are distinct objects denoted by
•John', or else must avail himself of some subterfuge
(as Russell does) to the effect that there are as many
names as changes. The first alternative would give us
further examples of names not restricted to one object.
It is a bit more difficult to come up with a name
that has not named anything; this is not because names
have not been thus used, but because most names used for
non-existent things have at one point or another been
used also for things less ontologically exotic. American
rocketeers, for example, seem to have a penchant for
Greek mythological names. 'Santa Claus' will perhaps
do, or 'Bylp', which is a name I have just invented for
Santa Claus's next-door-neighbor. I doubt whether this
latter name has ever been the name of an existing thing.
Although the claim that a thing can have only one
name does not affect the issue over the generality or
20G
non-generality of names, it does seen usually to be a
part of the theory of naming we are considering. So we
might point out the commonplace that such cases as
"Cicero" and i!Tully", "Mark Twain" and "Samuel Clemens"#
and aliases# nick-names, pet names# honorary names, etc.#
plainly do exist.
If we symbolise the name relation, called variously
•denoting', 'designating'# etc., by a lino connecting
the name with what it names as in figure (1) below# the
three kinds of exceptions just given can be shown as
(2M4):
A A A A B
(1) (2) / \ (3) (4) \/ (5)
O O 0 O O
Uhy, it might be asked# are there no cases of (55 —•
why is the breakdown of (1) not symmetrical for (3) as
it is in (2) and (4)? The reason is that the relation
symbolised is the name relation; names are presupposed
by the relation. One could easily give examples of
things without names, e.g., the pen with which 1 am
writing these words. There are, after all, many more
things without names than with. But such examples are
irrelevant when we are trying to understand names, for
where there is no name there is no name relation. This
reply might invite the rejoinder that (3) is not
relevant either# for the name relation, as do all
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relations, presupposes the existence of both its relata—
there are no "unattached" or "floating" relations. The
cases are not parallel however; all those examples,
including those of type (3), were produced as examples
of perfectly good names in order to discredit the pic¬
ture of names as being one member of a simple two-place
relation. It is no good to patch up such cases as (3)
by saying- that existence is analogical, or different
from subsistence, or many layered, or that some apparent
names are not names at all; any such move starkly
reveals the stipulative, rather than descriptive,
character of this approach to proper names. If names
(as relations) do presuppose the existence of what they
purport to name, then naming cannot be a relation.
The idea of presuppositions is not so easily put
down, however, and for good reason: there is something
important which underlies it. To see just what it is,
we shall have to make a distinction between denoting and
referring." Denoting, as I have been using that term,
is something a word is said to do by virtue of a rela¬
tion between the word and an object—the word is a name,
o
and the thing it names is its denotation. As I believe
"first suggested, to my knowledge, by Strawson in
"On Referring", reprinted in Caton (ed.), Philsophy and
Ordinary Language, p. 170.
o_
xhis use of "denote" is not the same as Russell's
in "On Denoting"; I could have used "designate" instead,
but confusion is hardly likely to arise.
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I have just shown, denotation is not an adequate explana¬
tion for ordinary proper nones.
Referring, on the other hand, is something that
people do, it is an act we can perform. In performing
such an act we can use words. They are not a necessary
part of referring, however--various non-linguistic con¬
ventions can be used as well. The most important of
these conventions is perhaps pointing; others are
glancing at, holding, thrusting, etc., which can be
construed as minor variations on pointing. They are
commonly all lumped together as acts of ostention (when
they are, in fact, being used referringiy) because their
function is to pick out and displaj'- some one particular
object. Using words and ostensive conventions exhaust
the ways we can refer to something; what I want to find
out is how we con use words to refer.
Referring, like many thing's wo do, is an act of
achievement. It suggests that some sort of successful
result lias come about. Winning a race, for example, is
something one can successfully do by crossing the finish-
line first; it presupposes that there was an end to the
race, a finish-line to cross. Spotting an airplane is
also an achievement: it is the successful result of
having looked for it, and the very success presupposes
the existence of an airplane."'" Achievements are not
"'"These two examples of "achievement terms" are due
to Vendlor, Linguistics in Philosophy, pp. 103-107.
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like ordinary actions such as writing, or hammering a
nail, but are the consequences of such actions, and they
happen jgt a time, not during a time." Referring is the
consequence or result of using certain words in certain
ways, but of course such uses need not guarantee suc¬
cessful reference, any more than running a race guaran¬
tees winning it. But if one does succeed in referring,
i.e., if one does refer, then certain things are pre-
supposed in the achievement of this act which correspond
to the conditions imposed upon a name for it to denote.
These presuppositions of referring emplain why, when
naming is conceived, as a simple relation, names are
described as terns which must satisfy these conditions.
The corresponding presuppositions for singular refer¬
ence are that (1) what one has referred to must e2d.st
(much as there must be a finish-line to win), and (2)
there must have been one and only one thing to which one
has referred (if there were tx;o finish-lines, what would
constitute winning?). These are not, let me repeat,
conditions on words, but what must be the case if one
has achieved an act of singular reference.
B. Meanings
We saw that there were two ways to refer, using
either words, or non-linguistic conventions. What is it
^Vendlor attributes to Ryle an emaiaplo which illus¬
trates a grammatical feature of achievement terms;
(substituting "refer" for "see") we can say "l have
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that we must be able to do in order to use these to
refer? (I ara speaking henceforth about singular refer¬
ence.) In both cases, to satisfy the requirements of
referring it is sufficient to be able to pick out and
identify some particular object-~the one to which we
refer. The answer I wish to suggest is, briefly, that
one can refer to something only if one could identify it.
Let me hasten to add that I do not mean that one has to
be able to physically pin-point the object on the spot,
or even that he could do that with no further informa¬
tion, given only enough time. By "one could identify
it" I intend to include 'borrowed reference', in the
sense that if pressed about the intended referent of a
name one used, one could ultimately come up with either
a direct physical 'laying on of hands', or (if the thing
is historical) enough information to satisfy those people
most knowledgeable about the thing, that had you been
there then, you could have picked out and actually iso¬
lated the thing from all other things plausibly confused,
with it. In both cases one is referring in good faith
upon the belief that one could strictly identify the
referent if pressed. If that belief is well founded, I
would say that one has roade a 'borrowed reference', and
therefore that one could identify that to which he refers.
referred" as soon as we can say "I refer"--in general,
achievement terms have unorthodox interpretations of
both their ordinary and progressive present tenses.
Ibid., pp. 103-104.
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In ostention we simply employ the most obvious meth¬
od for drawing attention to the particular object itself.
In the case of words we can use a description of the
object, a demonstrative, or a name. Concentrating on
the latter, what we need to know is how a name can be
used to pick out and identify a particular object,
especially in view of the conclusion for which I argued
above that it is false to think of a proper name as a
word necessarily hooked onto one particular object. The
answer I wish to suggest is that proper names enable us
to refer because they have meanings, just as general
terms apply to (are true of) those things to which they
do apply by virtue of their meanings. In fact, a name
can only be used to refer to something if it gives us
some information about what it is used to refer to, and
we get this information from the meaning of the name.
The only alternative is that the name has no meaning,
but just stands for some object (or equivalently, its
meaning is the object), and this has been shown to be
1
inadequate in many cases. But the claim I wish to make
here is stronger than the mere production of counter¬
examples will allow: a theory of purely denotative
terms, or logically proper names, is not just false for
some names--it cannot be true for any. It cannot even
be intelligibly stated. Our suspicions ought to be
"4>ee below, p. 267 n. 1.
212
ax'oused by the lack of attempts to give a precise account
of what it is to denote by those who hold such a theory.
We are usually given just a variety of alternate terms.
Sometimes an analogy is attempted, such as Mill's chalk-
mark on the house. But we have seen that almost as soon
as he broached this analogy he fundamentally altered it,
as Bradley was quick to point out, by saying not that
a name marks an object, but the "idea" of the object.
This alteration, incidently, brought Mill closer to a
correct account than he was aware.
Another analogy sometimes used is that names are
like ostention, they point to what they name. Thus
Russell: "the name itself is merely a means of pointing
to the thing".The trouble is that it is basically
people who point, not words; but perhaps he meant that
people can point 'by means of' names, rather like they
can point by means of special signs with arrows on them,
and indeed, that is the special merit of names over
actual pointing—they can point when neither the object
nor the one who points is present. There are difficul¬
ties with this analogy too; the presumed merit is no
advantage, but rather its Achilles heel: what is being
actually pointed at is always present to the person
pointing. It just makes no sense to talk of pointing
when that is not the case, and of course we do use
"^Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism",
op. cit., p. 245.
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names in the absence of what is named, and we come across
names when there is no one to do the pointing (in print,
on the radio, etc.)."*"
Again, we should suspect that something lias gone
x^rong when Russell is reduced to giving a few minutes
-worth of "this" as the only names which satisfy a theory
of purely denoting terms. With regard to the properties
which names are supposed to have by virtue of the naming
relation, which we found implied by Hill's analogy, and
which we extracted piecemeal from Russell, we saw that
they were not properties of names (how can a word
guarantee that something exists in the world, or that
it cannot name more than one thing?), but rather neces¬
sary conditions for successfully bringing off an act of
referring. There just is no way of coherently formu¬
lating a theory of names which on the one hand is
dominated by the naive view of two objects (a thing and
o
a name) tied to opposite ends of a rope, and which on
the other hand will account for certain simple facts
about how we use names. The reason for this is that it
omits the very element of proper names which enables us
^Cf. Sidney Sink, "The meaning of Proper ITames",
Hind, 1963, pp. 488-489.
o
"rlie idea is seldom so crudely put as that, but
consider, e.g., the following illuminating metaphor
used by Pears: is "a complex singular symbol . . . like
a name with a single filament reaching out for a denota¬
tion?" D. F. Pears, Bertrand Russell & The British
Tradition in Philosophy, p. 204.
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1to identify what they name: their meanings. Before
proceeding to consider in what sense proper names have
meaning, and what arguments there are to show that they
have meaning, I would like to consider some further
arguments recently advanced against the denotation
theory which are of a more internal character than the
charges I have made of inadequacy and incoherence.
Argmients against the
Denotation Theory, including
the Rejection of a Proposed
1SyntacticalT Criterion for
Proper ilam.es
Sidney Sink has argued that
the denotation theory holds that the meaning of a
proper name is the thing that it names....
But a thing which is held to be the meaning of a
proper name, say lit. Everest, existed before the
name existed. In the beginning was the thing.
If, then, the thing named is the meaning of the
name, the meaning of the name existed before the
name existed, and this meaning would have existed
The view that names have a meaning enables me to
deal with a possible objection to the first sort of
example in the previous section. "Surely," it might go,
"there are not two or more people denoted by the one
name 'John Smith', rather there are two or more different
names." I admit that there is something odd about one
and the same name designating different things, because
when we use a name to refer, we are referring to one
thing. But since I take isomorphism (graphic or phonetic)
as a criterion of the identity of a name, and do not
accept the identity criteria of things as the identity
criteria of their names, I reject the alternative sug¬
gested in the objection. My answer is that there are
different meanings of the name "John Smith", just as
there are different meanings of "beetle", "fair", "to
lap", etc. The meanings of names are, however, con¬
nected with the criteria of identity of the things
they name.
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even if the narie had never existed. But this
contradicts the notion that only the symbol has
meaning.1
Therefore it follows that "no part of the meaning
o
of . . . proper . . . names could be the things named."
Much as I sympathize with this conclusion, the argument
is clearly fallacious. First of all, the mountain is,
the meaning, it does not have the meaning (a point Sink
himself makes, in spite of the last line of the above
passage); so it lias not been shorn that something other
than the symbol has a meaning. For that to follow, a
premise is required to the effect that if a meaning
exists, there must bo something which possesses it.
Then, if there is no symbol for the mountain, something
other than a symbol must have a meaning, which is
counter to the hypothesis, etc. Although this premise
is neither stated nor supported, it is plausible enough
not to cause the argument serious difficulty. A second
problem is not so easily met, however. The advocate of
a denotation theory does not have to hold that because
Mt. Everest is the meaning of "Mt. Everest", the meaning
of "Mt. Everest" existed before "Mt. Everest" did. The
mountain of course existed before that name for it did,
but it was not the meaning of the name until there was
the name. Sink is trying to use the absurdity of case




(5) diagrammed above on page 207 to disprove the possi¬
bility of a denotation theory; we there rejected case
(5) on the grounds that the name relation presupposes
names. Another way of putting it is to say that a thing
is not a meaning merely because sometime hence it will
be named; for the denotation theorist it only need
become a meaning when it is given a name. To argue as
Zink does is no better than claiming that since I admire
lit. Everest, lit. Everest is what I aclmiro, and since
what I admire existed before 1 did., Mt. Everest was once
the object of the admiration of someone who did not yet
exist. Obviously, it did not become the object of ray
admiration until I admired it; nor did it become the
meaning of "lit. Everest" until it was called by that
name. The denotation theory cannot fall prey so easily;
it is necessary to show what is fundamentally wrong with
it. And that is, 1 think, that it tries to ignore how
we use names to refer, it substitutes a short circuit
straight from the word to the name. The consequences of
this course are that a kind of relation is assumed of
which an adequate account cannot be given, and that the
meanings of names, which enable us to use the names to
refer to things, are completely forgotten, if not out¬
right rejected.
John Soarle has given two further arguments which
are both more serious for the denotation theorist. The
first one concerns identity statements: we are inclined
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to say that statements of the form na « a,! are analytic,
while those of the form "a = b" are synthetic. But if
the meaning of names are simply the things which they
name, "Tully <= Cicero" is just as true as "Tully =
Tully", and for the same reasons. There is in fact no
difference, for in both cases the names involved name
the same object, and that is why both are true. Thus
"a «= b" cannot convey information (be synthetic) any
more than "a = a" can.'*" (Searle also points out that
"a = a" can be synthetic if we change our rules for
using syrabols, and he describes such a change; but
then "a = b" would be analytic--they could not both be
the same, at least for the change he suggests. Thus
the present argument would still work, but in reverse,
i.e., we would say thai the denotation theory counter-
intuitively makes "a = a" analytic after all.)
Wittgenstein handled this problem by proscribing
identity statements altogether, for "a = a" is so
absurdly trivial that it means nothing, while "a - b"
is just plain absurd, since no object has two names,
3
and two objects cannot be the same. Those of us
unfortunate enough not to have been on hand when our
i
Searle, "Proper Names and Descriptions", Encyclo¬
pedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards, vol. 6, pp.
487-491; p. 488.
^Searlo, "Proper Names", Philosophy and Ordinary




language was constructed, however, have to cone to grips
with the fact that statements of the form "a = bn can
be informative, and within the conventions of our lan¬
guage, quite different from "a = a!i. There is some
point after all, about arguing over whether Shakespeare
T7as Bacon or not.
This argument of dearie's derives from Frege, who
concluded from it that proper names must have a sense,
and that "a = b" is informative because it tolls us in
particular cases that names with different senses can
be used to refer to the same object. (Actually Frege
says that names themselves refer, not that they can Ice
used by people to refer; but due to the relation between
sense and reference for Frege, this is of little conse¬
quence. I introduced the notion of referring partly
to indicate and emphasise how the use of a name depends
upon its meaning: you cannot use a name to refer if it
does not have a meaning. The parallel point about
Frege's view is put rather neatly by dearie: "According
to the classical [denotation] theory, names, if they are
really names, necessarily have a reference and no sense
at all. According to the Fregean theory, they essen¬
tially have a sense and only contingently have a refer¬
ence. They refer if and only if there is an object
which satisfies their sense."^)
Searle, "Proper Homes and Descriptions", op. cit.,
p. 488.
Searle's other argument concerns existence state¬
ments :^ on the denotation theory such statements must
be either true or else be some kind of contradiction.
"Cerberus does not exist", for example, we would like
to think is true, but if the meaning of "Cerberus" is
some existing object--Cerberus in fact--then it has to
be the case that "Cerberus does not exist" is false.
Thus "exists" attached to a name must be true, and "does
not exist" false; but "Cerberus exists" is false, and
"Cerberus does not exist" is true. The truth or falsity
of such statements depends entirely upon whether or not
the name names anything, and so we cannot assume at the
outset that the name does denote. Rather, we must say
that an existential statement "expresses a concept and
o
states that that concept is instantiated." Therefore
proper names in such statements do not denote, but "must
3have some conceptual or descriptive content."
Modern defenders of denotative theories of proper
names are not unaware of this problem, and they employ
one method or another to avoid predicating existence onto
proper naraes. Wittgenstein held that names denote the
substance of the world, of which it makes no sense to





consequences of this view (substituting in his own
exposition the term "particulars" for "substance"—at
one point explicitly likening particulars to substances
except in respect of their duration*^), rejected ordinary
proper names as not being proper names at all, logically
speaking. For he recognised that we could say truthfully
that "Pegasus exists" is false, and for factual, not
grammatical reasons, and that in doing so we were in
some sense making claims about the instantiation of
concepts or properties.
Anscombe avoids this rejection of all proper names
as not being genuine proper names, as Searle points out,
by using the existence of a bearer for the name in
question as a criterion for whether it really is a proper
o
name. Thus "Caesar exists" and "Pegasus exists" are
true and false respectively, but for different reasons:
the first because "Caesar" is a genuine proper name,
i.e., it actually names something which exists, and the
second because (presumably) the properties associated
with the psuedo-name "Pegasus" are nowhere found
together. Searle's objection to this is quite direct:
on Miss Anscombe's view a name is not necessarily a
name just because we think it is--whether or not it is
must be decided. But, Searle says, any such decision
is arbitrary: "membership in a syntactical category
xSee above, p. 202.
2
Anscombe, Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus,
p. 41.
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becomes contingent on the nonsyntactical relation of
name-bearing".
Although I agree with Searle that the relation of
naming should not be used as a criterion for a word's
being a genuine name—ay reason being that I do not know
what such a relation is--I do not know how he would go
about giving a syntactical criterion such as he implies
ought to be given. He noxjhere gives such a criterion;
to the contrary, he says that "we have the institution
of proper names to perform the speech act of reference.
The existence of those expressions derives from our need
to separate the referring from the describing functions
of language." This suggests that the criterion for
proper names is to sought in their function, not their
membership in syntactical categories, and I think this is
quite correct. It is differenco of function which under¬
lies difference of syntax, and not vice versa. The
fundamental difference between the referring and
describing functions of language is the rationale for
parsing statements into subjects and predicates. But
it is a mistake to go from there, establishing radically
different and exclusive categories of syntax into which,
Procrustean-like, an expression must fit or be tailored
to fit, or else be rejected as not really what we thought
it to be.




Taking as a basis function, rather than purely
syntactical considerations, we can formulate a criterion
for proper names as follows: an egression is a proper
name if its function in some statement is to refer, or
in other words, if it can be used in an attempt to refer.
This would include definite descriptions and demonstra¬
tives as well; they may be distinguished, if you wish,
thus: the given criterion is for names; definite
descriptions are names beginning with the word "the";
demonstratives are the following names—"this"that",
"I", "now", {etc., through an exhaustive list); the
rest are proper names. I shall urge below that although
these distinctions can be made, there is no deep
importance in them.
Such words are the subject(s5 of a statement,
and the rest, which says something about the purported
referent(s), is the predicate (ignoring the obvious
complications introduced with logically compound state¬
ments ). llotice that this criterion includes "Pegasus"
as a proper name in the statement "Pegasus causes
poetic inspiration", for the function of an expression
is independent of whether or not it manages to achieve
its purpose. And I submit tliat this is just what we
want: surely "Pegasus" is as much a name as is "Caesar".
To some who worry overmuch, the most obvious next
question is, what about statements whose subjects are
names which cannot bo used in a successful act of
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reference because the pre-conditions for referring are
not met? For example, "Pegasus", since Pegasus does
not exist. Are they true, or false, or what? To answer
this one way or the other is, I think, genuinely
arbitrary, and makes little difference."*" Let us say
they are false (S. la Russell), or neither true nor
false (A la Strawson), or sometimes true and soaetiraes
false, letting "exist" apply more loosely than only to
material bodies (5. la Linsky), or let us await decision
until a statistical survey of preferences among plain
men has been conducted. Hone of these alternatives
will cause us to believe in ghosts, gods, and golden
mountains unless we have independent reasons to do so.
The immense controversy over this point has obscured
what is Interesting in Strawson's discussion of Russell,
and it is a red herring.
A Bad Suggestion
It might be thought that one way to give a criterion
for proper names is to start out with the syntactical
distinction between subject and predicate (ignoring how
that is to be obtained), and then to 3ay that proper
names are words which occur as subjects (with certain
specifiable qualifications), but not as (or in) predi¬
cates (except in certain specifiable circumstances).
This is no caricature, but a point of view recently
l
"See the discussion of descriptions below, pp. 369f,
especially pp. 373-376.
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advocated by Richard Campbell. Let us look more closely
at just how his method goes wrong.
The circumstance in which a proper name can occur
in a predicate, he says, is when it has sorae descriptive
content or import; thus two cases arise--one for those
words which can form a predicable by prefixing some form
of "to be", and the other for those which cannot. In
the first case, a sufficient condition for an expression's
being a proper name is given by:
I, For any n, if (a) [is an nJ or [are nj is a predica¬
ble expression,
then (b) [nj is a proper name
if and only if (c) [n is not an n] or [n are not n]
is not self-contradictory.i
This is supposed to count words such as "Napoleon" as
proper names. The second case is dealt with by another
sufficient condition, which together with (I) forms a
necessary condition for an expression's being a proper
name. In this second condition, a number of qualifica¬
tions are included to eliminate certain expressions
which also do not form a predicable with "to be".
II. For any n, if (a) [is an nj or [are nj is not a
predicable expression,
but (b) it makes sense to attach a
predicable expression to [nj,
and if (c) [nj is not a quantifying
expression,
''"Campbell, "Proper Names", Hind. 1968, p. 338. See
the next footnote.
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and if (d) it is not impossible that a sen¬
tence of the form [n is should always be used
to make the saiae statement,
then (e) [nj is a proper name."*"
Looking at II first, condition (a) is satisfied
by "Cynthia", "seven plus a tree", "all men", and "this"-
i.e., none of these examples forms a predicable as
required. The successive qualifications are designed
to eliminate each term but "Cynthia". But suppose the
predicable in the 'meaningfulness1 qualification
(condition (b)) were "is divisible by two"; then all
names but numerals would be eliminated. The problem




My objection rests upon the former interpretation, which
has the effect of eliminating proper names of anything
not of one kind, since there are no genuine predicables
sensibly applicable across all categories. So Campbell
must have meant this qualification to have the latter
interpretation. But then it can easily be subverted by
using the predicable "makes no sense", for "seven plus
a tree raakes no sense" makes sense; it is even true.
Ibid., p. 339. In both this and the previous pas¬
sage I have split Campbell's text and added the letters
in parentheses as labels to ease my subsequent discus¬
sion; removing these labels and running the rest together
restores the quotation verbatim.
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Worse yet, "seven plus a tree makes sense" must also make
sense, for it is false. Thus Campbell must strengthen
this qualification by ruling out the use of the predica-
bles "makes no sense" and "makes sense"—but the latter
one is needed to state the qualification itself.8
Condition (c) eliminates expressions like "all men"
and "some men"; but what about other members in the
general class in which these are included, which Geach
(following Johnson) calls "applicatives"? Some examples
which Geach gives are "a", "the", "some", "any", "no",
"every", "only", "just one", "all but two", and "most".
Campbell "assumes that quantifying expressions are
individually definable in rules parallel to those
governing the use of quantifiers in predicate logic,
o
. . This, with some careful attention to scope,
takes care of "all", "a", "some", "every", "no" and
"any". The numerical ones "only", "just one", "just
two", etc., can also be handled this way, and thus can
be eliminated by this qualification.
Among the applicatives which remain is "the". "The
men" forms the predicable "are the men", as in "they are
the men", so it would fit into I, only to be there
eliminated because contrary to 1(c), "the men are not
the men" is self-contradictory. There are other
"Geach, Reference and Generality, p. 47.
2
Campbell, op. cit.. p. 338.
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examples, however. An expression will fit case II, and
therefore be a proper name, if either [are n] or [is an
nJ is not a predicable--it need not be the case that
both are not predicables. ,!Is a the man" is not a
predicable, and thus "the men", while failing under I,
passes muster under II. Equally non-predicable are "is
a the man" and "are the man". None make sense, yet
predicables can sensibly be attached to both "the man"
and "the men". Thus if expressions beginning with "the"
are to be eliminated as proper names, this must be done
under condition (a), and not by anything prior.
Campbell could try to eliminate those examples
under the next condition, by arguing that it is possible
that expressions such as "the man" could be always used
to make the same statement. This in effect would be an
objection to the uniqueness clause of the Russellian
analysis of definite descriptions (a move I think ought
to be made), and would amount on Cambell's part to
saying of sentences of the form [n is $]—and presumably
also of the form [n are <$]--xi7here n is of the form [the
mj and a is a general term, that they cannot be construed
as always being about the same objects. To a simple idea
of statement I reply with simple examples: definite
descriptions which carr3r on their face an explicit claim
to uniqueness--"the father of John", "the tallest roan
who has ever or will ever live", "the only natural
satellite of Earth", etc. These expressions will pass
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condition (d) and be counted as proper nones, a conse¬
quence X think Campbell would not welcome.
On the other hand, this move by Campbell would
eliminate certain nones as well, such as "The Royal Bank
of Scotland", for it is of the form [the m], yet it car¬
ries no explicit uniqueness claim. If Campbell were to
say that it does carry one implicitly, that is, if ho
were to reject Russell's analysis not for all expressions
of the form [the a], but 011X3/ for some of them, then the
natural question to ask is how do you distinguish one
from the other—how do you know, e.g., that "The Royal
Bank of Scotland" is meant to be unique? The only non-
arbitrary answer I can imagine would Ice that proper names,
but not necessarily definite descriptions, are meant to
he unique. But within a criterion which is designed
specifically to distinguish proper names from other
expressions, including descriptions, that would be flatky
circular, for it presupposes that distinction already.
To continue with applicatives, what about "most",
"almost all", "two-thirds of all", and other such expres¬
sions which involve an explicit or covert reference to
a totality ("most" meaning "more than half of all")? If
they are thought to fit case I, then they form proper
names, for "most men are not most men" is not contra¬
dictory, but true: in the only way that sentence makes
sense, all men, and hence most men, are each just one
man, not most men. But if they are thought to come under
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II, then to be eliminated they must be explained, if not
as quantifying expressions, at least in the same general
way as quantifying expressions are explained, and it is
incumbent upon Campbell to show us how thi3 is to be
done. I know of no such account which is satisfactory.
The only attempt of which I am aware is given by Geach,
in which "most A's are F" is explained as, for three A's
^al' a2' a3^:
(Fa-j . Fa2) v (Fa^ . Fa^) v (Fa2 . F^)-
The general idea is that you simply disjoin all possible
conjunctions of F-statements about the individual A's in
which the number of the conjoined statements in each
disjunct is at least one more than half the total number
of A's there are. A very natural solution one might
think; unfortunately it assumes a complete and finite
o
list of all the A's. This is the requirement we had
to force upon Wittgenstein in order to understand his
interpretation of the quantifiers, and which had the
consequence of making universal statements not general
after all, but just a logical product of singular proposi¬
tions. Geach avoids this by suggesting an alternative
interpretation of the quantifiers; it works for "some"
and "all", but not for "most" or any other applicative
3
expression which refers to a totality.
"^Geach, op. cit.. pp. 32-83, 172, 177-178.
2Ibid.. pp. 71, 82-83, 163, 178.
3
Geach, Reference and Generality, pp. 185-186. On
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Of course Campbell need not try to define "most"
so as to exclude it under qualification (c) in II; he
could simply add another qualification excluding it and
others like it. But this is not so simple as it sounds,
for he cannot merely list them if the totalities
involved are infinite, as is assumed in the notion of
the matter of the alternative interpretation of the
quantifiers, see Geach, ibid., jd. 185, and also "Quantifi¬
cation Theory and the Problem of Identifying Objects of
Reference", Acta Phi1osophica Formica, 19G3, p. 45. This
interpretation is now usually called "substitutional
quantification", as opposed to classical, or "objectual
quantification", due to Quine, who succinctly describes
it thus: "An existential substitutional quantification
is counted true if and only if there is an expression
which, when substituted for the variable, makes the open
sentence after the quantifier come out true. A universal
quantification is counted as true if no substitution
makes the open sentence come out false." ("Existence
and Quantification", Qntolocrical Relativity, p. 104; also
Fact and Existence, (edj J. Uargolis, p. 11.) On this
view we worry about linguistic items only, names, open
sentences, and the truth-predicate, instead of--as on
the ordinary viow--a mixed bag of non-linguistic objects,
open sentences, and a cross-category relation "is true
of". Quine advances two arguments against substitutional
quantification. One is that "whereas the expressions,
simple and complex, available to us in any given language
are denumerable", any universe containingr the real
numbers, for example, is nondenumerable, and therefore
"an existential quantification can come out true when
construed in the ordinary sense, and yet be false when
construed [in the substitutional sense]." ("Reply to
Professor ilarcus", Synthase, v. 13, 1901, p. 328.) The
assumption is that "given" languages must have a denumor-
ablc number of names. The magic of "being given" pre¬
sumably involves that it is an actually used language,
and of course no such language uses a nondenumerable
quantity of names. But neither does such a language ever
use a oienumerably infinite number of names—used expres¬
sions are always finite. But if used languages can be
theoretically extended to contain a denumerable number
of names, why cannot we consider a language extended to
contain nondenumerablo names? The procedures we use to
talk about real numbers could be employed in our talk
about the language too. Quine has asserted in a variety
generality involved in general terms, because there will
be an infinite number of such applicatives. (Let the
first be "most"; let the second be "at least two more
than half", and the third be "at least three more than
half"; etc., ad infinitum.) Therefore his new qualifi¬
cation will have to include a recursive specification
of places his belief that the elements of a language must
be denumerable, but always without any reasons given.
In one passage he argues that "if we succeed in
showing that every result of substituting a name for the
variable in a certain open sentence is true in the theory,
but at the same time we disprove the universal quantifi¬
cation of the sentence, then certainly we have shown
that the universe of the theory contained some nameless
objects." (Qntolocrical Relativity, p. 64.) In a foot¬
note to this lie points out that the relevant state of
affairs is typical in any "numerically insegregative
system", i.e., in the 'interestingly' co-inconsistent
ones, which he discusses in "w-inconsistency and
Infinity", Selected Locrical Papers, pp. 114-120. But
nothing he says there indicates that the devices availa¬
ble for showing that every instantiation of the certain
open sentence is true in the theory, can be extended to
a nondenumerable set of names. The devices in question
must be recursive for theories with an infinity of names,
but no recursive methods could be so extended, for it
would allow a recursive specification of the nondenumera-
ble. Therefore the strongest conclusion Quine ought to
draw is that the existence of interestingly co-inconsistent
systems implies that not all systems have as many names
as objects in their universe; one could never prove that
more than a denumerable number of a system's names always
rendered a certain open sentence true in that system.
Proving that the substitution of all names (specified
in some recursive fashion) into an open sentence are
true, yet its universal quantification false, estab¬
lishes only that either there are more things than names,
or that' the names are not all reached by the recursive
devices, i.e., they are nondenuiaorable. Thus o)-
inconsistency does not furnish an argument against sub¬
stitutional quantification: a system with that property
could always have it because one of the names not cap¬
tured recursively renders the open sentence false upon
substitution. Thus oj-inconsistency can be viewed as a
property a system might have which proceeds purely as a
consequence of denying that everything can have a name.
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of the applicatives; it would Joe easy enough to generate
the series of applicatives I just now gave as an example.
But I have no idea whether all applicatives which refer
to a totality are denumerable. Campbell would have to
show that this were the case before we could be sure that
his new qualification excluded everything that it should.
What about Campbell's last qualification, condition
(d)? This is designed to eliminate demonstratives, for
it is impossible that "this is red" or "he is ill", etc.,
can be used to make only one statement, because it is pos¬
sible to use them to make different statements. But it is
possible to use "John is ill" to make different state¬
ments (as the notion "statement" is used by Campbell),
It remains for Quine to show why such a simple assumption
cannot be held.
Quine's second argument, and the reply to it are
more direct: substitutional quantification, he says,
"abstracts from reference altogether." ("Reply to Pro¬
fessor Marcus", op. cit., p. 329.) To one who suggests
that the criterion for existence commitments is to be
found in what one is prepared to quantify over, this
objection is to be expected. But to one who wants to
separate the existential and quantifying roles of the
idiom "some", this feature of substitutional quantifica¬
tion, with its attendant demand for a special treatment
of "exists", is no objection, but something quite wel¬
come. We sometimes refer to things, and we sometimes
use language. The fact that we sometimes do the latter
in order to do the former is no reason to conflate these
activities in our formal analysis of the structure of
language. Keeping reference distinct from syntax serves,
among other things, to render understandable, if not
actually desirable, not only recent attempts to construct
"free logics", which make their existence assumptions
plain, but also earlier and recent suggestions related
to "sortal logic", which appear to accord much more satis¬
factorily with the way we use language in making infer¬
ences, and with the overly abused traditional analysis
of terms. But to deal with these matters thoroughly
would be to go well beyond the scope of this thesis. Let
it suffice to say that Quine's second charge is accepted
with enthusiasm.
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and therefore it is impossible that "John is ill" can
be always used to make only one statement. Therefore
"John" is not a proper name. Condition (d) is, however,
more subtle than this argument suggests. Demonstratives
are eliminated because
(1) For any demonstrative n, it is impossible that
sentences of the form [n is <&] are always used
to make the sane statement.
This follows because there is no demonstrative which
cannot be used to refer to more than one thing*. That
is part of what it means to 3x2 a demonstrative: suppose
there were a demonstrative "thas" which was always used
to refer to the same thing. We would not call it a
demonstrative for that very reason, lout probably would
think of it as a name, as indeed Campbell's criterion
would have us do. But consider a claim parallel to (1)
for proper names:
(2) For any proper name n, it is impossible that
sentences of the form [n is <&] always 1x2 used
to make the same statement.
For a unique name (2) is false and its negation true;
thus we write:
(3) For some proper name n, it is not impossible
that sentences of the form [n is <&] always 3xd
used to make the sane statement.
The question now is, how can Campbell justify converting
the quantifier in (3) into a universal generalisation,
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since that is needed in order to capture all proper names,
and not just those feu which happen to be unique? Each
name not captured by (3) as it stands (i.e., every name,
if there are any, which renders the instantiation of (3)
false), will not be captured as a proper name in CampbeHfe
criterion. The only way I can see for him to do it is by
arguing that names which happen not to be unique, such as
"John", might have been unique--they might have been such
that "John is <&" always makes the same statement. How do
we know this? Well, the answer could run, there are a
few names which are unique, and there is nothing special
about them—the same might have happened to any name.
This argument can be dispatched straightaway: every
proper name, unbeknownst to Campbell, names not only
those things he thinks it names, but also names two
numbers. Therefore there can be; no unique names, for
every name must name at least two things, if not more.
This objection is highly artificial, and rather silly,
but Campbell cannot reject it on the most obvious grounds
that it is part of what it moans for a word to be a
proper name, that it might always be used to refer to
only one thing; for his whole project is to give criteria
for proper names independent of moaning and referring.
Basically, my point is that if condition (d) is really
going to be able to distinguish proper names from demon¬
stratives, it must assume a non-linguistic characterisa¬
tion of proper names which Campbell's criteria I and II
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are designed to avoid: it must require that proper names
are such that some of them are able to be used to refer
to one and only one thing, and therefore all of them are
such that they might have been so used—this being part
of what being a proper name means. Demonstratives, on
the other hand, could never be so used--this being part
of what being a demonstrative means. I think these
characterizations are correct, but Campbell cannot avail
himself of them and still pretend to be giving purely
linguistic criteria.
So much for II; does I fare any better? I think
not. Let n be "book"; then "book is not a book" is
not, as it stands, self-contradictory, but ungrammatical
and meaningless. There seem to be three courses open to
Campbell: he could (1) deny that "book is not a book"
is ungrammatical and meaningless, (2) change [n is not
an n] to [an n is not an n], or (3) add "or ungrammatical
and meaningless" to the end of 1(c).
(1). The only way for "book is not a book" to be
grammatical and meaningful is to understand the first
occurrence of "book" as mentioning the word, not using
it, or else to take it as being used to refer to the
concept of book; in either case the statement is then
not self-contradictory, but true. Thus "book" is a
proper name.
(2). This change would rule out "book", for "a
book is not a book" is self-contradictory; but if "is a
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Napoleon" is a preclicable , as Campbell wants to allow,
then i!a Ilapoleon is not a Napoleon" is just as contra¬
dictory, and "Napoleon" is not a proper name. This
emendation would eliminate all those proper names the
criterion was designed to pass (i.e., those with
"descriptive import").
(3). This seems to be the most plausible way. But
it works only by depending upon an accidental feature
of English: singular common nouns cannot ordinarily
occur as subjects without an article (barring other
words they might occur with, such as quantifiers and
5quasi-quantifiers1, i.e., "most", etc., since they do
not form predicables in the required way). What about
languages without articles? Actually, there is no real
problem here, for while the Russian " n-ce^ry
tvuAM^n ("book [is] not book"), e.g., is not meaningless,
it is self-contradictory. Moreover, Campbell might say
that he is only concerned with English. Actually we
do not need to go outside English to turn up a problema¬
tic example, for plural common nouns do not need an
article to be a subject: "books are not books". Occur¬
rences of this kind are provided for by Campbell—they
are eliminated because they are self-contradictory. But
are all such grammatical and meaningful sentences contra¬
dictory? I might, for example, wish to say that "losers
arc not losers", so far from being contradictory,
expresses a deep truth: losing causes suffering, and I
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believe (along with Dostoevski, say) that suffering is
the only way to salvation. Those who are saved are not
losers, but the receivers of what is most important--
redemption from evil. Campbell of course would reply
that if what I say is not self-contradictory, it is only
because I equivocated on "loser": it has a different
meaning on each occurrence in my sentence.
My reply is that that is precisely what he does
in saying that if "Aristotle" is a proper name, then
"Aristotle is not an Aristotle" is not a self-
contradiction. So any objection to my move is equally
an objection to the namehood of words which I is sup¬
posed to isolate. To see this, we must first notice
that there are two ways sentences of the form he is
interested in might or might not be self-contradictory:
by virtue of their form alone, or by virtue of the
meanings of the words involved.
Considering the former alternative, if the form of
"Aristotle is not an Aristotle" is analysed as simply
"Fa", no conclusion about its being a contradiction or
not could follow. It must, therefore, have a different
form, perhaps that of a negated identity statement:
"a £ a". This is patently a contradiction, so
"Aristotle" is not a proper name. Barring some radi¬
cally new analysis on Campbell's part, there seems to
be no way to show that names with descriptive import can
avoid formal self-contradiction when they enter into
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sentonegs of the form [n is not an n]. (Claiming that
the form of our example is "Fa" is no consolation,
because while not a formal contradiction, it admits also
the analysis of "em elephant is not an elephant" as
"Fa"; thus "an elephant" would be a none.) Therefore
the decision as to whether [n is not an n] or [n are
not n] is contradictory for some n must depend not upon
form, but upon the meanings of the words. This intro¬
duces an element Campbell would rather his criterion
did without, but for the moment we might waive the fact
that this is a serious complication for him, and see
whether any view about the meaning of proper names can
provide an out.
Let us then consider how "Aristotle is not an
Aristotle" (which I shall subsequently refer to as "A")
could escaxoe self-contracliction (if it can) on the three
versions of proper names we have looked at: Mill's,
Russell's, and Bradley's. For Mil, "not A" is not
necessarily true, and nor, then, is "A" self-
contradictory. It cannot be, because the first occur¬
rence of "Aristotle" has no meaning. "According to
. . . [my] view of essential propositions, no proposi¬
tion can be reckoned such which relates to an individual
by name, that is, in which the subject is a proper
namo. But the second occurrence does have meaning,
Hiill, A System of Logic, p. 73.
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for "all concrete general terns are connotative.
Therefore since only one occurrence of "Aristotle" has
meaning, they cannot both have the same meaning, and
"A" is not self-contradictory, because it is a (degener¬
ate hind of) equivocation. If Campbell were to adopt
Mill's view, and yet try to avoid this charge of equivo¬
cation by saying that the second occurrence of "Aristotle"
also has no meaning, then "A" becomes some strange hind
of identity statement (if anything at all) which is con¬
tradictor],-, and hence "Aristotle" is not a name«
For Russell, either (a) "Aristotle" is treated as a
logically proper name, and its meaning is some particular
thing, or (b) it has no meaning (it is analysed into a
definite description, and they have no meanings on their
own). If (b), then an argument lihe the one for Hill
applies. If (a), then the two occurrences of "Aristotle"
have different meanings: the first is a thing, and the
second is a (lihely complex) property. If the second
occurrence is a name and not a general term, then either
it moans a different thing from the first, and "A"
is not self-contradictory, but is equivocal, or it means
the same thing, and "A" is self-contradictory. Thus
"Aristotle" is not a name, or it is equivocal.
So far the result is that on either denotative
theory of proper names, a name used as in "A" is used
"'"Ibid., p. 19.
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equivocally, or else Campbell's criterion will reject
the statement as contradictory, with the consequence
that the word thought to be a naiae is not a name.
The alternative to yet consider is the connotative
theory of proper names, such as I have adapted from
Bradley. The result is exactly the some. On this view,
either (1) "Aristotle" is the name of the man who was
a pupil of Plato, was born in Stagira, wrote some
philosophical treatises, etc., or (2) "Aristotle" is the
name of some other man with a different assortment of
properties. The name has a different moaning in each
case. When "Aristotle" is used predicatively it also
has a meaning, and lot us assume that it is used uni-
vocally in both versions of "A" corresponding to the
use of "Aristotle" as subject according to case (1), or
to case (2). Let us further assume that its predicative
meaning indicates something characteristic of the man
named "Aristotle" in case (1). How if the two occur¬
rences of "Aristotle" in "A" are not equivocal, "A" is
self-contradictory, since the meaning of the second
occurrence of "Aristotle" is part of the meaning of the
first. Hence "Aristotle" is not a proper name. On the
other hand, when the subject of "A" is construed as in
(2), "A" will not be self-contradictory, but only because
it is equivocal: "Aristotle" means something different
on each use in "A".
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Campbell's criterion I thus works only if he allows
sentences of the form [n is not an n] or [n are not n]
to be equivocal. But then any general term for which I
can cook up a suitable equivocation (such as in my
example with "loser,!) will be a proper name.
The difficulties we have found in Campbell's two
(together necessary and sufficient) criteria for testing
whether or not a word is a proper name all stem ulti¬
mately from the underlying misconception of a functional
category as a syntactical one, and the consequent attempt
to specify proper names as what can be a subject, rather
than specifying them by their function (which is that
they can be used to refer). The syntactical distinction
of subject and predicate is a result of the basic duality
of function in language: referring and describing.
ii. What meanings Are, including
a" Discussion of Presupi jog it ion
Returning more directly to the function of proper
names in acts of referring, I might briefly sum up my
position: referring, like winning, is an achievement--
if we do not succeed in our attempt to refer, we have
not referred. If we do refer, then it must have been
the case that there was something, and only one thing,
to which we referred. An act of reference can be
achieved through ostention, or xjords. In both cases
the object must be picked out and identified (or else,
in the case of verbal reference, one must at least have
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a reasonable belief that one could, through the knouleckje
one lias of the knowledge of others, satisfactorily
isolate the object referred to.) To communicate the
identification of something by means of words, some
information must be conveyed about the object of refer¬
ence, and this information is obtained from the meanings
of the words with which we communicate, What, we may
now ask, are meanings?
To answer this we should begin by sharpening the
notion of "information about". When we have information
about something, we know some things which con be said
to be true or false of it, i.e., we are enabled to give
a partial description of it, which is the same as
knowing some of its properties and/or relations. It
seems to ae obvious that we could never have complete
information about something in this sense, even without
assuming an infinite nurober of objects related to it,
about which we know nothing beyond their existence. But
complete information of relations to remote and exotic
objects is not necessarily needed to identify ordinary
garden variety objects. All I wish to claim is that the
non-ostonsivo identification of medium-size dry goods
can be effected by describing some of their properties
and/or relations.
Proper names, of course, do not explicitly describe
the objects they name--they do not overtly specify
properties as, say, "is six-sided, oblong, and blue"
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does. But we can and do refer with names; we must there¬
fore be able to identify (at least in the qualified
sense specified above) what is named if we refer with
a name--this means being able to describe the named
object by giving a list of properties and/or relations
the object has, since verbal (jL.o., non-ostensive)
identification relies solely upon such descriptions. (For
the sake of convenience I shall drop the inclusive dis¬
junction "properties and/or relations" in favor of just
"properties", which can be construed as something pos¬
sessed by one, or two, or three, etc. things.) Often
the descriptions we could provide are frustratingly
specific, and exploit our confidence both that someone
we know or have heard of could make the identification,
and that we, if pressed, could do so also to anyone's
satisfaction. But we should not let this circumstance
obscure the facts that we are still using descriptions
of the object, arid that there is a cluster of properties
for any given object which is prone to repetitive employ¬
ment in identifications regardless of what other useful
descriptions circumstantially come along. Contextually
obtained information (except when ostention is possible,
which is not usually) is parasitic upon this cluster of
properties; in the last analysis it is these properties
we have to rely upon when we have to no avail exhausted
our supply of accidental and specific properties in an
attempt to communicate to someone what we are talking
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about. To the e:ctent that a person can draw upon this
cluster of properties in order to specify which thing
it was whose name he was using in an attempt to refer,
to that extent he knows the meaning of the name. In
general, we can identify things with names because they
do have meanings, i.e., there is, for any name, a set
(or 'cluster') of properties implied by that name. A
sufficient condition for any purported property of a
thing belonging to the set which constitutes the meaning
of its name is that if the object named does not actually
have that property, there would be no non-arbitrary way
of deciding what the name names. I suspect that weaker
conditions also operate: for "is blind" and "spoke
Greek" seem to be as much a part of the meaning of "Homer"
as does "wrote the Illiad", yet unlike for the latter,
discontinuing discoveries about the former properties
would not cause serious difficulties for us.
nonetheless, names do imply some properties. If
there were no properties necessarily connected with the
name, we could not, in using the name, be taken to have
identified anything, or, therefore, to have referred to
anything. I may have wanted to refer to something, but
I could not have done so anymore than I could refer by
uttering a noise which ex hypothesii has no meaning.
i
It might be thought that this is exactly what we
do when we give a name. A new name, if it implies any
properties at all, surely cannot imply properties of
something it lias never been a name of; it could, in
fact, imply no properties whatsoever if it is a
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1their names," therefore to say that the essence of
Thompson includes rationality is to say nothing more
than that since he is a man he must be rational,
because "man" means, in part, being rational. These
are the innocuous "nominal essences" of Locke's. Ilis
"real essences", however, are another matter; Mill sug¬
gests that physics takes the real essences of ordinary
objects to be their "corpuscular structure", but he
declines to offer a definition of what the real essences
of corpuscles and other basic entities might be. This
studied impartiality is not an ovasion, but is actually
meant to be a rhetorical device indicating his rejection
of real essences; for on the previous page he emphatical-
ly says: "Individuals have no essences." Thus the idea
of an object cannot include any properties which are
special, unique, and essential to it--it must include
only ordinary properties, properties which the object
in fact has, but ones other objects might have as well.
It appears, therefore, that the account of proper
names which Mill slips into under pressure from the
absurdity of his chalk-mark analogy—that proper names
are connected with the ideas of the objects they name--





quite distinct from and incompatible with the account
he gives in more guarded moments, and it is, as I am
arguing, substantially correct. However, it is the
theory of proper names as meaningless, as purely
denotating terms, which is quite justifiably remem¬
bered as Hill's; it is this theory which he explicitly
advocates, seemingly mindless of the complications
introduced by ideas of objects.
Campbell has suggested, in the article discussed
above, that the view of proper names I have been recom¬
mending- -that they have meanings which consist of some
of the properties of the thing named—does not represent
a view opposed to Mill's. He says,
If Hill's definition is to lead to any workable
account of proper names, his notion of connotation
needs to be freed from any suggestion of meaning
the associations to which a normal use of the name
might give rise, associations which might vary
from person to person. For these same reasons, the
current Searle-Strawson account of the descriptions
'presupposed' by the use of proper names shoifld give
no encouragement to those who are still tempted to
say that proper names do have connotation, thinking
that thereby they are at variance with a Million
treatment.1
It is not exactly clear what he means by a "sugges-
tion of meaning the associations to which a normal use
of the name might give rise", but whatever he does mean
by it, he thinks that it represents a wrong idea of
Hill's "connotation", and that dearie (I shall consider
Campboll, "Proper llanes", Hind, 1968, p. 333. My
account of proper names is heavily "indebted to dearie,
as will be even more apparent below.
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his view mainly) advocates it, and that therefore
Searle's theory, when it attributes connotation to
proper names, does not attribute to them what Mill
denied of then. Campbell mentions two misconceptions
about Hill's "connotation", one of which ho appears
to explicitly impute to Searle in the contest of the
passage I quoted, and another which, were it correct
(i.e., were it a misconception), would also apply to
Searle.
The first derives from a mucklle about "imply":
when a word connotes a property, it is said to imply
the property. Implication might be taken as a relation
between ideas which psychologically are necessarily
associated together (i.e., always are associated
together in thought), or it might bo taken as a purely
logical relation, as Campbell suggests Mill might have
taken it. He implies just before the passage I quoted
that we must understand Mill's "connotation" in the
latter- way, because of the poverty of associationist
explanations of implication, dearie, he seems to sug¬
gest, is still bedeviled by this relic from the past--
he puts scare-quotes around Searle's "presupposed" as
if to emphasise that this is different from "implied"
as explained in logic, and reminiscent of associationist
accounts in which ideas bring one another to roind. This
of course is absurd; Searle no more holds an association
psychology than Campbell does. But we might wonder what
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"presupposition" does mean for Searle, if it does mean
anytiling else than logical implication. I shall pursue
this matter a bit, for it will throw some light upon my
own use of that notion. Scarle uses "presupposition,
plus various other expressions ('"backing", "condition",
"precondition") often enough in both of his articles on
proper names," but almost always it is with regard either
to the use of a name, or to the object named, and not
to the name itself. That is, as with many things we do,
certain other things are required in order for us to be
able to do what it is we wish to do. Reading, e.g.,
presupposes certain abilities and skills. Successfully
using a name to refer presupposes the ability to
identify what is referred to. It presupposes also, if
the name is used more than once, that the object referred
to is in some respect the same object each time. These
presuppositions are not independent: "to presuppose
that the object is the same in turn presupposes a
criterion of identity, that is, it presupposes an ability
on the part of the speaker to answer the question 'In
virtue of what is the object at time t-j referred to by
name IT, identical with the object at time t0l referred
2
to by the same name?'." This sense of presupposition
^"dearie, "Proper Names", Philosophy and Ordinary
LAddddbib (ed.) Caton, pp. -"Proper Homes and
Descriptions", Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (ed) Edwards,
vol. G, pp. 487-491.
o
dearie, "Proper Names and Descriptions", op. cit.,
p. 489,
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is more or less the same as I was using above in section
2.A. of this chapter.
On the other hand, Searle says:
How what I am arguing is that the descriptive force
of "This is Aristotle" is to assert that a suffi¬
cient but so far unspecified number of these state¬
ments [from "a set of uniquely referring descrip¬
tive statements"] are true of this object. . . .
To use a proper name referrincrly is to presuppose
the truth of certain uniquely referring statements,
but it is not ordinarily to assert: these statements
or even to indicate which exactly are presupposed, I
Ilere presupposing is connected with assertions and state-
ments--they, not abilities, are what are presupposed.
But they are presupposed by an act of referring, a use
of a name, so we still have not got a logical connection
in the sense of a relation between expressions. However,
in talking about the descriptive force of a name, Searle
considers himself to be elucidating the claim that names
have a sense, and in this connection he says,
We might rephrase the question "Do proper names
have sense?" as "Do proper names entail any
descriptive predicates?" or simply as "Are any
propositions that contain a proper name as a sub¬
ject and a descriptive expression as a predicate
analytic?"2
From this passage it is clear that "presupposition"
is meant to have logical force, if, that is, the ques¬
tion posed is answered affirmatively. Is it?
If it asks whether or not proper names are
logically connected with characteristics of the
■^Searle, "Proper Names", op. cit., p. 159.
2
Searle, "Proper Names and Descriptions", op. cit.,
p. 489.
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objects to which, they refer, the answer is "Yes,
in a loose sort of way.
Two questions thus arise: how are these two senses
of presupposition related (acts presupposing abilities,
and names presupposing descriptions), and how is the
second, the "loosely" logical one, related to implica¬
tion (i.e., entailment)? Looking at the latter question
first, we can immediately observe that what is meant by
"loose" has nothing to do with the logic involved (how
could a logical relationship be loose?), but rather
refers to Searle's view that the descriptive statements
presupposed are not specific. For anyone at any particu¬
lar time, some, but not necessarily any actually desig¬
nated subset, of the true descriptive statements about
some thing are presupposed by the name of that thing.
The looseness consists in that subset not being deline¬
ated once and for all.
Strictly speaking, implication is something which
obtains between statements (or propositions, or sentences,
etc., whichever ore you choose to grind), not between
terms or expressions which are not statements, such as
names and descriptions. Both Hill and Searle do use
"imply" in the latter way (actually Searle uses "entail",
both for his own view and when speaking of Mill's). But
we can easily translate such useage into the stricter
usage: if an egression is said to entail (imply) some
"Ibid., p. 490.
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property (or better, an expression for some property),
we can take that to roean that any statement containing
the former expression as the subject entails (implies)
some other statement which contains it as the subject,
and which contains the expression for that property as
the predicate. An analogous translation can be made for
presupposing. Then letting 'S1 and 8P' be statements,
our question can be phrased: what is the difference
between fS presupposes P' and 'S entails P'?
Searle does not discuss this, but he does say that
in using "presuppose" he is following Strawson;^ so let
us look at what Strawson says:
It is self-contradictory to conjoin S with the
denial of P if P is a necessary condition of the
truth, simply, of S. it is a different kind of
logical absurdity to conjoin S with the denial of
P if P is a necessary condition of the truth or
falsity of S. The relation between S and P in
tKe first case is that S entails P. We need a
different name for the relation between S and P
in the second case; let us say, as above, that S
presupposes P.2
When Strawson says that P is a necessary condition
of the truth, simply, of S, he is talcing the symbol "P"
to represent a statement about a fact, not the fact
itself (as is obvious from the context of the quoted
passage, if not already from his use of it in the expres¬
sion "S entails P"). But statements are either true or
false or neither. Since nothing entails a statement
1
Searle, "Proper llames", op. ext., p. 150.
2 -
Strawson, Introduction to Logxcal Theory, p. 175. i
have changed St rawsem ' s symbol "S,!! ever;;where into "P".
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which is neither true nor false, he cannot mean to
include that possibility for P when he talks of it as
being a necessary condition™ Could the truth of S have
as a necessary condition the falsity of P? Since this
case is parallel to the other, we can ash: could the
truth or falsity of S have as a necessary condition the
falsity of P? If so, we could say that the truth or
falsity of "the king of France is bald" has as a neces¬
sary condition that "there exists on© and only one king
of France" is false. This of course is just the oppo¬
site of what Strawson wants to claim. So what the
truth of S, or the truth or falsity of S have as a neces¬
sary condition is the truth of P. We can represent the
two cases as follows:
(1) S entails P iff; the truth of P is a necessary con¬
dition of the truth of S, together with the assump¬
tion that S . <»P, results in a contradiction.
(2) S presupposes P iff; the truth of P is a necessary
condition of the truth or falsity of S, together
with the assumption that S . ~P, results in a
different kind of logical absurdity from that of
contradiction.
If we are to discover the difference between entail¬
ment and presupposition, we must find out how the logical
absurdity of case (2) differs from contradiction. But
if the assumptions in case (2) can also be shown to be
contradictory in the same sense as for case (1), the
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distinction will disappear. So let us first see how (1)
is contradictory. If the contradiction is straight¬
forwardly logical, the expression "is a necessary condi¬
tion of" must be understood as a logical one. Typically
this is done with the material conditional; it, however,
forms a statement from statements, not frora facts such
as, e.g., the truth of some statement, or the truth or
falsity of some statement. It must be construed as com¬
bining the statements which express such facts: "'P' is
true", "fS« is true", n,S' is true or false", etc. Since
disjunction also combines statements, and not--logically
speaking--predicates, we can understand "'S® is true or
false" only as "'S' is true or 'S ® is false". But "'S'
is false" if and only if "'~3' is true" (the negation
of something neither true nor false is still neither true
nor false). Finally, "'S1 is true or '~S® is true" is
equivalent to ®"S or ' is true". Hot; we can rewrite
(1) and (2) as:
(3) S entails P iff:
C(»S" is true D "P" is true) . "S . ~P" is true]
is contradictory.
(4) S presupix>ses P iff:
[("S V ~S" is true D "P" is true) . "S . ~P» is
true] is logically absurd, but not contradictory.
The metathooretical devices can now be dropped, for
the truth conditions of "'A' is true D ®B® is true" are
the same as for "A D B": the former is false only (and
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otherwise true) when "'A' is true" is true, and "'B* is
true" is false, i.e., when "A" is true, and "B" is false.
Likewise, mutatis mutandis, for "'A . MB" is true". (3)
and (4) thus simplified become:
(5) S entails P iff {(S D P) . (3 . ~P)} is contradictory.
(6) S presupposes P iff ([(3 v ~S) D P] . (S . ~P)} is
absurd.
We can now see how the assumptions of (1) result in
contradiction: assume an S and P such that S D P and
S . ~P; from the latter we get S by separation, and with
that and the former we get P by detachment; we can also
get ~P from the same place we got S, so by conjunction
we have P . ™P. However, we can now just as easily show
that the assumptions of (2) result in a garden-variety
contradiction as well: if we have an S and P such that
(S v ~3) D P and also S . ~P, then we have (S D P) .
(~S D P) also, since it is equivalent to the former; by
separation we can obtain S D P, and together with S
separated from the second initial assumption, we get P
by detachment; but ~P also comes from that second assump¬
tion, so by conjunction we have P . ~P. Since the
assumptions of both (5) and (6) result in the same kind
of absurdity, namely, contradiction, I fail to see the
difference Strawson was trying to capture. There is
some difference between (5) and (6), because from the
first assumption of (6), but not from that of (5), we
can also derive a contradiction if we further assume
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~S . HP. This does riot help to establish a distinction
between two relations any two statements might possess,
a distinction characterised by a difference in kind of
logical absurdity resulting from conjoining one with
the negation of the other. What it does suggest is that
presupposition is, quite simply, entailment by both some
statement and its negation. Presupposition is not some¬
thing radically different from entailment, but just a
tag for a certain arrangement of entailments: 3 presup¬
poses P if and only if S entails P and entails P.
Let us now see how this result accords with Searle's
account of names presupposing the truth of certain
descriptive statements. Instead of talking about
"Aristotle", for example, presupposing something, I
shall in accordance with the translation proposed above
take a statement in which "Aristotle" is used to refer
to Aristotle, say, "Aristotle is in Greece", and consider
that it presupposes "Aristotle is a person"."'" Thus if
Searle is following Strawson, he means that "Aristotle
is in Greece" entails "Aristotle is a person", and
"Aristotle is not in Greece" also entails "Aristotle
is a person". But this cannot be right; it seems to
suggest that his being a person follows from his being
in Greece, and also follows from his not being in Greece,
whereas clearly it follows from neither (Athens is in
1
Assuming for simplicity that "is" is timeless, and
Aristotle lived all his life in one country.
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Greece, but is not a person). What whether or not he is
a person does depend on is Aristotle himself. The
problem is that anything capable of attribution to a
subject seems to figure as a sufficient condition of its
being what it is. Perhaps Searle could avoid this prob¬
lem by restricting the set of statements which do any
presupposing to those which are used only to refer
(i.e., which does not also attribute some property to
what is referred to). A paradigm example of such a
statement would be thought by many to be "This is
Aristotle", and it is interesting that Searle uses this
very example at one point. Thus "This is Aristotle"
presupposes "Aristotle is a person"; we can say that
the former entails the latter, and also that "This is
not Aristotle" entails the latter. But the second case
is absurd; it might not seem so absurd if we say that
we could not ordinarily deny that something is Aristotle,
unless it might have been, and it could have been
Aristotle only if, like Aristotle, it is a person. It
is plausible, however, that I might deny of something
that it is Aristotle, not because it is not a person,
which it would have to be to be Aristotle, but because
I am blissfully ignorant of whatever "Aristotle" might
mean, yet I am quite certain that this thing's name is
(say) "London", and not "Aristotle". So why in this case
should my saying "This is not Aristotle" entail something
about any particular thing named "Aristotle" rather than
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some other thing named "Aristotle"? It would seem, then,
that in this restricted set of statements we do not have
presupposition after all, but at best only entailment.
And that is not even to mention the violence such a
restriction would do to the basic thesis that the use of
names in general is such as to presuppose that what is
named has certain properties.
Worse yet, Searle says that statements like
"Aristotle is a person" are analytic, and since a neces¬
sary statement is implied by any statement, such state¬
ments are presupposed by every statement. At this point,
I think a fresh start is indicated.
Searle wants to say that "Aristotle" has a meaning
which consists of certain properties of that which
"Aristotle" names. Another way of putting the matter
is to say that "Aristotle" implies or presupposes some
other words, the words, in fact, for those properties.
And all that means is that statements in which we use
"Aristotle" to refer to Aristotle, and then go on to
predicate of Aristotle one of those properties, are
analytic. That is all that is meant by "implies" or
"presupposes" in this context, and no importance should
be attached to the terminological difference. In par¬
ticular, we should not construe Searle as following
Strawson's distinction between entailment and presup¬
position (at least as I have argued it must be inter¬
preted) . For if "Aristotle" implies "is a person" is
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roughly analogous to "S implies P", how could "Aristotle"
presupposes "is a person" be even roughly analogous to
"S implies P, and ~S implies P"? What, in other words,
would the truth of correspond to, if the truth of
"S" corresponded to using "Aristotle" to refer? Any
answers I can think of (e.g., not using "Aristotle" to
refer, but not to Aristotle, etc.) just do not make
sense, either on their own right, or in connection with
the claim that they would imply that Aristotle is a
person.
Therefore, what is logical in Searle's use of
"presuppose" (and, I might add, in Mill's use of "imply")
is contained in the assertion that statements such as
"Aristotle is a person" are analytic (for Mill, that
statements like "Any man is rational" are analytic).
With this interpretation, the complications just noted
arising from recasting the relata of "presupposes" from
terras to statements are avoided. The result is simpler,
and it achieves a naturalness intended, I think, by
both Searle and Mill. Thus when I say that S presupposes
P, or that S implies P, I intend to follow Searle and
Mill: I mean that S is P is analytic.
What about the other sense of "presuppose" men¬
tioned earlier, in which an act of referring by using
a name is said to presuppose the ability to identify
what is referred to? Is this totally unconnected with
the logical sense, the analysis of which I have been
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concerned with up till now? If so, we night as well—
indeed we probably should—simply change our terminology
and stop worrying. But they are not unconnected. I
said earlier that achieving an act of referring presup¬
poses that the referent exists, and is only one thing,
and that these conditions are satisfied if the object
can be identified." How there is something logical about
that claim; we are even inclined to say that it must be
true, that being the result of a conceptual elucidation,
it is a kind of analytic truth. That is precisely what
I wish to suggest. "Presupposes" only appears to be
relating acts and abilities; in fact it is functioning
just as it does in the claim that "Aristotle" presupposes
(implies) "being a person". In the latter case "presup¬
posed' serves to elucidate that a certain property is
part of the meaning of a certain name. In the former
claim it is the meaning of "referring" itself which is
being elucidated: to refer is, in part, to perform an
act, the success of which requires the existence of
just one thing, a thing which the performer is able to
identify. I would add, of course, that linguistic
reference also involves using words which serve as
"'"This cannot be strengthened to "... if the
object is identified" because some types of singular
reference, e.g., definite descriptions, do not by them¬
selves contain enough inforraation for the identification
of the thing to which reference is being made. I shall
argue below that proper names cannot be thought to do
so either, without involving the dubious principle of
the identity of indiscernibles.
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devices for identification; it is only via the properties
of thing that it can be isolated and piclced-out verbally.
Whether or not Searle would put the matter this may I
cannot say; in any case, it is horn I wish my use of
"presuppose" in this sense to be understood.
The second, misconception about "imply" which CampbeH
mentions is not explicitly attributed to Searle, but he
does say: "That Mill's usage of 'connotation' is not
uniform is important in view of the muddles into which
l
later writers have got." Campbell says that by "connote"
Mill meant that a word implied a property, as "white"
implies the property whiteness; he is then pussled why
Mill does not say that "man" connotes manhood, instead
of what he actually said, that it connotes "corporiety,
o
animal life, rationality, and a certain external form".
These, Campbell scolds, are not what "man" should con¬
note , but rather are properties "which provide the
criterion for the correct application of the name 'man'."
Quite so; and it is just because they do provide it,
that they constitute the meaning of the word, that they
are connoted by it. As Searle puts it: "For Mill a
common noun like 'horse' . . . connotes those properties
which would be specified in a definition of the word
^"Campbell, "Proper Names", Hind. 1968, p. 330.
%Iill, A System of Logic, p. 19.
°Campbell, op. cit., p. 330.
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'horse® . . . Campbell has stumbled over an acci¬
dental feature of one of Mill's examples—'snow is
white", in which "white" is said to denote white things
and connote the property whiteness, i.e., the property
of having a white colour. That only one property is
connoted, the name of which, "whiteness", is parasitic
upon the x/ord which connotes it, is due not, as Campbell
would have us believe, to the view that defining proper¬
ties are not connoted, but to the fact that colours
happen to be simple--they have no defining characteris¬
tics. With regard to "man" Mill did not have to resort
to some stop-gap like "manhood"; but he was forced to
do so with "white", since that xjord cannot connote the
properties xjhich provide criteria for its correct use--
there are none. So xjo should not take Mill's analysis
of "snox-j is xjhite" as the key to his theory of connota¬
tion, but merely as an example of how he handles the
seemingly non-connotative common names for simple proper¬
ties of sensation.
This all together, then, puts paid to both of
Campbell's arguments that the cormotative theory of
proper names I have been advocating does not represent
a viexj directly opposed to Hill's. I can now collect
together a number of threads running through this
section.
^"Scarle, "Proper Names and Descriptions", op. git.,
p. 487.
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Referring is an achievement-act performed by
people; it is performed with or without words, the latter
kind of act being called ostention. Proper names are one
of the various kinds of words and expressions which can
be used to refer. A successful act of reference pre¬
supposes the existence of one and only one thing to
which one is referring; this is part of what "referring"
means. That part of a statement which is used to refer
is called the subject; the rest is called the predicate,
and it lias the function of describing or giving further
information about the thing referred to by the use of
the expression which serves as the subject. An act of
reference is accomplished by identifying some object by
one means or another. If the purpose of identifying
the object is to draw attention to the object by virtue
of its features, so that it can thereby be picked-out
and distinguished from other objects, but not to say of
some antecedently picked-out object that it lias such-
and-such features, then one has done what is termed a
linguistic act of reference. In using a proper name to
refer, the object is picked-out and identified by virtue
of the meaning of the name. The meaning of a name is
a number of properties of the thing which are implied
by the name, i.e., those properties which, when used
individually in predications, form an analytic statement
when joined to a subject which is the proper name in
question.
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iii. Arcuments for the
Connotative Theory
We have already seen, seme negative arguments against
the denotation theory; what arguments are there which are
specifically for the alternative, the connotative theory?
a) dearie's Arguments
There are, first of all, the two arguments of
Searle's turned around: we do make informative identity
statements and false existential statements, and both
can be satisfactorily explained by the connotative
theory. In an informative identity statement, such as
"Tully is Cicero" we successfully refer twice, but do
so with names whose meanings are not fully or accurately
known to whomever the statement informs. These state¬
ments are exactly on a par with statements like "marble
is crystallised limestone", which can be either informa¬
tive or tautologous, depending upon what one knows. In
both kinds of statements the informative aspect is due
to an original ignorance of the proper meanings of the
words. An identity statement is true or false insofar
as the properties meant by the names describe the same
or different objects, respectively. There is, however,
a further sense of "informative" which is not connected
with ignorance. Even if we know that Tully is Cicero,
the truth of "Tully is Cicero" seems different from that
of "Cicero is Cicero", and we try to convey that by
calling the former, but not the latter, informative.
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The difference between these two cases can bo represented
in a connotative theory as follows: the latter case is
one in which there is no possibility of the identity
statement having on one side a name which implies a dif¬
ferent sot of properties from that implied by the name
on the other side--the name is the same on either side.
In the former case, however, there is such a possi¬
bility—in fact it often happens. It can, because
nothing requires that the two or more names of a thing
(if it has more than one) all imply the exact same set
of properties. "Tully is Cicero" is thus contingent,
for the fact that the two sets of properties describe
the same individual is contingent. By the same sort of
reasoning, "Cicero is Cicero" is analytic.
Existential statements, true or false, can be viewed
on a connotative theory not as attempts to refer, but
rather as statements about whether or not the properties
which the name means are anywhere found together. If
they are not, as in the case "Pegasus exists", the state¬
ment is false and meaningful—they say in effect that the
name cannot successfully be used to rofer. That follows
because of the world, not because of the meaning of the
name. Thus iinscombo's dual explanation for the truth
of "Caesar exists" and "Pegasus does not exist", with
its stipulated distinction between genuine and psuedo-
propor names, need not arise. Membership in the cate¬
gory of proper names does not depend upon things in the
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world, but the ability to successfully refer with a
proper name does.
It night bo objected that these arguments are not
adequate for showing that proper names have sense, for
there might be an alternative account which could also
satisfactorily deal with such statements. But I have no
idea what such an alternative would be; for me it is
quite plain that either proper names have sense, or
they do not. What could the middle view be which I am
unjustifiably excluding? Perhaps it might be suggested
that just as numbers are neither red nor not red, it is
a category mistake to say that proper names can have or
not have meanings. But if anything lias meaning, words
do, so proper names on this view could not bo words,
which is fatal, I think, to any reasonable theory of
proper names. Since the denotative and connotative type
theories exhaust the possibilities, showing that one
cannot while the other can account for certain facts
constitutes an argument in favor of the latter.
It might be suggested that contextual considera¬
tions afford a via media between connotative and denota¬
tive theories. As I conceive these theories, however,
there is little room left between. A denotative theory
denies that a name implies any of the named thing's prop¬
erties, while a connotative theory claims that all or
some of them are implied. It is within this framework
that I discuss below which properties are those that
constitute meaning's. (See below, pp. 341f.) Since
any view which holds that any of a thing's properties
are implied by its name is a connotative theory, any
alternative to a coimotative theory must, like denotation
theories, deny the implication of properties by names.
While conceding the theoretical possibility of a non-
denotative theory of proper names which does not involve
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b) Linguistic Arguments
A rather different kind of argument consists in
looking at a variety of actual names and a number of
different uses to which they can be put, apart from
explicitly referring uses.^ For example, they can be
names implying properties (to which the qualification
'type' in the text above is a concession), I am at a
loss to understand the difference between it and an
unabashed denotative view. If we consider the relation
between names and their objects presumed by the denota¬
tion theory, how are we to distinguish it from the rela¬
tion presumed by someone who says that nothing we know
or could ever know about any particular object is
relevant with regard to our use of the name? I do not
mean to attribute this view to one who advances the
importance of contextual considerations for proper
names; I mean only to draw the consequences of the
connotative/denotative distinction far enough to show
that the claims of context are a burden greater than
the denotative theory can bear. Contextual considera¬
tions are quite important in our actual deterraination
of just which thing is being referred to, and these
considerations are invariably such as to provide clues
as to where a thing was when, or as to how it looked,
or who is acquainted with it, etc. 1 attempt below to
discuss the relation of a thing's contextually under¬
stood properties to the properties which are taken to
constitute the meaning of its name (see below, pp.
358-361). The point worth emphasising here, however,
is simply that our context provides information about
things, and that, were it to be explicitly formulated,
it would appear as properties predicated of things.
The difficult question about context is not whether it
provides an alternative to connotative theories (it
cannot, since it is one), but which, if any, of the
contextually associated properties contribute to the
meaning of the name? Host of them are far too specific
to be considered part of the name's meaning, since
meanings must to some extent bo "inter-subjective".
Some of the following examples wore suggested by
Gardiner in various parts of his The Theory of Proper
Names, though not in support of the argument for which
they are here adduced.
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used with articles: "a Ford", "a Napoleon.", "the new
Jerusalem"; with plurals: "lie saw a dosen Jane's in the
mirrors"; with both: "the Andes", "the Pleiades", They
can be used as noun-modifiers: "the Rhodesia blockade",
"a Winston Churchill accent". All of these grammatical
constructions are such that the place occupied by the
proper name could be filled by a common noun, and moot
of then would be much more often used with common nouns
than proper names. (It might be said that in "the
export blockade", e.g., the name "Rhodesia" has been
replaced by an adjective, not a noun. If this were
generalised into an objection against all my examples,
it would amount to a rejection of the commonly recog¬
nised category of noun-modifiers: all words used to
modify a noun would have to bo adjectives. "Export",
of course, has a recognised use as an adjective, as a
glance in any dictionary will show. But my dictionary,
at least, does not recognise as having an adjectival use
seven of the eight modifying words in the following
plausible, even if improbable, signpost inscription:
"Mohawk Squadron Emergency Airplane Radar Parts Replace¬
ment Supply Depot". But even were the objection allowed,
it -would be of no importance against the point I wish
to make, for adjectives as well as common nouns are
general and have meaning.) If, then, our understanding
of such constructions is dependent in pari upon the
meanings of the common nouns involved, if, e.g., we know
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the moaning of the expression "the older rug" only if
wo know the moaning of "rug"—then it is difficult to
see how we could understand those constructions when
the general term is replaced by a word which is sup¬
posedly without any meaning. Or to put it another \mj,
if it is conceded that names in such constructions have
meanings--that "the Rhodesian blockade", e.g., means a
blockade against the former African colony of Britain
in which there is presently a suppressive minority
government whose independence and legitimacy are not
recognised by Britain--then how can a word such as
"Rhodesia" have no meaning ono moment, and just 'pick
up' a meaning the next, even within the space of a single
sentence: "Winston Churchill seldom spoke with the now
familiar Winston Churchill accent"?
Proper names can be modified by adjectives and
possessive pronouns. When a common noun is thus modi¬
fied, it is often explained as a restriction of the
applicability of the noun; this achievement is tanta¬
mount to the creation of a net? general term, the meaning
of which consists of the properties implied by the noun
plus the properties added try the adjective or pronoun.
Thus :small man" is a gen ral term which means being
corporeal, rational, possessing animal life, a certain
external form, one. moreover, being small. Examples of
modified proper names are: "young Billy Jones", "my
little Mary", "psuodo-Dionysus". The denotation
theorist would probably say that it is not necessary to
give an explanation such as the one above which requires
the modified word to have a moaning, and if ho does 1
would agree, for the cases are not strictly analogous.
But if he proceeds to explain then by saying that they
amount to assertions that the object denoted possesses
the specified properties, I must object: that does not
give the whole picture. To say that "My little Mary is
talcing piano lessons" is represented by "Fa . Ga . Ha",
where "a" denotes Mary, "H" is "taking piano lessons",
"F" is "little", and "G" is "belongs to me" or "is
related (in some literal or metaphorical sense of that
word) to me"--to say that is to miss the point of what
has been said. "My little Mary" is an expression which
is being used to refer, and only "H" is being predicated
of what is referred to. Talcing this into account, the
denotation theorist might say that "F" and "G" are su¬
perfluous in the analysis after all; just write "Ha".
But then part of the expression the user of the sontenco
felt it necessary to include to insure that his refer¬
ence was understood will have been omitted. He did not
originally say only "Mary is talcing piano lessons",
because ho thought it might not have been clear which
Mary--the point being that often more than one thing
hao the same name, as the other examples I gave perhaps
indicate more clearly. It is even more explicit in "I
have three Sam Goldwin's in my class". What I wish to
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maintain Id that these names have multiple meanings,
and that the qualifiers sometimes conjoined to then
serve to indicate which meaning is intended in some
particular use of the name. Such qualifiers might (but
need not) be redundant, for they might add nothing to
the moaning already given by the name; even so, they are
still useful for indicating the relevant meaning, for
disambiguating. That, incidently, is why I thixuc that
these examples are different from the typical case of
a modified common noun--the adjectives in "small man"
and "big man" do not indicate different meanings of
"man". (There is, however, an exactly analogous situ¬
ation with homonymous common nouns, such as "pipe",
"beetle", "jack", and "rut". Sometimes they are disam¬
biguated by the use of a superfluous modifier, as in
"a smoking pipe", "a crawly beetle", "a lifting jack",
etc. ilotico on the other hand that the modifier in
"a leather jack" disambiguates, but is not superfluous;
in "a water pipe" it is not superfluous, but does not
disambiguate either; and in "a hollow pipe" it does not
disambiguate, but is superfluous.)
Faced with two Mary's, the denotation theorist need
not throw in the towel and admit that the name has two
meanings, and hence that names in general have meaning.
He might say that the name is equivocal, and mean by that
merely that it designates more than one thing. But then
most names would be equivocal, and practically all
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sentences containing a proper name would be ambiguous--
"John is sick and John is not sick" could not prima
facie be held to be self-contradictory. Alternatively,
he might say either that such names are not genuine
nones, or that they really are several names. Russell
hold the first, and Mill probably held the second
(although it is difficult to be sure); both options are
totally arbitrary, and border on fiddling the facts to
fit the theory. The first has the absurd consequence
that virtually all proper names recognised as such, are
not proper names after all; the second is almost vacuous
without some criterion for distinguishing the name
"John" from the different nam "John". Labeling them
with subscripts is technically possible in artificial
languages, but it is silly to say that we do this in
practice or to recommend that we do it. The simplest
and most natural criterion for a name's being the same
name is phonetic or graphic isomorphism, and if that is
accepted, then we must hold that proper names have
meanings to account for the different John's and Iiary's.
Some proper names are overtly descriptive, and
they clearly originated as descriptions true of the
things they name. Some ©samples are "The Royal Bank
of Scotland", "University of Edinburgh", "Commercial
United Assurance Limited", "Choral Symphony", "Dartmouth";
such a list could be extended almost indefinitely.
These names identify the things they are used to refer
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to not only by implying properties of the things, but
by actually specifying some of them outright. Hill,
as would bo expected, objected to this way of viewing
sueh names, and ho gave a well-known argument against it:
A town may have been named Dartmouth, because it
is situated on the mouth of the Dart. But it is
no part of the signification of the word . . .
Dartmouth, to be situated at the mouth of the Dart.
If sand should choke up the mouth of the river,
or an earthquake change its course, and remove it
to a distance from the town, the name of the town
would not necessarily be changed. That fact,
therefore, can form no part of the signification
of the word; for otherwise, when the fact con¬
fessedly ceased to be true, no one would any
longer think of applying the name.1
Gardiner cites a linguist who, pursuing the logic
of this argument to an extreme, concluded that no
expression with a descriptive import could be a name
until the description became false; Spittal, in Corinthia,
e.g., did not have a name until there were no hospitals
there, and "Dartmouth" 'will not be a name until the sand
or earthquakes comes. Gardiner rightly rejects this
without much ado, but his reaction to Mill's argument
itself is curious1;/ ambivalent. He says that such names
are names "because they are accepted as the designations
of the [thingsj in question, and because they are known
to be the right linguistic instrument for identifying
them"; but still they do have a meaning, and "for lis¬
teners ignorant of the objects to \tfhich they refer the
"kiill, A System of Logic, p. 20.
2
Gardiner, The Theory of Proper Homes, p. 8.
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meaning thus afforded might provide some identificatory
help." He concludes, therefore, that "proper names that
have a clear etymology or recall some similarly con¬
structed proper name are slightly less pure examples of
the category than completely arbitrary and unintelligible
1
names". Strictly speaking, then, proper names designate
and have no meaning, but some are unfortunately sullied
by having an origin not exactly arbitrary, while others
are degraded from their pristine innocence by unwanted
analogies and associations. Gardiner wants to say,
against Mill, that many names have meaning, but with
Mill, that they do not. lie manages to do this by
stressing that "the term proper name has reference to
the mode of functioning which certain words possess
2
within the mechanism of speech". Thus even though a
proper name might have a meaning, it is irrelevant to
the function of the name: "Ultimately, York will prove
much more informative than cathedral-1own, but in itself
it does no more than establish the identity of the town
spoken about". The notion of the function of a name
being to identify what it names is not a casual aside
for Gardiner, but is rather the basic principle upon
which proper names work.





I would agree that the category of proper names
should be characterized functionally, and that their
function of being able to be used to refer involves, in
an essential way, the process of identifying things.
Unfortunately, Gardiner nowhere explains how things are
identified by words, and he does not seem to realize
that it can be accomplished only by means of informative
descriptions. "York", he allows, is richly informative,
much more so than the suggested meaning "cathedral-toxm",
but this, he says, has nothing to do with its capacity
for identification. What does though, is a mystery.
It is curious that, without realizing it, he was
close enough to the correct connection between identi¬
fying and informing (i..e., describing) as to remark upon
them both in the same breath, only to arrive at a con¬
clusion diametrically opposed to the (I think) obvious
one. Why, that is, did Gardiner feel it necessary to
point out the informative nature of proper names, only
to deny of this aspect any importance with regard to
their use in the identification of objects, without
equally denying the importance of, say, their capitali¬
zation? Could it have been that he dimly realized that
these unimportances are unequal? Perhaps it was simply
because as a linguist he was more sensitive to the
actual functioning of proper names, yet like Mill, he
was coropletely unaxjaro of the difficulties involved in
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the idea of a simple, meaningless, one-to-one designating
relation between words and things.
However this minor pussle is resolved, it remains
that his objection to Mill's argument is somewhat beside
the point (although intentionally so); he is only quib¬
bling over whether we do or do not ever think of the
the meanings of the words which make up some proper
names, and Mill's own argument about "Dartmouth" (which
Gardiner cites) should have settled that, since it pre¬
sumes the activity in question. The main point that
"Dartmouth" identifies Dartmouth without the aid of any
kind of meaning is completely accepted.
Mill's argument does not work, however, and for
reasons that Bradley could easily have advanced and
should have. The mistaken assumption is that the
meanings of proper names must be derived exclusively
from the meanings of their parts. The meaning of
"Dartmouth" is thus assumed to be "that on the mouth
of the Dart". (It is no mere accident that "Dart" was
given no analogous explication, for it is not composed
of words which are not proper names; but the ease with
which he switched from "Dart" to "the river" is instruc¬
tive.) On this assumption, "Dartmouth" should be dis¬
carded as the name for Dartmouth were the Dart to change
course above its mouth. But the assumption is wrong--
"Dartmouth" means much more than being situated on the
mouth of the Dart. It includes a whole host of
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properties, of which the one suggested by Mill is only
a little part. If one of Mill's catastrophes were to
occur, the meaning of "Dartmouth" would shift, but no
differently from the way the meaning of "music" has
shifted since the discoveries of Schoenberg, or that of
"star" since the invention of telescopes. The moaning
of any word is subject to changes from many sources,
but xdiatever the source, the effect is always an altera¬
tion of the set of properties of the thing or things to
which the word applies which are considered "essential".
This is not to suggest that substances have certain
properties without which not, but only that things with¬
out these properties cannot be called by that name. The
necessities involved are those of symbolic conventions,
not metaphysics. After Mill's earthquake "Dartmouth"
need mean "on the Dart" no more than "England" now means
"land of the Angles". So Mill's argument does not show
that proper names do not have meanings, but only that
the meanings of ostensibly descriptive proper names can¬
not be identified with, or even be held to necessarily
include the description which the name overtly specifies.
This same phenomenon occurs also in complex common
nouns, and does not cause any doubts there that the words
have moaning; e.g., the meaning of'tegghead" has nothing
to do with eggs or heads, nor does "oldwife" (a kind of
fish) have anything to do with wives or being old, any¬
more than "goosefoot" (a kind of herb) has to do with
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geese or feet. However, in spite of Hill's argument,
some proper names are overtly descriptive of the thing
they name, and some of these names, unlike "Dartmouth",
describe characteristics which are quite central to the
meaning of the name. While no one would worry much if
the Dart changed its course, we would think it a bad
joke at least, if not even an outright deception, were
The Royal Bank of Scotland to lose its ro^^al charter,
move all its places of business to Leeds, cease its com¬
mercial activities, and become a charitable institution
for the preservation of decrepit castles, and yet were
to retain its present name. This shows, if anything,
that some names do have a descriptive import which is
part of their meaning.
Another fact about proper names which indicates
that they have meanings concerns our learning of them.
When we first hear a name, we might say that it is a
"mere name", and after all, what's in a name? If these
egressions are taken to suggest that names have no
meanings, they only repeat an old error; but if they are
interpreted--especially the first--as a reflection upon
the fact that when we first become acquainted with a
name, we do not know what it means, then they express
what is deservedly thought of as a truism. It is often
the case when we first come upon a name in a newspaper,
and always the case in a novel, that the name tells us
nothing—i.e., we have no idea how to use it properly.
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because we know nothing about that which it can .be used
to refer to. If we are discussing harmony, and I aia
ignorant of modern Viennese developments, and you say
"Now consider Anton Webem", I slia.ll draw a blank, for
I know nothing of Webem. If 1 interrupt, and ask about
him, the replies will furnish descriptions which will
enable me to use the none with a rudimentary understanding
of whom I am talking about. The difference between my
inability to use the name correctly at first, and my sub¬
sequent ability to use it can be explained in terms of
my partially learning the meaning of the name; and all
I learned was that 3orae otherwise unspecifiable object
has certain properties.
Basically the same phenomenon occurs with common
nouns as well. On first hearing "murrain", e.g., I might
not have a clue as to what you are talking about, and the
quickest way to learn is to bo told that it means a
plague afflicting domestic animals. To be able to use
the word it is necessary to learn the salient properties
a thing must have in order that it might have the word
applied to it, and theso are no more apparent from just
inspecting the word, than aro the properties constituting
the meaning of a proper name apparent from a simple-
minded inspection of the name.
"But", a denotation theorist might complain, "you
have ignored the paradigm example of learning a name:
when what is named confronts you, and you are directly
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acquainted with it as you receive the name. There is no
problem about noonings here, and what you call noonings
in the other situations--with regard to proper names any¬
way—are no more than a few facts about what is named
which serve only as a substitute for direct acquaintance.
And even in those cases acquaintance is paramount, be¬
cause someone, we trust, has been acquainted with the ob¬
ject. That is, after all, why it lias a name. Our use of
the none is parasitic on the acquaintance someone lias.I!
Disregarding the obvious difficulties about fic¬
tional names, and the fact that many names would be
saprophytic, not parasitic, tills account of names ren¬
ders our use of them dependent upon a belief, which often
is unverifiable, that someone was once acquainted with
what is named. A more fundamental objection, however,
is that acquaintance is not the simple affair denotation
theorists often tend to assume it is. When we perceive
an objoct, we notice various properties, and it is from
these that we glean the criteria for rousing the name.
If wo did not recognise certain features of a thing, we
could not tell whether it wore the same thing, and
whether we would be justified in using- the name, on
sone future occasion. So the denotation theorist "was
correct to point out that being told the properties
associated with a name is not the only way to learn it,
but in suggesting acquaintance as the alternative way
he overlooked the fact that his alternative is an
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alternative way of learning the relevant properties: we
just directly observe them instead of having them given
via descriptions.
The following example affords a good illustration:
suppose I introduce you to Joe Harrison; three days
later we are walking along together, and I gesture
towards someone in the distance and say, "Say, isn't
that Joe Harrison?" Suppose further that it is not, and
you realise it; you might say "Ho, Joe had black hair,
didn't he?" or "Ho, it doesn't look like him," or some
such reply in which the name would be denied of that
person in the distance because of some properties this
man has and you remember Joe not to have, or vice versa.
You are able to reply this way because in learning the
name through being introduced to the person, you associ¬
ated with the name various properties. And by "associ¬
ate" I do not mean merely the vague "bringing together
in the mind" of associationist psychology; rather, I
mean at least that you use the name in a way which indi¬
cates that you would assent to the analytic truth or
falsity of certain statements in which the name was the
subject, were you ever directly asked.
Jespersen has given arguments similar to the four
I have here advocated on mainly linguistic grounds,
although he does not emphasise quite the same things I
^"(1) proper names can take articles and plurals,
and can act as noun-modifiers; (2) they can be qualified
by adjectives and possessive pronouns; (3) some are
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have."'" He has other arguments as well; two are closely
related to ray second argument and depend upon separating
the issues of plurals and modifiers which I combined.
But there is danger in separating the issues this way:
the mere fact alone that proper names can sometimes
take plurals does not by itself force the conclusion
that they have meanings. Nor does it follow that names
have meanings siraply because they can be modified by
adjectives, as Campbell supposes Jespersen to be
o
arguing. Jespersen's point is the somewhat more subtle
one that the things we name are constantly changing,
and some sentences indicate this overtly by qualifying
a proper name in such a way as to show that the thing
named has changed; e.g., "there were days when Sophia
was the old Sophia--the forbidding, difficult Sophia".
This kind of example, he suggests, is very hard to
account for if we assume that names are non-connotative.
The denotation theorist could say that ordinary proi^er
names are really a succession of independent proper
names, each naming one unchanging bit, or he might
relent and say that some changes are irrelevant. The
first alternative is exceedingly bisarre, and has the
overtly descriptive, and the content of some of these
are essential characteristics of the thing named; (4)
learning the proper use of some names can be gradual,
involving learning more about the thing named.
"Jespersen, The Philosophy of Grammar, pp. 65-71.
2
Campbell, "Proper Names", op. cit.. pp. 331-332.
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consequence that names are dependent upon properties any¬
way , for if a single property of something changes, the
1
none ceases to designate it and a new name is needed.
Lesniewski appears to have taken this first alterna¬
tive: since "Warsaw of 1831 is smaller than T. Jarsaw of
1931" is true, "Warsaw" cannot name one object only,
unless it is taken to name the four-dimensional object
Warsaw from its beginning to its end, and "Warsaw of
1031", 'Warsaw of 1931", etc., are taken to name only
parts of it. (Cited by Lejewski, "Proper IJanes", Proc.
Arist■ 3oc. Supp. Vol. XXXI, p. 253.) But each and
every change in Warsaw, no matter how fleeting, would
by the same reasoning require a name of its own, and we
have for each proper name of ordinary usage a whole
plethora of proper names, one, in fact, for each dis¬
tinguishable proper part of the thing named.
In a similar vein, Woodger has argued, that since
things truly attributable to Winston Spencer Churchill
with respect to some particular time are not attributable
to him with respect to some other time, "Churchill", and
in general all ordinary proper names, are terms not
restricted to one thing only—i.e., they are not proper
names after all. They are, quite simply, general terms.
(Woodger, "Science without Properties", The British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 2, pp. 203-
2047T~ If we want to find a proper name, therefore, we
must find an expression which can be used only of a locus
of a constant set of properties. Such loci are as
ephemeral as states of the world, and consequently, as
equinumerous. Homes, when we look, are found to breed
like the May-fly.
in due respect, it must be pointed out that neither
Woodger nor Lesniewski recognise a fundamental and cate¬
gorical distinction between singular and general terms.
For both of them names are basic, and that a name might
be a name for only ono thing-, is an eccentricity which
we note in passing with the tag "proper", or more tech¬
nically for Woodger, the tag "has cardinality 1". There
is no distinction for them between subject and predicate,
insofar as that distinction requires, as in Principia.
that the respective terras be of two different kinds:
singular and general. The formal feasibility of such
a view has its vindication even from within Princieia-
style systems in Quine's elimination of the singular
variable, following SchCnfinkel, and in the exploitation
of many-sorted logics by Smiley. (See SchSfinkel, "On
the Building Blocks of mathematical Logic", a translation
with an introduction by Quine, in Source Book in mathe¬
matical Logic, 1879-1931, (ed.) van Ileijcnoort, pp. 355-
3GG; Quine, "Variables Explained Away", Proc. of the
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The second alternative is less arbitrary, but it amounts
to saying that some changes are relevant, i.e., sone
properties are essential if the name is to continue to
be applicable, and this is about as close as one could
American Phil, doc., vol. 104, pp. 343-347, reprinted
as ch. of his delected Logical Papers; Smiley,
"Syllogism and Quantification", Journal of Symbolic Logic.
vol. XXVII, pp. 58-72.)
Inasmuch as I have boon arguing that the expressions
usually given as examples of singular terms function in
propositions just as do general terms, it might be asked
whether any of these formal developments might be recom¬
mended over the traditional Principia formalism, as more
closely capturing the actual use of language. Woodger's
system is a curious algebra of terns, the formulae of
which are statements of equality or inequality with
respect to the "cardinality" of their terms (the numeri¬
cal sine of their extensions), and which even include
arithmetical operations of addition, subtraction, and
multiplication. It is explicitly extensional (case (i)
of theorem 1G, op. cit., p. 199), and although I have
no proof, I suspect that it is isomorphic to some
ordinary set theory. Consequently, proper names are
essentially unit classes, and as such suffer from the
same difficulties which afflict the denotation theorist--
e.g., in "Sophia is not the same old Sophia"', two differ¬
ent unit classes must be involved.
The system Lesniewski called "Ontology" is somewhat
of an improvement, in that its more highly developed
state renders its evaluation more definite. It consists
of one of a variety of equivalent axioms joined to
another system which serves basically the same function
as an ordinary propositional logic. The earliest axiom
Lesniewski used for his system of ontology is perhaps
the most intuitively clear; it introduces an undefined
constant "£" which connects two terms (capitalisation
is formally meaningless--Lesniewski used it where the
term would be most naturally thought of as applying to
only one thing). The axiom is:
(A,a) :: &{Aa} . 5 :. ~((B) . ~(e{BA})) (B,G)
m
Ba
6{CA}' . D . e{BC} (B) : e{BA} . D.
(Lesniewski, "Uber die Grundlagen der Ontologie", Comptes
Bendus des s6ances do la Soci<|t6 des Sciences et dos
Lett res do Varsovio. Class e III, v. 23,* p. 114*71 It
says "that for any two terras" A and a, the A is an a iff:
something is an A, only one thing is an A, and any A is
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con© to saying that the name has a meaning without actu¬
ally saying it. This reply is quite similar to a point
made by Bradley in the course of his argument against
purely denotative names:
an a. (Cf. Slupecki, "S. Lesniewski's Calculus of Names",
Btudia Logica. vol. Ill, pp. 20-21.) In a footnote to
this axiom Lesniowski invites comparison of it to
Russell's analysis of definite descriptions, and the
suggestion is apt: were one to use singular variables,
this anion could be directly correlated with Russell's
definition of Y ((? x) (<&x)). Thus while Lesniewski does
not distinguish between singular and general terns, and
consequently appears to conform to the view that "the
only way we can linguistically got at individuals is by
speaking of them as what certain common nouns apply to",
(Prior, "Existence in Lesniewski and in Russell", Formal
Systems and Recursive Functions. (ed.) Brower, Heyting,
Robinson, Suppes, p. 154still no statement of the
form "A is a" can be true unless there exists one and
only one A. Lesniewski's special constant "£" can be
interpreted, as Prior points out (due to Los), as unit
class inclusion. Then if "Sophia is not the same old
Sophia" is represented as "~(A - A)" (whore "A = B" by
definition is "A £ B . B £ A": Slupeokl, pp. cit.. p. 40.),
it can Ice true only because either there is no A, or
because there are more than one A. But neither, by
hypothesis, is the case. Therefore that case will have
to be represented by "the one A is not the one B", i.e.,
"<v(A ~ B)", and we are again driven to conjuring names
at the drop of a distinguishing feature. While l
approve of Lesniewski*s return to a 3neo-Aristotelian'
analysis of the structure of predication, his choice for
the predicative constant is an unfortunate resurrection
of the uniqueness requirement of the denotation theo¬
rist's singular term.
I am inclined to think that the most fruitful line
for further development of a calculus which reflects the
basic views 1 have boon advocating is to bo found in
sortal logic. Smiley, extending the work of Church and
Wang, has moved in this direction, but there has not
yet been enough done in connection with the problems of
existence assumptions and the so-called "free logics",
identity, interpretation of the quantifiers, and
requisite metatheory, to permit my suggestion to lee
anything but very tentative. I do not, of course, wish
to suggest that there would be no profit in pursuing
ideas initiated by Lesniowski--his work has continuing
interest for a multiplicity of reasons, not least of
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The meaning of a sign need of course not be fixed.
But is the thing it stands for quite invariable?
If the "connotation" is unsteady, does the "denota¬
tion" never change? But where the latter is fixed
there the former on its side (within limits) is
stationary.1
Jespersen's remaining argument is somewhat dubious.
European surnames are transmitted through descent, and
he says "it would be rash to assert that Tymperleys, for
o
instance, have nothing in common but their name".
Wittgenstein's remarks on family resemblance suggest
just the opposite, and I think correctly. At best all
the Tiaberleys might be said to have in common the
properties of being a person, and being descended from
the same ancestor. Given names of people furnish better
examples, although Jespersen does not think so. They
are better because they are often restricted in such a
way as to imply a few properties regardless of who they
name, unlike surnames, whose conventions of bestowal
preclude this. "Mary" usually implies being female;
"Heinrich", being male and German; "Xavier", being male
and Roman Catholic; etc.
All of these considerations lead Jespersen to con¬
clude that
no sharp line can be drawn between proper and com¬
mon names, the difference being one of degree
which, for me, is his constant effort to make his sym¬
bolism reflect the deepest traits of language, from
which it springs.
^Bradley, Principles of Logic„ p. 60.
^Jespersen, op. cit., p. 67.
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rather than of kind. A name always connotes the
quality or qualities by which the bearer or bearers
of the name are known, i.e., distinguished from
other beings or things.~ In Mill's terminology,
but in absolute contrast to his view, I should
venture to say that proper names (as actually used)
"connote" the greatest number of attributes. <-
This is substantially the view we found in Bradley,
and the one I have been advocating here. Campbell cites
the arguments Jespersen uses, only to try to side-step
his conclusion by imputing to Jospersen, as he also did
to Searle, an associationist interpretation of "connote".
Jespersen does in fact say that "the main point in my
argument ... is that whenever the name Maud is natur¬
ally used it makes the hearer think of a whole couples:
of distinctive qualities or characters", and Campbell
duly pounces upon this statement as conclusive evidence
that Jespersen considered "connotation" to be "what the
use of a word brings to mind". But Jespersen's remark
need not lee understood so uncharitably. If the connota¬
tion or meaning of a word is a complex of properties,
it is only natural to say that if one is thinking of the
word one thinks of these properties, or at least some
of them. Be that modest claim true or false, the
important point remains: Jespersen's facts, which





a strictly non-associationist interpretation, and then
at best Campbell's objection is an irrelevant ad hominun
argument.
Apart from charging Jesperson with a confusion over
what Hill meant by "connote", Campbell says that the
view that the meaning of a name is what it makes someone
think of, is faced with "insuperable difficulties", for
most probably any name makes different people think of
different things, so how could they be thinking of the
same thing? It is no help to say that it is enough if
they each happen to be thinking of some set of descrip¬
tions (not necessarily the same set), each of which is
1
true of only one thing, as Russell has suggested, for
they may not be true of the same thing. One person
might be thinking of certain characteristics not true of
the thing whose characteristics the other person is
thinking of.
Jespersen has more or less anticipated this criti¬
cism, and he answered in effect that if this is a
problem for proper names, it is as well for other words.
If, e.g., "if is hard to see how both speaker and hearer
can be thinking of the sane thing when they talk about
O
Maud", it is just as hard if they are talking about
sugar, and the speaker is a chemist thinking of
^12^22^11' hearer is a housewife thinking of
^Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, p. 57.
^Campbell, "Proper Names", op. cit., p. 332.
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a grainy white sweetener, or if the discussion is about
flint, the speaker knowing only that it is a material
used in muskets to ignite the powder, the hearer all the
while knowing only that it is a material used in some
1
societies for making arrowheads.
But this way of meeting a problem--pointing out
that it is a bigger problem than suspected—is not very
satisfactory. If we reformulate Campbell's objection
by excising the aosociationist overtones, it then amounts
to the question of how is it possible to claim even that
a word has an unequivocal meaning, in the sense of
implying a certain specific set of properties, if the
word implies different properties for different users
of the word? We certainly cannot deny that some words
imply different things for different people; that much
is obvious fact. Moreover, consider the gradual increase
in our own knowledge of the meanings of many words,
which shows that a word implies a different set of
properties even to the same person at different times.
The consequence for proper names which Campbell wants
to draw from that fact can be answered only in a discus¬
sion of what properties, if any, are necessary and suf¬
ficient for identifying the thing named. It is these
properties which would constitute the meaning of the
name„ I shall postpone this issue; meanwhile, however,
^Cf. Jespersen, op, cit., p. G8.
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it should be remembered that the function of a name is
to lee used in an act of reference, and that the condi¬
tions upon being able to use it to refer are satisfied
if the user is able to identify that to which he refers.
This is emphatically not a condition on our ability to
communicate; one might manage a reference without knowing
an adequate, accurate, or even correct set of identifying
characteristics.
c. A Metaphysical Argument
A further argument fox* the meaningfulness of proper
names is based on what might be called metaphysical con¬
siderations. It runs as follows: there are no such
things as "bare particulars", i.e., things with no
properties. Plato says specifically that at least two
properties, being and number, are necessarily found in
anything.
It i3 also plain, that in speaking of something we
speak of being, for to speak of an abstract some¬
thing naked and isolated from all being is impos¬
sible .
But how can a man either express in words or even
conceive in thought things which arc not, or a
thing which is not, without number?--
It was argued above that this much (properly inter¬
preted) is necessary for a successful reference to some¬
thing; however, I think an even stronger claim is war¬
ranted whether or not a thing is ever referred to. From
"Plato, Sophist, 237, 238 (Jowett's translation).
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our conception of the distinction between substance and
attribute it follows that "(3s:) (J?) ~(fx)" is necessarily
false, even excluding "being" and "number" from the
values of "f"„ This is equivalent to the necessary truth
of "(x)(3f)(fx)", or "everything is such that it has sone
property". That is a different clain, of course, fron
the assertion that "everything is such that it has some
property necessarily". This latter claim is that every¬
thing has some essential attribute, without which it
could not be. The properties concerned in the claim I
on interested in making might be said to be "essential",
but not in this way. They are essential only in respect
of the thing's being called by a certain name. if the
thing is a man, say, then necessarily it is rational—
but the thing nay well not have been rational, in which
case it would not have been a man. I mentioned earlier
that the essences involved in this kind of example are
what Locke called "nominal essences", and that Hill
accepted them as quite innocuous. Hill applied this
view, however, only to common nouns, not to proper names;
he emphatically denies that individuals have essences.
But if we accept that "(x)(3f)(fx)" must bo true,
then for some particular proper name "a", "(3f)(fa)" must
also be true . Mo have already explained that if "a is
F" must be true, we can say that "a" implies "F", and if
a name implies a property, we can say that the property
is part of its meaning: that is what "moaning" means.
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From "(3f)(fa)" we cannot infer "Fa", for "F" nay not
bo the particular property. That •would be the sane mis¬
take as inferring iron "Someone is bald" that "Jones is
bald". But if "a is some f or other" must be true, then
we can at least say that "a" implies some f or other
and that therefore some f or other is part of its meaning.
Which is merely to say that "a" lias a meaning, although
wo have not shown what its meaning is.
d. Identity
The last argument for the meaning of proper names
I shall consider is one we have already run across in
the discussion of Bradley's treatment of proper names.
It depends upon the thesis that all identity statements
are relative to some general term. This being the case,
"the continued application of [aJ proper name requires,
as part of the sense of the name, that it always be
i
applied to the sane X". Or as Bradley might have put
it, the use of a proper name for some individual requires,
for "real identity", that the proper name have a meaning,
that it imply a universal which can be used to identify
and reidentify that individual. Extrapolating a bit
upon Bradley's qualification of "identity" with "real",
we might think that there is another kind of identity—
1
Goach, iiental Acts, p. 71. See above, pp. 135-136,
where the relevant passage in Bradley is also quoted from
Principles of Logic, p. 61. Soo also Goach, "Identity",
Beview of Lletaoiivsics, vol. XXI, pp. 3-12, together with
a criticism by Felckian, a rebuttal, and a reply, all in
the same journal, vol. XXII, pp. 547-561.
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perhaps "apparent identity". The difference would be
that for real identity, any statement of the form "a is
the sane as h" could only be true if some predicate F
is true of both a and b. iinother way of putting it is
to say that there is an incompleteness in tin identity
statement unless it is of the form "a is the same F as
b". On the other hand, for aomrent identity, the first
form is sufficient—there need be no relativization of
. .is the same as . . to . .is the same F as
. . .Let us call these alternative views of identity
the absolute, or A-theory (means "is the same as"),
and the relative, or R-thoory ("«" means "is the same
F as").
The argument for proper names having meaning can
be stated as follows: one con refer to something when
one can identify it. Identification, in the sense of
distinguishing that something from everything else, can
be accomplished by ostonsivo conventions, descriptions,
demonstratives, or names. It is the latter we are con¬
cerned with here. Consider a situation in which, two
names, say "a" and "b", ore used to refer to the same
thing. Either "a" and "b" are words of different typos,
or they are two words differing only as two different
tokens of the some type (e.g., either "fully" and
"Cicero", or "fully" on one occasion and "fully" on
another). Since an identity statement relating those
two names must be of the form "a is the same F as b,
for some F", it must be the case that "Fa" and "Fb" arc
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both true for seme F. In general, if (35c) (3y)(3F)(r is
the sane F as y) is true—or nore conveniently, if
(1) (3:x) (3y) (3F) (2: j? y)
is true--then for those things "which the object-
variables in (1) range over which render it true, some
predicate or other, say F, is truly predicated of them.
If two names which satisfy (1) are "reidentifications",
i.e., if they are different tokens of the same type being
used to refer to the same thing on different occasions,
then there must be some F true of the thing on both
occasions. If they are not being used to make a
reidentification, but to make a genuinely informative
identification, then again there must be scaae F true
of the thing no natter how denominated. Thus identity
statements, whether they are reidentificatory or informa¬
tive in intent, are all alike in implying that each name
involved has some (at least one) one-place predicate F
such that when F is predicated of what is named, a true
statement results. Thus
(2) (3x)(3F)(a p) D (3F) (Fa)»
Since anything is identical to itself,
(3) <3F)(ajya),
and therefore from (2) we can obtain
(4) (3F) (Fa).
Any name, therefore, which can bo used to refer to
something on the basis of our Joeing able to identify
that to which we refer, can bo said to "imply" some
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predicate, and that is a basic part of saying that it
has meaning, in the sense of "having meaning" which I
wish to argue names have. (It is only a part, since
proper names imply more than some one property. But
it is a refutation, pending the discussion which follows,
of the view that proper names have no meaning, when "a
proper name 'n' has no meaning" means "'n' does not
imply any properties".)
To relate this argument to the extrapolation of
Bradley's remark which preceded it, we 3imply observe
that the argument assumes what I have called the R~theory
of identity. Whether or not Bradley would have sanc¬
tioned the distinction of two views of identity, the
argument just given for the meaning of proper names is
squarely in accord with the spirit of his remarks, and
it does require the R-theory. Since this is incompatible
with the A-theory, one can easily see that Bradley would
have to support his view of identity to anyone who tried
to stop him by objecting that his view is wrong, that
identity is not relative to a general term, but pure,
plain, simple, and absolute.
A confrontation as I just imagined between an A-
theorist and an R-theorist has recently occurred between
Quine and Geach (although it seems not to have been
motivated by its role in an argument about proper names).
The most recent argument Geach has given for the R-
theory is complicated and ingenious, and I shall attempt
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a re-statement of what I think to be its central thesis,
divested of the ad horainum and polemical character of
the original." I think this worthwhile for two reasons:
I regard the argument as persuasive, and I do not think
that just what is the argument is at all obvious in
Geach's own presentation, If I misrepresent Geach (as
I concede is quite possible), then so be it; I am mainly
interested in the argument which I do present.
The argument is conducted within the context of a
formalised language, or theory, in the Tarski set-
theoretic sense. Thus we shall begin with a universe
containing some objects, arid our theory Tn will contain,
besides the usual apparatus for prepositional and quanti-
ficational logic, some predicates, some of which are true
of some of the objects. Let Tn also contain an I-
predicate, which is a two-place predicate satisfying
(5) (x)[Fx = (3y)(Fy . xIy)J
for any n-placo predicate F constructible in Tn. An
a-place predicate is constructible in T if m-1 of its
places can be filled up by names in T. This schema
says that given any F, and for any x, x is F iff some¬
thing is F which is also I-related to x. A consequence
of (5) is
"^Geach, "Identity" Review of metaphysics, vol. 2X1,
pp. 3-12, and "A Reply", op. cit.. vol. 2X11, pp. 556-
559. Cf. also Feldman, "Geach and Relative Identity",
oo. cit., vol. XXIII, pp. 547-555, and "A Rejoinder",
ibid., pp. 560-561.
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(6) (x) (y) (Fx . xly. = Fy),
for any F. This implies
(7) (x)(y)[xly D (Fx s Fy)J,
for any F, which is one form of what is sometimes called
the "indiscernibility of identicals". Thus "I" may be
viewed as an "indiscernibility-predicate"; i.e., what¬
ever are named by two names which can flank "I" to make
a true statement are indiscernible.
Let us assume further that apart from each object
in our universe being I-related to itself, there are
some objects indiscernible from each other; i.e., let
(B) (3x) (3y) (xly)
be true in Tn.
Now we can either construe "I" as an indiscerni¬
bility-predicate, or as absolute identity, depending
upon hot? we interpret our quantifiers—upon what our
variables range over. Consider the two possibilities,
respectively, of
(i) the objects ranged over include some which have just
the same properties,
(ii)the objects ranged over are each distinct from one
another (each has at least one property not possessed
by another).
On interpretation (ii), for (8) to be true in Tn
there will have to be at least one object with two names.
There will be more objects on (i) than on (ii), but the
objects of Tn on (ii) will be more "abstract11 than on
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(i). So far there is nothing in particular which recom¬
mends one interpretation over the other. The "abstract-
ness" of (ii)'s objects is nothing to worry about; it
merely means that the objects will have a certain sub¬
structure from a different perspective which is ignored
on the perspective adopted as just generating so raany
idle wheels. A current dispute in microphysics might
afford us an example. One can range one's variables
over the standard sub-atomic particles and view quarks
as metaphysics, or one can range over quarks, reducing
one's stock of objects, and explaining other particles
as constructions (quarks in certain structures). Until
there is good observational evidence, one choice over
the other is rather arbitrary.
With regard to the I-predicates of Tn, they ma;/ be
thought of as expressing identity- Indeed, ju3t replacing
"I" with "«•" in (5) results in a schema which can suffice
as the sole axiom for deriving classical identity theory
in a predicate calculus. On (ii) the 1-predicates will
express absolute identity, a relation each object has
to itself, and to nothing else. The thesis Geach
explicitly attributes to the A-theorist is:
(9) x is identical with y iff whatever is true of x is
o
true of y, and conversely.
^Geach, "Identity", op. cit., p. 3, where he cites
Quine.
^Geach, "A Reply", op. cit., pp. 556-557. It is
not clear to me why Geacnhas expressed this going both
On (i) the I-predicates will express a relativised
identity, where identicals are identical only relative
to the theory in which "I" is a predicate. Since it is
the predicates of the theory to which "I" is relative,
we might say that if "alb" is true, then a is the same
X as b, where X is a complex predicate composed of all
the predicates in T11 which are true of a and also true
of b. X might be more naturally construed as a simple
predicate, namely, one of those true of the I-relatod
objects individually. Further restrictions on the con¬
st rual of X may be motivated for various reasons,"'" but
this broad way of putting it (i.e. : "X" attached to any
name forms a statement equivalent to the conjunction of
ail the true statements formed toy attaching predicates
of Tn to that name) is sufficient for us to capture the
relevant predicate if and when it is deemed appropriate.
To take a concrete (though trivial) example, con¬
sider the universe of letters in the next line:
inn
Let our predicates be:
ways—with an "iff" instead of an "only if"—since the
half of it going the "if" direction is the "identity of
indiscernibles", a principle some A-theorists may not
wish to aacept, and which nowhere explicitly enters
Geach's argument. However, there is a complicating
factor in this direction, which I discuss helov.
"'"Geach, e.g., wants to restrict X to the most
general substantival term available in one's theory
true of that 'kind' of object, which he calls the
name's "nominal essence". Reference and Generality,
pp. 43-46.
G — is discontinuous
H — is curved**"
J — 3ms a form
Let T* consist of nG", "H», and "J", the usual logic,
and some I-predicate, say "K". On interpretation (i),
(10) (3x) (3y) (xKy)
is true, because it is a generalisation of "ngKno",
which is true, (n^, ng, and n3 are the names for the
first, second, and third objects respectively.) On
(11), (10) is true also, but for a different reason.
It is not true because the object tig and the object n,>
have exactly the same predicates true of them, namely
"H" and "J", bat because "ng" and "no" are different
names for exactly one and the same object. The vari¬
ables of T* range alternatively over (i) letter tokens
or {ii) letter types. and for (ii) the I-predicate "K"
can be construed as "is the same as". For (i), "K"
can be construed as "is the same X as", or "is the same
with respect to form and being curved as"; more briefly,
"is equiform to".
An advocate of (ii) might try to argue that (i) is
untenable because (9), in which there is no mention of
the relevant theory whose predicates are at stake for
"*This property could, of course, lie so defined as
to exclude anomalous points of infinite curvature, and
typographically extraneous curves in the little lefthand
flag at the top of the stem in the first letter. Devi¬
ously ingenious typesetters could be given a wholly
different example.
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the R-theorist. That is, he night try to argue that
reference to the (or some of the) predicates of a theory
is unnecessary, for no natter what two names stand for,
if they can be used to form a true identity statement,
then any predicate whatsoever which is true of that named
by one name, is true of that named by the other. If
this is so, then merely restricting the predicates avail¬
able to some specifiable set will not suddenly weaken
the sense of identity so that two things identical in
one sot might not be identical in another. They will
be identical in every possible set if they are identical
at all.
To an A-theorist who chooses to argue this way,
Goach points out that the semantic paradoxes involving
the predicate "is true of" are a consequence of this
objection to the R-theorist, and that the usual way of
avoiding them is to define "is true of" upon a specific
set of predicates and objects, thus placing "is true of"
not in that theory, but in a metathoory. Therefore, on
this solution of the paradoxes, (9) is unintelligible
as it is stated, without reference to a specific theory.
This is not to force (i) over (ii), for (ii) might
still be opted for within the confines of some theory.
It is only to rule out the claim that (i) is untenable,
when that claim is based upon (9), at least until the
A-theorist can come up with an acceptable solution to
the semantic paradoxes which does not need recourse to
the specification of some theory.
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So far we have found no good reason to adopt one
view of identity over the other. But now consider the
addition of some predicates to Tn sufficient to render
(3) false. Call this new theory Tn+"S our previous
theory Tn is a proper subset of it. The effect of this
change is either to render distinguishable some objects
previously indistinguishable, or to eliminate all cases
of objects having more than one name. The first
alternative is the one which will be taken by the R-
theorlst, and it presents him with no special diffi¬
culties .
The A-theorist, on the other hand, must take the
second alternative, since he countenances no indistin¬
guishable objects. But how is this 'elimination of
cases' to be accomplished? He cannot simply eliminate
some extra names, for that would be to abandon T for
some other theory; for the same reason ho cannot simply
eliminate many-named objects together with their names.
Ho change in names was involved in going from Tn to
t%L,l
T . He cannot leave the offending names and excise
the offending objects, for then some true statements
in a subset of Tn+^" (namely, Tn) would be uninterpreta-
ble in Tn+^ ("ling", e.g., in T*). His only remaining
recourse is to admit that what he previously thought had
more than one name, actually is more than one object,
that there is one object for each of the names he previ¬
ously considered to be names of the same thing. But
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this is simply a move from the objects assumed on
interpretation (ii) to those assumed on (i), which in
x , of course, are all distinguishable. This conse¬
quence means that whereas the R-theorist can retain the
variable range (his ontology) which he adopted for Tn
when he moves to consider Tn+\ the A-theorist is forced,
if he is to retain his interpretation of "I", to range
his variables over the same objects as does the R-
theorist.
If increasing the number of one's objects were the
only consequence forced upon the A-theorist, it would
not be so bad. After all, a few revisions in one's
ontology are sometimes both necessary and desirable,
especially -when one lias good reasons for admitting new
predicates to one's theory which cannot be admitted
without changing the number and binds of things one
considers to escist and be real. But the rub comes not
when we consider the ascension to theories ever richer
in predicates, but rather when we consider the descen-
sion from a prodicatively rich theory to poorer subsets
of it. Let IT be a theory with many predicates and
many true statements of the form
(11) (3z:)(#s),
where "4)" is a schema for the predicates of the theory.
The A-theorist will construe any two names which can be
used to make instances of (11) which correspond in
truth-value for every $, and also used to make a true
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instance of (8), as names of the same object- Any two
names which make a true instance of
(12) (3x)(3y)(Fx . ~Fy),
no matter what F is, cannot name the sane thing. How
consider a 3iibset of 'I?1, call it Tn~"b which is the
sarae as T1*1 except that those predicates which render
(12) true for some names are omitted. There will then
be some objects ranged over by the variables which will
be indistinguishable, and which will be I-relatod. For
the K-theorist this will be no problom, for identity to
him is not restricted to a relation which only obtains
between an object and itself. On his view, it can
relate any two distinct objects which have only the
same predicates true of each. But for the A-theorist,
for whom identity cannot relate distinct (even though
indistinguishable) objects, this situation is unaccounta¬
ble. To retain identity as only a self-relation, he
must re-road his quantifiers for this subset as ranging
over objects more "abstract".
Let us look again at our previous example T45", and
the theory T^*1" - of which it is a subset. T*+^ is simply
the theory T4i" plus the predicate "L" which is such that
(13) Ln2 «
is true in T4^, The A-theorist will construe the
objects of T";!+^ as letter tokens; but in the subset T4*,
he will find his variables ranging over two distinct
objects of the same form (because they have only the
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same form predicates, and no other predicates), which
are therefore indistinguishable. To retain his absolute
interpretation of "K" he will have to range his vari¬
ables over letter types. And since this is a subset of
jb:'+l, the variables of will also have to be inter¬
preted as ranging over types as well as tokens, because
the variables of part of a theory cannot have a range
different from the range of the theory it is a part of.
From this ©sample it can be seen that in general,
for any theory each subset which is formed by
omitting at least one predicate such that for each O
remaining,
(14) ~(3x) (3y) (®2c . ~®y)
Yl *
is true in T when it was false in T (where $ included
the deleted predicate(s))--each such subset will require
the addition of a further whole type of objects, jL.e.,
further objects of a wholly different kind, to the
ontology of Tn. Assuming, as is likely, that any
interesting theory will be rich enough to contain a
plethora of such subsets, the A-theorist is faced with
the prospect of maintaining an ontology full of many
objects of a wide degree of "abstractness", all types
of which--most curiously—must be in the range of the
'master1 theory. (Appropriate, if peculiar, formation
rules or effectively similar restrictions could avoid
the Russell paradorn.)
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In those circumstances, it is the R-theorist who
views a desert landscape. He need recognise only those
objects which are of the lowest level of "abstraction"
needed to render all the statements of the theory
appropriately true or false. With regard to subsets in
which distinguishing features of several objects have
lost their representation, these several objects can be
said to be I-related with respect to the predicates of
the subset, without the assumption of types, types of
types, etc., forced upon the enthusiast of absolute
identity. Such identity statements, properly relativised,
are true not only in the subsets of a theory, but in the
theory itself. Both the kinds and (usually) the absolute
number of objects will be fewer for the R-theorist.
This argument depends, of course, upon a preference
for an ontology containing the fewest kinds of things
thought necessary for an adequate description of the
world. Anyone who is willing to embrace an over-ripe
metaphysics, who finds in the study of Being a veritable
cornucopia, will not feel its force. But no matter how
important complication is in aesthetics or even real
life (which I do not merely admit, but positively advo¬
cate in both), I am yet to be convinced by those who
would ignore Occam in matters of natural philosophy.
The most sustained criticism of the 12-thesis which
I know of is given by Wiggins. He views the R-thesis
"""Wiggins, Identity and Cpatlo-Tomooral Continuity.
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as tantamount to a rejection of Leibniz1s Law, which he
gives as
(15) (a p b) 3 (©) (<3a » ©b)."*"
*
He gives the E-thesis as
(16) (a b) , (a g b) . (Ga v Gb),
and it is easily shown to be inconsistent with the
p
assumption of Leibniz's Law. (15) is " "iggins ' way of
Ibid., p. 3; the predicate letter "F" appears to
be construed as a particular predicate, and "a" and "b"
as specific, yet arbitrary names.
"Ibid., pp. 3-4; his proof is marred by the fact
that he represents R as different £rom (16) in the proof--
there it is given as (a f b) . (a J§ b) . (Ga). The
difference makes no difference, however; for the record
here is an amended proof (I adopt certain familiar
parenthesis and dot conventions for grouping, and indent
procedures for the deduction theorem). Let Leibniz's
Law, as in (15), be abbreviated "LL". To prove:
LL 3 ~(a f b . a g b . Ga v Gb).
Proof:
1. LL assumption
2. (3) (a f b 3 . ©a s ©b) 1, P 3 (©)Q . 3 .
(©HP 3 Q), MP
3. apb3 . a^asa^b 2, UI ("aG" for »©»)
4. a b 3 . a^bsb^b 2, UI ("Gb" for "©")
5. a p b assumption
6. a m a 2 a ^ b 3, 5, MP
7. a ^ b s b | b 4, 5, MP
8. a | a = b | b 6, 7, trans, of bicond.
9. Ga 3 a ^ a reflesivity of "g"
10. 6b 3 b | b reflectivity of "g"
11. Ga 3 a g a . Gb 3 b ^ b 9, 10, conj.
12. Ga v Gb . 3 . a ^ a v 11, (P 3 Q . E 3 S) 3
b^b (P v E . 3 . Q v S),b MP
13. Ga v Gb assumption
14. a ^ a v b ^ b 13, 12, MP
15. a 5? a 8, 14, conj., (P = Q .b P v Q) 3 P, HP •
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of stating what I earlior represented in (7); since the
"I" in (7) ultiraatoly becomes interpreted by the R-
theorist as "is the same F as", or simply "s", that
difference comes to nought. But the universal quanti¬
fier over predicates which appears in the consequent
of (15) is a different matter, as we shall shortly see.
Besides the formal demonstration of the incompati¬
bility of (15) and (16), Wiggins' strategy includes
showing to he useless several likely emendations of
Leibniz's Law, and also providing accounts compatible
with (15) for various eroiaplos intended to cast doubt
upon it. I do not plan to discuss these examples;
rather I shall turn to some considerations which seem
to me to undermine his whole position, from the formal
proof onwards. In particular, his claim that the
R-theorist cannot in some sense accept Leibniz's Law
is incorrect, and his various attempts at restating
this principle, if intended to represent the R-theorist
16. a = a D a » b
G (Q D P), MP, sop.
15, 16, MP
6, (P 5 Q) D (P D Q)
17. a - b
G
18. CavGb , Da^b
19. a p b D : Ga v Gb . D
a g b
20. LLD :. a^bD : Ga v
Gb , D a ° b





20, (P 3 : Q 3 . S D
S) e (P D ~(Q
R)) '
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under pressure, are misguided, Both {15} and (16) ore
acceptable*-when properly understood----to the R-theorist.
Turning first to (16) as a representation of the
K-thesis, I have already remarked that statements
I-rolating objects in some subset of a theory are true—
•when construed as properly relativised to that subset--
in the theory of which it is a subset. To return again
to our previous ©sample of the theory and its subset
T#, "ngRno" is true in T*, and when read as nn2 is
oquiform with nd, is true also in T4^, oven though
Ln.2 . ""hng (perhaps "L" might be "occupies the second
position"}. As long as any statement of I-relatodness
is construed as identity with respect to a specific set
of predicates (or some 'master' predicate coextensive
with the set), such a statement will not be falsified
by its inclusion into a theory formed from the one in
which it was defined by adding more predicates. Thinking
that such a true statement must remain true in such an
extended set, for all of the added predicates also,
night well be called the Fallacy of Ident ity-lhtens ion.
It is this fallacy which bedevils biggins' arguments.
In TiH"! it would license an inference from "ng and
aro oquifom" to »n2 occupies the second position iff
IP does" (interpreting "L" as recently suggested).
Refusal to permit this inference can be represented
as a statement of the same form as (16):
(17) (np fi tin) . (n2 n3) . (Hn2 v Hn3),
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where "IP is some predicate coextensive with "G", "H",
ancl "J" (the prodicatos of T ••), and "N" is one coemton-
sive with "G", "PI", "J", and "L" <tho predicates of
rp^H-l) o (16), taken as a principle forbidding
countenance of the fallacy of identity-eid:ens ion, does
reflect the E-thesis.
But then how is (16) compatible with (15), especial¬
ly in light of Wiggins' proof to the contrary (as
emended in footnote 2, p. 308 above)? The problem lies
in the quantifier in (15), carefully omitted in (7)
in favor of a predicate schema for one from a there
unspecified set of appropriate predicates. Leibniz's
Law, as stated by Wiggins, involves the material equiva¬
lence of two statements each containing a name and the
same predicate, no matter what that predicate is, if only
the object(s) named are related by identity. This kind
of latitude is, of course, an open invitation to the
semantic paradoxes. The in (15) must be restricted
to some specified set of predicates which constitutes
part of the extra-logical component of some theory.
If the range of wore restricted merely to the
predicates of a theory in some subset of which an 1-
statement could be truly asserted, then (15) would still
permit fallacious inferences of identity extension, as
in the example above with TiH"~ and its subset T*. The
appropriate set of predicates for the range of "<5" must
bo specified before Leibniz's Law con 3x2 accepted in
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its generalised form, as in (15). A perhaps more intui¬
tive way of putting this is to say that if two objects
are the sane with respect to certain predicates, we
cannot say that they are the sane with regard to any
predicates—this is only another way of stating the
rejection of identity-extension fallacies. The revi¬
sion of Lcibnis's Law, as given by (15), which this
requires is not any rejuggling of its expression in
normal first- and second-order logic—various possi¬
bilities of which Wiggins examines and rejects—but a
motatheoretical identification of the range of with
the set of predicates coextensive with the predicate "X"
for which the objects are the same X as one another.^
The range of "<$>" cannot be extended beyond the predicates
which justify "(3x) (3y) (xly)" without justifying false
as well as true statements. Thus (7) and (15) might
both be appropriately and properly represented as:
for some F coextensive with the predicates of theory
Tn~k, if the predicate variable "<§" has a range including
only the predicates in Tn"^", then
(18) a f b D ($)(<5a s «to)
is a true statement in Tn"^ and any theory Tn containing
Tn~^ as a subset.
This way of qualifying the 1 ■ indiscemibility of
identicals" blocks a crucial step in Wiggins' proof of
%or any version of LL in n-adic logic, a restric¬
tion formally equivalent to the metatheoretical one
envisioned could bo formulated in m-l-adic logic, but
this is already beyond the moves Wiggins anticipates.
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the incompatibility of (15) and (16)"-namely, the stops
from 2 to 3 and from 2 to 4 in the version above. Ho
thinks it necessary to apologise for this step, but
his worries are over "ag" being considered a legitimate
predicate, and not over the fundamental error of allowing
"S" to range over "Gn--a predicate not found within the
set relative to the truth of "a |? b". It is this which
vitiates his demonstration.
What I believe I have shown is that given proper
interpretations, Leibnis1s Law and tho R-thesis are
acceptable together. Wiggins raises several other points
connected with this view of identity in a long footnote
to his claim that
the principle [Leibnis's LawJ marks off what is
peculiar to identity and differentiates it in a
way in which transitivity, symmetry and refl@3d.vity
(all shared by congruence, consanguinity, etc.) do
not .2
In the footnote he acknowledges in effect that (5) is
sufficient for deriving the indiscemibility, transivity,
symmetry, and reflesdLvity of identity, yet he goes on
to deny that a relation's satisfying (5) Completely ties
that relation down within a first order formal system
to what we normally intend Icy identity." He does this
for reasons he does not specify, but does attribute to
1
Footnote 2, p, 308; in Wiggins' version, the step
from 3 to 4, op. cit., p. 3.
%iggins, op. cit., p. 5.
^Ibid., p. CG n. 9.
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Quirio and Geach. Moreover, he does not tell us what are
his intuitions about "what we normally intend by iden¬
tity", "which -would make (5) necessary but not sufficient
as an onion for capturing identity in a formal system.
I myself would say that (5} is incomplete until the sot
of predicates schematised by "F" is specified in the
manner done for (7) in (18), and Wiggins seems to hint
that this is what he had in mind when he later in the
same footnote says
liny complete vindication of my use of it [Leibnis,s
LawJ would involve e.g. discussion of the specifi¬
cation of relevant predicables and discussion of
whether these could be specified absolutely without
danger of parados.
But the appropriate specification is the one I have
already given, and it opens the way for the H-theorist.
He probably had, therefore, something else in mind.
Might it have lueen that (5) should go both ways before
it is sufficient? In other words, could Wiggins be
hinting that in addition to Leibnis's Law, we need also
the identity of indiscernibles? I suggest this because
of the role played by the identity of indiscorniblos in
the passages of Quino's to which Wiggins refers.
It is clear that this cannot bo the case for
Wiggins, however, since he explicitly denies it.
Leibnis's Law and its contraposition gives a suf¬
ficient criterion of difference, but none of
identity. The Identity of Indiscerniblos yields
no sufficient condition. For tho strong or classi¬
cal Identity of Indiacernibles phrased in tenas of
pure predicates is not a logically true principle.
The weak principle of Identity of Indisoernibles,
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with predicate variable unrestricted and open to
prodicables with embedded proper names, is a true
principle but does not give us any effective suf¬
ficient condition of identity. It is not effective
(i) because, for any identity a =» b, there will
be many predicates whose application to one or
other of a and b can only be settled by first
settling whether a » b, and (ii) because the weal:
Identity of Indiscomibles presupposes a prior
understanding of the identities of times and places,
or of the identities of the particulars whose names
turn up inside such predicates as 'five miles S. W.
of Big Bon*. In either case we are thrown back
onto a prior understanding of the individuation of
persisting things.1
The last sentence in particular, mid the teed: fol¬
lowing it, indicate that for Wiggins fining the sense
of identity statements involves principles for tracing
spatio-temporal objects, and it is this which is loft
out of (5), and which renders it deficient as tying
down l5what we normally intend by identity". But Wiggins
does not give a single good reason as far as I can tell
for thinking that identity statements are normally,
or ought to be understood within his style of an
Aristotelian substance metaphysics, and hence why (5)
cannot suffice for identity theory.
Regardless of this problem, it is clear that
Wiggins does not think that the identity of indiscomi¬
bles is what is needed to capture the notion of identity.
However, he refers specifically to Quine's discussion of
"relative discornibility"; the consequences Quine draws,
which presumably are the ones Wiggins accepts as showing
ibxd. , p. 34 •
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the inadequacy of (5), depend upon what Quino calls the
"maxim" of the identity of indiscernibles, ~ to which
Quine elsowhoro says he is committed in a "mild way".
Insofar as Wiggins accepts Quins's consequences (if
only to use then for a contrary inference), he appears
also to accept this mild maxim of the identity of
indiscemibles, in spite of what he says in the passage
just quoted.
But leaving Wiggins' difficulties aside, I would
like to look further at the connection between the E-
thesis and the identity of indiscernibles, Quine's
discussions are particularly helpful in this natter.
He gives in Word and Object a general method for con*
structing a complex formula in any specific theory which
is coord;ensive with, and which can therefore be taken as
defining, identity in that theory. He instructs us to
write 'if Fx then Fy' and vice versa with each of
the absolute general terms of the vocabulary in
place of 'F'; also *(s)(if Fxs then Fys)' and '(s)
(if Fax then Fay)', and vice versa, with each of
the dyadic relative terns in place of 'F'; and so
on to '(a)(w)(if Fxsw then Fysw)' etc. The conjunc¬
tion of all these formulas is coordensive with
^Quino, From a Logical Point of View, p. 71.
9
Incidently, I think it should be acknowledged that
what Quine has to say in Set Theory and Its Logic, pp.
12-16, From a Locrical Point of View, pp. 70-72, and in
Word and Object, pp. 130-131, lias been seminal in Geach's
argument for the E-thesis, and eg- adaption of it. With¬
out his insights I doubt that such an argument would
have been readily apparent.
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he = y' if- any formula constructibl© from the given
vocabulary is; and otherwise we can without con¬
flict adopt that conjunction as our version of
identity. In so doing we impose a certain identi-
fication of indiscemibles, but only in a mild way.
This method will generate a series of conjoined
material equivalences of the form
(S) (^ = §^2).
^3' '®axlx3 ® 9mz2s3'*
(x3'




(Xg)...(3^,+ l) (S^fx^.Xj,™,^,.^) 3 ) ,
*
where Xg# . . . , and ^ are variables, <3^ is the
m-th Ic-adic predicate (there trill be n formulae for each
line, where n represents the number of i-adic predicates;
for each class of i-adic predicates their number n is
possibly different, 0 s m s n), and the parentheses
around and commas between the variables in the last
line represent a generalisation that each possible
permutation of the 1c number of variables inside is to
be represented with its own line, on the sole condition
that any combination on the right side of the equiva¬
lence must be the same as that on the left, except for
the substitution of "xg" for "xx".
buino, Jord and Obi act, p. 230.
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If we instantiate all these expressions, we will be
left with a lot of predicates which have only one place,
marked by either or and then we can simply
write the series (S) using monadic predicates—different
ones, of course, for each number and order of original
variable places. We shall have a new set of notationally
equivalent "constructed" predicates in just the sense
used by Geach, and which I intended in describing (5)
above. If "F" in (5) schematises these constructible
predicates, then (S) represents for (5) an explication
of indiscernibility, or I-relatedness.
For Quine, however, (S) represents an explication,
or, stronger still, a definition of identity. But if
indiscernibility in the sense of (S) defines identity,
Quine thinks it is only a "mild" case of the contra¬
position of Leibnis's Law, He elaborates this claim by
drawing a distinction between x being absolutely dis¬
cernible from y (which I shall abbreviate "scD^y"), and
its being relatively discernible from y (abbreviated:
1
"xDj^y"}. Let "<$>" schematise the monadic predicates of
a theory, and "f" the dyadic; then for some <& and W,
xBrY (<*>x • ~Sy) v (<&y . <-«5x),
Relative discemibility or indiscernibility has
nothing directly to do with the relativity of identity
itself, which Quine will not brook. The term "relative"
as it figures in Quine's distinction here will not be
used elsewhere, and an R-theorist will continue to be
one who advocates the relativity of identity, not the
relativity of indiscernibility (although 'for him idontity
is relative just because it is the same as indiscerni¬
bility) .
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bDRy (3s)[(fx5 . ofya) v (fys . ~fxs5 v
(fax . ~fsy) v (fay . -VFax) j.
More briefly, for some <3> and f,
(19) xD^y =»df ~($x s $y)#
*
1
(20) sDRy **(]_£ ~(s)(fxs = fys . fax = fay).
* *
Quine claims that construing (S) as coextensive
with identity involves only identity of relative indis-
cernibles (analogously abbreviated: "xIRyn, where by
definition xIRy ~ <vxDpy), but not identity of absolute
indiscemibles (abbreviated: "xIRysl, where by definition
xl^y s 'vab^y). That is, it requires the truth of
(21) (a)(fxs » fya . fax s fay) D x * y,
P >
but not the truth of
(22) (<$x 5 $y) D x » y,
*
for any $ and f. (S) does not involve (22) because
there can be some x and y, and some f, say R, such that
(23) Rxy . ~Rxx . ~Ryy.
If (23) is the case, then x and y need not be absolutely
discernible, i.e., it could be true that for any #
"It might be thought that a more accurate repre¬
sentation of Quine's definition would be xDpy -cif ~(fxy s
fyx), for some f; but this would be a mistalee, since
this formula expresses symmetry, but not reflexivity.
Thus two objects could be relatively indiscernible under
all predicates including some nonreflexive ones, and
because of that latter fact they would not be identical
by (S). Therefore (S) xjould not declare identical just
those objects that are not relatively discernible, as
Quine says it would. Compare my extension of relative
discomibility in (30) below xjith the quote from Quine




while at the same tine 2: f- y, because to be identical,
among other things
(25) (s)(S2ca D Rya)
must be true for 2: and y. But it is not; for presumably
y is in the range of the quantifier, and from (25) we
can get
(26) Rxy D Ryy.
From (23) this, and thus (25) must be false. Not only
is (25) false, but
(27) (s)(E2£s a Eys)
t
is too, since (25) going the other way is falsified by
instantiating 22 for the quantifier. Thus for any two
objects to be identical under (S), they have to be not
only absolutely indiscernible, but also relatively
indiscernible. This is "milder" than the plain identity
of indiscemibles because beyond two things having all
and only the same monadic predicates, for them to be
identical they must also bo subject to the further
restriction that, if they are related to anything by any
dyadic predicate, they must be related to it by that
predicate regardless of ordering.
The important question at this point is just hot;
far does this qualification go in mitigating—in making
genuinely "milder"—Quine1s embrace of the identity of
inciiscernibles?
321
First of all, I think it ignores altogether the
troubling aspects of that principle, and I shall return
to that later. But secondly, it depends upon refusing
to adroit the formulation of monadic predicates "con¬
structed" from n-adic ones. For if this were permitted,
cases like (23) would simply not be cases of absolute
indiscernibility (let R and its first place be U, then
Uy . and let R and its second place be V, then Vx .
~Vy), and in general, relative discernibility collapses
into absolute indiscemibility. Quine has in other con¬
tests exploited the collapsing of n-adic to monadic
predicates, by the use of what he calls a "derelativiaa-
tion operator" to eliminate the formal need for variables
of quantification."1* But if for that purpose predicates
can be "derelativised", why not in matters concerning
identity? Even in Word and Object Quine talks of forming
absolute predicates from relative ones:
Relative terms also combine with singular terms by
application, to give absolute general terms of a
coi^xJsXte "kind. Thus the relative term 'brother
of gives not only the absolute general term
'brother', lout also the absolute general term
'brother of Abel'. 2
Apart from all this, why should Quine stop rela-
tiviaing discemibility at the level of dyadic predi¬
cates? Consider a case where 2C and y are neither
^"Quino, "Variables Explained Away", Proceedings
of the American Philosophical Society, vol. 1C4, p. 334.
Also in Quine, Selected LoriicaT^Papers, p. 230.
2
Quine, Word and Object, p. 106.
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absolutely nor relatively discernible, as defined in (19)
and (20), yet it is the case that for some three-place
predicate, say T, that
(28) T23?y . ^yyy.
In those circumstances, x is not identical with y
because (S) is not satisfied: the fourth conjunct is
falso. Thus following Quine's lead (talcing absolute
discernibility as relative (0) discornibility, and
relative discomibility as relative (1) discernibility,
with corresponding changes in the subscripts of "Dn and
!SI!!) we can define relative (2) aiseemibility as fol¬
lows: x and y are relatively (2) discernible if some
open three-place sentence is satisfied by them in all
except at least one of the orderings. Symbolically,
for socio 9,
(29) csDgy -$± (3a) (3w)[ (Oxsw . <~Qysw) v (Gyaw . o-Gxaw)
v (Gaccw , "M0ayw) v (Gayw . oOsccw)
v (QatKC , MDawy) v (Gawy . ~0awx)].
More succinctly, for some G,
(30) xDgy '"df ~(a)(w)(Qxaw = Gyaw . 0acot s Osyw .
Gain: s Gawy).
Relative (2) indiscernibility is just the definiens of
(30) without the negation, for any 0. We can now see
that just xl^y and xl^y alone are not sufficient to
make x « y: xlgy is noedod also. Thus (S) declares
identical only those objects which are relatively (o),
(1), and (2) indiscernible. However, this same line of
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reasoning could bo carried on until we would say that 2:
and y are identical by (S) only when they are relatively
(i-1) indiscernible, with i always bigger than you
please. Quine does not consider such a radical rela-
tiviaation of the principle. As we have seen, he stops
at relative (1) indiscornibility. And as I earlier
ashed, why should he?
I suspect the reason is that he thinks (30) can be
reduced into (20), perhaps by something like the follow¬
ing definitions: let f be a predicate constructed from
0 and the variable w; them (30) becomes, for some f,
(31) xD2y »dfx,(s) (^2aa 3 « ^22; = fay . fax ~ fay).
* * a
Since the last conjunct is redundant, we have for some
(32) xDgy =df ~(s)(fxs a fya . fas; = fay),
* *
which by (20) makes fiD2n the same as "D^n. But if we
can go this far, surely we can go the last step and
reduce (32) to (19)—after all, the process would be
exactly the same. All that is necessary is the con¬
struction of a predicate $ from f and the variable a;
thon from (32), after removing redundant equivalences,
we get, for some
(33) xD2y "df ~(<Sx s $y).
Therefore, for this reason and those mentioned
earlier, I do not believe that Quine's device of dis¬
tinguishing levels of indiscemibility helps at all in
rendering his acceptance of the identity of indiscernibles
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noro agreeable. (He might, of course, reject this reduc-
tion—on what grounds I shall not opeculate--in favor
of the radical extension mentioned above, where for i-
adic predicates in the theory, objects are identical
only if they are relatively (i-1) indiscernible.^ In
this event, ay objection against the arbitrariness of
stopping the relativisation at relative (1) indiscerni-
bility is beside the point. But the whole business still
depends upon not allowing reductions in the '-adicity'
of the predicates of a theory, ana ay objections here
still stand.}
Returning finally to the connection between the la¬
thes is and the identity of indiscernibles with which the
discussion of Quine's attempted mitigation began, what
I wish to point out now is that, as Quine acloiot/lodges,
the A-theorist does have to accept it, yet the E-
theorist does not, except as an initial and informal
guide for the selection of an optimal ontology. Even
in this role, the principle is no more than a conveni¬
ence for the H-theorist, which could be done without.
Concerning the A-theorist, however, the reader may
already have noticed the covert entry of the identity
of indisceraibles into the argument in the three para¬
graphs above which contain (11) through (14). It was
^Although the passage in Herd apd Object 1 have
been discussing does not indicate anytIiing ITice this,
he does there refer (in a footnote) to the last of the
three passages I quote just below, in which an instance
of the negation of (30) occurs.
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maintained there that in descending from a theory Tn to
a subset of it T211"" which is formed from T53, by dropping
all predicates which for some two objects are true of
only one, the A-theorist will have to recognise a new
brood of objects, more abstract than those needed to
satisfy iP alone, on pains of having some indistinguish¬
able, yet non-identical objects on his hands. But if
he rids himself of such objects, he is in effect iden¬
tifying indiscornibles. Quino is fully aware that this
is what ho is doing, as the following examples show:
concerning the interpretation of (S), he says that
if the universe is taken as that of persons, and
the predicates are interpreted in ways depending
on nothing but people5s incomes, then the proposed
way of defining ® y' will equate any persons
who have equal incomes .... In cases of this
kind we could protest that the interpretation of
the universe and predicates is ill chosen, and
that it might better be so rectified as to con¬
strue the members of the universe as whole income
groups.
Where what we want to say about certain broad sur¬
faces does not concern distinctions between their
parts, we simplify our discourse by making: its
objects as few and as large as we can—talcing
the various broad surfaces as single objects.
Analogous remarks hold, and very conspicuously,
for conceptual integration—the integrating of
particulars into a universal. Suppose a discourse
about person stages, and suppose that whatever is
said about any person stage, in this particular
discourse, applies equally to all person stages
which make the same amount of money. Our dis¬
course is simplified, them, by shifting its sub¬
ject matter from person stages to income groups.
Distinctions immaterial to the discourse at hand
are thus ertruded from the subject matter. In
general wo night propound this macdm of the
^Quino, Pet Theory and Its Logic, p. 15.
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iclontirieation of indiscernibles: Objects indis¬
tinguishable 'iron one anotlaeF within the tems of
a given discourse should be construed as identical
for that discourse. Ilore accurately: the refer¬
ences to the original objects should be reconstrued
for purposes of the discourse as referring to other
and fewer objects, in such a way that indistinguish-,
able originals give way each to the sane new object,
A passage particularly relevant to the example of
types vs. tokens 1 used above in the argument for the
2-thesis is the following:
It nay happen that a theory dealing with nothing
but concrete individuals can be conveniently recon¬
strued as treating of univorsals, by the method of
identifying indiscerniblos. . . . [An] example of
ouoh identification of indiscemibles is obtainable
in the theory of inscriptions, a formal syntax in
which the values of tHe bound variables are con¬
crete inscriptions. She important predicate here
is 'C', where 'Csys' means that x consists of a
part notationally like y followed by a part nota-
ttonally like s. The condition of interchange-
ability or indiscernibility in this theory proves
to be notational likeness, expressible thus:
(s) (w) (Cxsw e Cysw . Ccsw e Csyw . Cswr: s
Cswy). *
By treating this condition as 'x = y' we convert
our theory of inscriptions into a theory of nota¬
tional forms, where the values of the variables
are no longer individual inscriptions, but the
abstract notational shapes of inscriptions.2
In this passage Qulne moves from distinct (non-
identical), yet indiscernible inscriptions, or tokens,
to indiscernible, hence identical shapes, i.e., types -
The point is, though, that if x and y are not indiscern¬
ible in some theory, yet the condition ho gives does
^•Quine, "Identity, Ostonsion, and Hypostasis",
From, A Logical Point of Vi,ew. pp. 70-71.
^Quine, "Reification of Universale", From a
Logical Point of View, p. 117.
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hold in some subset of it for that 2: and y, then there
are two alternatives. One is to hold that in the subset
22 and y are tokens of the same form; the other is to
say that in the subset we are now talking about types,
and 22 and y are the sane simplicjter. On the second
alternative, new objects are in the range of the vari¬
ables, and this night appear to be an econony. However,
the original theory is still there containing the sub¬
set, and since it must still as a whole range over
tokens (otherwise sane countere2ca£ples to Leibniz's
Law could be produced), its ontology must include both
types and tokens, if identity is to renain absolute.
Economy has gone out the window with the refusal to
relaiivise identity and opt for the first alternative.
It is interesting, and not a little curious, that
in a recent publication Quine more or less admits as
much. Speaking very generally aJxrnt the reduction of
ontologies and how this makes sense only relative to
some background theory, he says:
Our dependence upon a background theory becomes
especially evident whan we reduce our universe U
to another V by appeal to a prosy function.^ For
1
v/ith regard to reducing a theory 0 to a theory 0',
a proxy function is specified as "a function, not neces¬
sarily in the notation of 0 or 0', which admits as
arguments all objects in the universe of 0 and takes
values in the universe of 0'. . . . Then to each n-
place primitive predicate of 0, for each n, we effec¬
tively associate an open sentence of 0' in n free
variables, in such a way that the predicate is fulfilled
by an n-tuple of arguments of the procsy function always
and only when the open sentence is fulfilled by the
328
it is only in a theory with an inconclusive uni¬
verse, embracing U and V, that we can sake sense
of the prosy function. The function maps U into
V and, hence, neods all the old objects of U as
well as their new pr02d.es in V. ... if the new
objects happen to 330 among the old, so that V is
a subclass of U, thon the old theory with universe
U can itself sometimes qualify as the background
theory in which to describe its own ontological
reduction. But we cannot do better than that; we
cannot declare our new ontological economies with¬
out having recourse to the uneconomical old on¬
tology.!
With this I rest the argument that the ii-theorist
is ontologically extravagant and that his argument
invokes the plain, old-fashioned identity of India-
cernibles. Two issues I have raised as yet remain
corresponding n-tuple of values." Quine, The \7avs of
Paradox, p. 205.
^Qulne, "Ontological Relativity55, Journal of Phil¬
osophy, vol. lXSft pp. 205, 206, That these remarks are
directly applicable to the discussion of the relativity
of identity is made obvious by Quine himself, for in the
reprinting of this essay in Qntological Relativity and
Other Essays, he inserted ahead of theparagraph \which
TtseXf goFespondod into sis) preceding the part quoted,
the example of people being reduced to income categories.
And the way ho presents it there is quite remarkable,
for he seems to employ not only the idea of relative
indiscernibility, but also the relativity of identity
itself to the background theory. See Qntolocfical
Relativity and Other Essays, p. 55,
A further remark might be appropriate concerning
the last sentence of the passage to which this note is
appended; Quine rather neatly turns it from a predica¬
ment into a redactio ad absurdam proof that tho universe
of U is excessive. But tHIs" can only work when there
can be a proxy function, i.e., when the surplus universe
is bloated by "hidden inflation", to use another of
Quine's expressions (see "Implicit Definition Sustained",
The -Jays of Paradox,- pp. 196-197), or more simply, when
for any x and y made identical in the reduced theory,
it is not the case that they were discernible in the old
theory. This situation, of course, is precluded in the
arguments used on behalf of tho E~theorist.
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undiscussed: how does the identity of indiscemibles
figure in the R-theorists position, and chat is wrong
with the principle anyway?
It might be suggested that the R-theorist is con-
plicit in accepting the identity of indiscernibles, since
he uses it in his argument against the A-theorist. But
this would bo mistaken; that aspect of the argument
employs the fact that the A-theorist must accept it
(why else would he reject two things Joeing in all
respects the same?), and then proceeds to show the
unacceptable consequences for anyone who does accept it.
The R-theorist need not accept it to do that. For him
the crucial question is, given a theory with some true
statements of the form " (x) (y) (xly D Fx s Fy), for any
*
F in the theory, why does he take "sly" to express
identity? As was argued at the beginning of this sec¬
tion, an I-prod±eato espressos only indiscernibility
within the theory; then how does the R-theorist get
from x and y both having all and only the same predi¬
cates of the theory true of them, to saying that they
are the same? This question has only to be clearly formu¬
lated in order to see its answer, which is that the R-
theoriat does not say they are the same, but that they
are the same, with respect to all of some set of predi¬
cates (or some predicate coextensive with them). Rela¬
tivised identity is nothing else but an indiscomibility
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predicate with reference to that with respect to which
the indiscemibles are indiscernible.
What if, however, the R-theorist starts out with
his theory, consisting of a standard logic, same primi¬
tive predicates and names, and some true statements, but
not including any of the form "alb", and then proceeds
to discover that whereas (3x) (3y) (xly) has not boon
included amongst the true statements, nonetheless for
some x and y it is the case upon inspection that for
any predicate of the theory, <©x = <3y (where
t
schematizes the said predicates)? Should ho go on to
say that they are two indistinguishable objects, or
should he, at this initial stage (i.e., this is not a
case of examining a subset of some theory for which all
of this has been settled), decide that "hidden infla¬
tion", from whatever source, should be exposed and
exorcised? We might amplify this choice: he can (a)
admit some- statements like "alb" as being true, thus
allowing there to Joe in the theory itself, not just in
subsets of it, distinct indiscernible objects, or he
can (b) recognise as distinct objects in the full theory
only those objects which are discernible. The latter
course need not oblige him to do the same for subsets;
that would be tantamount to becoming an IL-theorist.
Yet it does involve him in an outright identification
of indiocernibles, at least initially in the process of
deciding what there is for the theory as a whole. Still,
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the principle is only being used as a guide of sorts,
and remains extra-theoretical. The other option, (a),
could have boon adopted anyway, and the principle not
invoiced in any sort of way.
Taking the second alternative, however, is probably
more natural. After all, what is the point of having a
needlessly prolix basic theory? Eliminating indiscerni¬
ble duplicate objects at the beginning is a common-sense
reduction of otiosity. In this exercise of identifying
indisceraibles the R-thoorist would appear to be in the
sure boat as the A-thoorist—even though the latter
makes such identifications at the least drop of a set
of differentiating predicates within his theory. For
the A-theorist as well, the principle is used as an
extra-theoretical guide, a !Imaxim!! as Quine calls it.
We are brought, then, to face directly the principle
of the identity of indiscomibles.
The difficulty with it, as is well known, is that
it appears to be—even if true—merely contingent. It
could be the case that there bo different objects
which have all their properties in common, even if in
fact there are none. Iiow then can the identity of
indiscernibles be a logical principle, if it is not
necessarily true? And if it is not a logical principle,
why even use it as a maxim when building theories about
how the world is?
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As I mentioned in connection with Bradley on the
1
identity of indiscernibles, a common way to avoid this
is to include spatial and temporal properties (or rela¬
tions) as genuine, admissible properties (or relations)
which designate some specific place or time (or some
relation to such). This is ju3t what we saw Wiggins
o
doing in a passage I quoted above. But pace Wiggins,
Ayer, Bradley (perhaps), and others, I do not think that
it works. Since the addition of spatio-temporal proper¬
ties is supposed to individuate by containing designa¬
tions of particular places and times, and since, as
Wiggins indicates, much the same effect can be got by
using predicates containing names of non-spatio-
tomporally defined individuals as well, this attempt
to save the identity of indiscemibles can more gener¬
ally be viewed as a lifting of the restrictions upon
the predicates schematised by n<3>" in the "classical"
version,
(34) §2: s fly . D x m y,
*
so that dyadic predicates or higher which have at least
one place filled by a name are included. For ease of
reference, 1 shall schematise this enlarged set of
predicates by and state the principle as
(35) Tic 5 ?y . 3 s » y.
¥
^"See above, Part I, Ch, I, 2, pp. 17ff.
O
^See above, this section, pp. 314-315.
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It is this latter principle Wiggins claims to be true,
while the former is at best only contingently true. As
I have already argued, there is nothing amiss in allowing
"constructed" predicates to bo included in the set
schematised by the predicate schema in the identity of
indiscemibles; the trouble with (35) lies elsewhere.
A J. Ayer gets closer to the problem when ho observes
that if (35) is true, it is so trivially, because "Wi",
where "A" is a name for something, is in the range of
and is true only of A; likewise for every other
object. Thus antecedent is false, and the whole condi -
tional true. This kind of trivialisation, Ayer claims,
is a consequence of admitting elements into the predicate
expressions which are not "essentially general". When
all such elements are replaced by general terms, the
principle is no longer trivial. "Consequently," Ayer
says,
an expression is, for our present purposes, to be
accounted fully predicative only if all the demon¬
stratives or individuating elements that it may
contain are replaced by indefinite descriptions.
And when it is claimed that objects can be dif¬
ferentiated only through their properties, or
rather, that to speak of different objects can
only be a way of speaking of different sets of
properties, the only expressions that are to be
regarded as designating properties are those that
are fully predicative in this sense. When it is
interpreted in this way, the principle of the
identity of indiscernibles is still necessarily
true, if it is true at all. . . .2
%yer, "The Identity of Indiscemiblos", Phil¬
osophical Essays, p. 29.
2Ibid., p. 30.
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Ayer is claiming that the non-trivial cases of (35)
are to bo changed by substituting descriptions for their
names, thus converting them into cases of (34), and it
is (34) which he believes to be logically true. In this
latter respect I think he is 'wrong and Wiggins correct;
I shall come to that shortly. But in vitiating Wiggins'
distinction by reducing (35) to (34), Ayer is on the
right track. Only he does not go far enough. Wiggins'
distinction, and the consequent possibility of spatial
and temporal relations sufficing for individuation, at
bottom amounts to fully general predicates on the one
hand, and predicates with non-general elements on the
other. But as I have contended that Bradley argued, and
as I have 3x3en arguing ever since, there are no non-
general terms. Proper names are general in the quite
specific sense that they, like all words, have a func¬
tion for which they can be used which depends upon
their having meaning. The meaning of a proper name is
a number of properties and relations the name implies
which enables the identification of the object which
the name is used to refer to.
But serving the purposes of an identification suf¬
ficient for communication is different from and falls
short of total "in principle" isolation and individu¬
ation. Wo relation, property, ox description can do
that. As Ayer puts it, " . . . descriptions are essen¬
tially general; to describe anything is to attribute
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to it a property of a certain sort, a property which is
capable, in theory, of being manifested in any number of
different contexts, whether or not it is so manifested
in fact.""*" Proper names, through their meanings,
•describe1 things, and are in this sense essentially
general; it remains to be seen whether or not there is
any non-general sort of property which is not callable
of multiple manifestation,
The main point is that names (and as I shall argue,
demonstratives and definite descriptions as well), while
they permit reference to individual things, they do so
through a mechanism which by its nature is capable of
including more than the one object intended. They are
therefore general. Because of this, we do not have to
make substitutions to collapse (35) into (34)--it collap¬
ses by itself. The distinction between them is actually
specious.
In a more recent work Ayer has moved closer to this
view, but still he talks in terms of an "abstract"
language from which all singular terms have been
"eliminated", and contrasts this with what he considers
a plausible, albeit not better warranted, "contextual"
o
or "referential" language. Much of his discussion
involves weighing the relative merits of each with
1Jbid.
2
Ayer, "flames and Descriptions", The Concept of a
Person, ah. 5.
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respect to various problems, arid the upshot is that an
"abstract" language, devoid of singular terms, is not
only feasible, but also
the statements which are expressible in any con¬
textual language can be adequately paraphrased in
an abstract language the mark of an abstract lan¬
guage being that nothing more is needed for the
understanding of it than a knowledge of its
semantic rules. . , . [Such a language will have
an "anchor in reality"] if our language is such
that its rules allow us to correlate its predicates
with types of empirical situations.^
I think this talk of relative merits and alterna¬
tive possibilities is still too much of a concession to
the intelligibility of viewing singular terms as non-
general. Either such terms somehow internally guarantee
that there is one and onljr one thing to which they can
be used to refer, or they do not. How they could is
beyond me; on the other hand, uniqueness of the referent
is a precondition of being able to successfully refer
to it. The meaning of the word we use in a successful
act of reference must be sufficient to enable the
speaker to identify that to which he refers (and suffi¬
cient also for the audience to do likextfise, if communica¬
tion is achieved). But how, it might be asked, can
anyone "identify" something using purely general terms,
short of claiming that a certain complex of properties—
namely, all that a thing has--is sufficient for individu¬
ation? The underlying issue here is the difference
between "identification" which is sufficient for
■^Ibid., p. 158.
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communication (including, in a degenerate sense, to
oneself), and identification as it figures in the iden¬
tity of indiscernibles.
The former requires only enough knowledge of the
thing to render ambiguity unlikely. If someone uses a
name to refer to something, and realises that his knowl¬
edge of the meaning of the name is slim enough not to
settle to his own satisfaction just what he was talking
about, or perhaps is asked by his audience whom he was
referring to: this Smith (say), or that one, all he
needs to do in such circumstances is to disambiguate
who or what he meant; he can do this by (respectively)
learning or specifying more about who or what he meant.
This process would amplify his (or the audience's, as
the case may be) understanding of the meaning of the
word. In practice, of course, ambiguity is never so
pernicious as to require a specification of all a thing's
properties and relations, even were that possible. The
difference between the two senses of identification lies
mainly in the functions served; the former serves a
practical function, and the latter a theoretical one.
The objection above appears to assume that it is
possible to list all of a thing's properties and rela¬
tions, that this will identify a unique individual, and
that no other method will suffice. It rejects the
practical possibility of communicating about individuals
short of full theoretical individuation. Since we
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obviously clo sometimes communicate without ambiguity,
the objection will be laid to rest if it can be shown
that even theoretically individuation cannot be achieved
by specifying the complete set of an individual's
properties and relations. This is the same as denizing
the necessity of the principle of the identity of
indiscernibles,
The most direct way to do this is to produce
examples of what has been called mere "numerical" dif¬
ference, since what denying the identity of indiscerni¬
bles really amounts to is saying that there could in
fact be numerically distinct individuals whose proper¬
ties are all the same. It is not supposed that dif¬
ferent numerals correspond to each indiscernible object,
for then they would be discernible. Numerical difference,
as opposed to qualitative difference, is so called
simply because two or more objects, whether discernible
or not, together still comprise two or more objects,
as the case may be.
Consider these examples: a universe consisting of
two identical objects;"'" a larger universe which is
radically symmetrical about some center; a cycle of
1This example and the following one are suggested
by Black, "The Identity of Indiscernibles", Minu, vol.
lid; (page references are to its reprinting in Balis,
Metaphysics. pp. 66-77; see pp. 69ff, and 74ff.)« The
next example and the last one are suggested by Ayer,
Philosoohical Essays, pp. 34, 32. The other three might
be construed as cases of Strawson's "massive reduplica¬
tion" of the universe; see Individuals, pp. 8ff.
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universes which always has and always will continue end¬
lessly to repeat itself exactly; a universe with one or
more exact simultaneous counterparts somewhere totally
apart from it (i.e., such that they are not spatially
comparable--there being no possibility of a compre¬
hensive "overview"); two or more universes like those
in the last example, except that they have totally
distinct and unrelateable times; two or more universes
exactly alike even with respect to time and place; a
universe consisting of an infinitely repeating series,
which might be represented as . . . BCDABCDAB ....
Each of these examples are such as to contain at least
two indiscernible objects, and there seems to be no
reason for identifying them other than the dogma of the
identity of indiscernibles. Ayer tries to eliminate the
examples by discrediting their intelligibility. He says
that "such examples seem intelligible to us only because
we tacitly introduce into them some further feature by
reference to which we do in fact discern between the
objects which we are supposing to be indiscernible."^"
But this just is not so. And he even admits as much for
the example of the cyclical universe (the last example
above) :
There would, of course, be no way of describing
any one term of the cycle so as to distinguish it
from any other, but this, it may well be said, is
no objection to their actually being, or even to
their being thought to be, distinct.^
%yer. Philosophical Essays, p. 32
2Ibid., p. 34.
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Indeed, it may well be said. I do not myself understand
why Ayer thinks this example so unique. In none of the
examples could there be any way of describing the rele¬
vant objects so as to distinguish them. When he suggests
that we actually sneak in some distinguishing feature,
he seems to be saying that wo could not even imagine,
let alone describe a universe without doing so. This
is tantamount to saying that asserting there are distinct
indiscernible objects is nonsense, and this because it
is unverifiable. For either, he appears to be implying,
there is some covert way of giving some empirical con¬
tent to the claim that there are two, not one, objects,
or else the claim makes no sense.^ I have never been
persuaded by this invasion of epistemology into ontology:
why should we think that what is or might be, is limited
to what is observably discernible? To put it another
way, why should there not be some distinct yet indis¬
cernible objects, even though ex hyoothesi there is no
observable nor even imaginable way of telling one from
another? Ayer himself is more tolerant of this in his
later work, where, having described a procedure for
avoiding explicit uniqueness claims in identifying
descriptions, he points out that it commits him only to
Leibniz's Lax?, and not to its contraposition. Pie quotes
^Reliance upon the verification criterion of
meaning-fulness is explicitly attributed to Ayer in
Black's article, op. cit.. p. 70.
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with apparent approval Wittgenstein' s remark from the
Tractatus to the effect tliat claims of mere numerical
difference at least make sense, even if they are never
true, and says that on this view "we have to treat
merely numerical differences as a primitive notion."^"
He then declines to discuss whether or not this is
preferable to the identity of indiscernibles. But if
he is prepared to admit that numerical difference can
be a primitive notion, even though there may be argu¬
ments against accepting it as such, he seems to be com¬
mitted to the logical possibility, at least, of objects
distinct merely numericallj'-, and that is enough to
render the identity of indiscernibles contingent.
Which Properties Constitute
Meanings
The possibility of mere numerical difference ren¬
ders the need to specify criteria for just what informa¬
tion is necessary and sufficient for identifying a par¬
ticular object somewhat of a hopeless cause: none ever
could be. But we still might ask what are the minimal
conditions needed to explain the success we undoubtedly
do have in communicating to others which things we are
talking about. What, in other words, need a name mean
in order to function as names do in our verbal activity?
The possible answers are: a name must imply all of the
"*Ayer, Concept of a Person, p. 157.
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properties of the thing named, some of them, or none of
them. The latter possibility I have all along been
arguing against, and I shall say nothing more about it.
The other extreme can, I think, be more easily dis¬
patched: if the universe is infinite, the meaning of
every name -would Ixs infinite, and consequently no name
could ever be fully understood. Even if the universe
is not infinite, it is known to be immense, and each
object in it will have more relations than we could ever
hope to know. Again, therefore, names have meanings
which 'passeth all understanding'. Of course, it could
be held that this by itself is no problem, for if it
is admitted that partial understandings of the meanings
of names can sometimes still be sufficient for communi¬
cation (as I am prepared to accept), why not all the
time? Wxy not admit, that is, that we never better than
partially understand, the names we use?
First of all, I think such a move does injustice
to what we normally take meanings to be. Quite gener¬
ally, meanings of words are whatever enables us to use
them in the regular ways we do. (This captures what is
interesting in the slogan "meaning is use"; its mis¬
leading implication of identity, however, ignores the
fact that theories of meaning are attempts to provide
an explanation for the observation that our use of words
betrays highly significant regularities.) It is
peculiar, to say the least, that a concept employed in
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explanations of how we use language eventually involves
our having to admit that our use of that language is
subject to regularity restrictions we can never know of.
We normally, and more properly, think of meanings as
being -whatever in fact is needed to explain the lin¬
guistic behavior competence of language users. Claims
that words have meanings which extend beyond the generali¬
sations we need to describe the actual use of these words
begin to look Idle© the historically inveterate tendency
towards ghosts, gods, and abstract ideas. Semantics lias
problems enough without all its elements being described
as unknowable.
Secondly, this view would render all statements
with a proper name as the subject expression analytic,
since everything which could be said about an object is
already implied by the name. Perhaps the conflict of
this claim with the more modest view that many such
statements are synthetic and a posteriori could be
mitigated by distinguishing between "analytic" and "a
priori", and saying that they are analytic a posteriori
statements. Analytic, because the meaning of the
predicate is part of (or excluded from) the meaning of
the name, and a posteriori because the meanings of
words are not innate--they must be learned through some
sort of experience. The truth or falsity of any given
statement about an individual must bo somehow ascertained
empirically, and this allows us to say that while any
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statement of the type we are considering is analytically
true or false, that it is one or the other must first
be discovered—i.e., it is an a posterior statement.
This defense of the analyticity of all proper name
statements may appear to be workable, even if somewhat
strange. But appearances can deceive. What is being
learned on this view when we discover a posteriori that
a proper name statement is true or false, is part of
the meaning of the proper name. It was no slip when
it x?as said above quite generally that the meanings of
words are not innate; if proper name statements are
called a posteriori because however much of the meanings
of proper names we know has to be learned from experi¬
ence, the same can be said for all statements, and not
just those whose subject expressions are proper names.
Obviously we learn the use of all our words from our
experience of the world around us--which includes, of
course, other language users—and therefore there are
n° & priori statements at all. This seems to be a worse
situation than the original admission that all proper
name statements are analytic. It all follows from the
objectionable literalistic interpretation of "a
posteriori" as "knowable as true or false only if there
is anything at all from experience required for that
knowledge". The sense in which typical examples of non-
empirical statements are said not to be a posteriori is
more restricted than that. It lias never, to my knowledge,
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been claimed that no experience of any kind is necessary
for someone to be in a position to know or affirm that
some a priori statement is true or false.
If the argument being eccaained does seriously sug¬
gest and insist upon such an interpretation of the a
priori/a posteriori distinction, in spite of its his¬
torical eccentricity, it can have the -words. But this
new terminology will not remove the substance of the
original objection, which was that some proper name
statements actually do enrich what we know about the
things named, often, in fact, far beyond what we know
about them as a result of achieving the ability to com¬
municate by employing expressions to refer to them.
Thus we have, roughly, two kinds of proper name state¬
ments (beyond the epistemologically preliminary ones
from which we in part learn the names): those which
repeat what we already must know in order to us© the
names, and those which inform beyond that. Using old
words or new ones, we still have a distinction.
Perhaps a different interpretation of na posteriori;t
could be given to capture the second kind of proper name
statement without capturing all statements; the onus
is on the advocate of the analyticity of all proper name
statements. In the absence of any such proposal, I shall
maintain the Kantian claim that a posteriori statements
are synthetic. Apart from finding no motivation for
talcing all proper name statements to be analytic—beyond
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a metaphysical fondness for grand simplicities—there
is still the objection I made earlier, that it is rather
mystical and in any case mystifying to be told that
certain perfectly ordinary, much used, and basic words
have meanings, the analysis and understanding of v;hich
are a practical impossibility.
If we are to discover what has to be attributed to
names in the way of meanings in order to explain their
fmiction in communication, we can rule out already the
extreme proposals: that any statement in which a proper
name occurs as a subject entails none, or all of the
statements which have been or ever could be made with
the name so occurring. The sole option is that some,
but not all, such statements are entailed, and the
obvious question is: can we restrict, in a fully general
way, this set of ,sGme' statements which for a given
name is constitutive of its meaning?
Let us consider briefly a proposal made by Geach.
It arises in connection with his argument for the aean-
ingfulness of proper names, which I compared to one from
Bradley at the beginning of the section above on identity.
Gaach says that
for any proper name there is some interpretation
of "X" such that we can truly say "the continued
application of this proper name requires, as part
of the meaning of the name, that it be always
applied to the same X".I
"''Geach, Ilontal Acts. p. 71,
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This "X", he says, expresses the nominal essence,
but it is not clear to xae why he says that it is only
part of the meaning of the name, since he adds in the
next paragraph that
I hold that the sense of a proper name never
includes anything about the individual peculiari¬
ties of its bearers.1
If "river" expresses a nominal essence of the Thames,
this would eliminate such general terms as "flows past
London", or "is polluted" from expressing part of the
sense of "Thames". It would seem that only those
general terms truly applicable to all rivers could
express ixirt of the meaning. But would not all general
terms applicable to all rivers ("flows downhill", "has
a mouth", etc.) express nominal essences of the Thames—
and of all other rivers as well? And since the general
terms applicable to all rivers, together with those
applicable to some (individual peculiarities5 or none
(irrelevancies) exhaust the supply of general terms,
the nominal essences of the Thames would have to be its
name's whole meaning—there are no other general terms
which could be a further part.
I suspect Geach would reply that a thing has only
one nominal essence, and that is why a nominal essence
furnishes only part of the meaning of its name. I say
this because he uses the phrase "the nominal essence"
•^Ibid. See also his Reference and Generality„ p.
44,
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ori several occasions , suggesting that ho does think each
none to convey only one, even though he nowhere says
so outright. But I do not see how he could limit the
number of nominal essences a name conveys to just one,
for nominal essences are defined functionally as that
expressed by general terms which can be used to identify
the same something-or-other on different occasions, and
they have nothing to do with "real essences". Thus any
general term which affords a criterion for the reiden-
tification of an object as the same object as before
will espress a nominal essence conveyed by the name of
that object. Clearly many general terms can servo that
function for any given object, Moreover, many general
terms which express individual peculiarities can also
serve the purposes of reidentification—indeed, often
the more peculiar they are the better they serve those
purposes. But this means that we no longer have any
very useful way of deciding which of a thing's properties
are, and which are not, conveyed as part of the meaning
of its name.
I do think that if nominal essences are to be par¬
celed out one to each object, Geach is right in holding
them to be only a part of the meaning of their respective
names. For the meaning of a proper name is rather inti¬
mately connected with the typically numerous identifying
descriptions used to figure out, remember, and communi¬
cate just which thing a name ordinarily names. The
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whole meaning of a name, in other words, is not to be
found in only one of the named thing's properties. On
the other hand, wo perhaps ought to be more charitable
to Geach's stricture against including "anything about
the individual peculiarities" of a thing into the meaning
of its name than I appeared to be above, for certainly
some of any thing's properties will not be relevant
to its name's meaning. We would not, for example, wish
generally to include as part of the meaning of a name
properties known only to an extremely small fraction of
the users of the name (through contextual acquaintance
perhaps). Meanings of all words, including proper names,
must lee objective, at least in the important sense that
they arc potentially accessible to any would-be user of
the word. There are, however, many notorious difficul¬
ties surrounding the whole idea of "objectivity". I
shall forego the more metaphysical ones, and look
instead at those likely to cause the meticulous lexi¬
cographer some trouble.
Suppose we wanted to give an account of the word
"mass" as it is used in classical physics; the idea of
"potential" accessibility used above is crucial here,
for the meaning of "mass" is not available to anyone who
lias not learned Newtonian mechanics, although anyone
could loam it (subject to certain trivial qualifica¬
tions). So if we were to try to discover what "mass"
means, we would have to restrict our inquiry to those
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i7ho know Newtonian mechanics, i.e. , to those who are the
"typical" users of the torn. But how shall we decide
who is to be included in this typical group: Newton
only, famous physicists since Newton (who have sometimes
disagreed about something so basic as mass), any student
in first-year mechanics, or who? Even the most techni¬
cally employed term is subject to dispute and alteration.
Were -this question settled we would still have to
restrict our inquiry in some way to the "normal" usage
of these typical users, for any of them might on some
occasion use the term in a quite different (perhaps
colloquial, or ironic) way. Although we may well want
to exclude such occurrences from our survey of what
"mass" primarily means, how to formulate the general
procedure is not so clear. (I suspect that the operating
1exicographical method is sheer intuition.)
Further, of the typical users we need an "average"
assortment, i.e., one indifferent to any significant way
of classifying them, for bias towards some special sub¬
group of the typical users could introduce distortions
into our assessment of what the terra means. For the
highly technical term I have been using as an example,
this appears to be a minimal problem. (Perhaps we
should worry about 'philosophical' issues which might
divide physicists, such as the discernibility of mass
and inertia, or the intelligibility of "virtual", or
non-detectable, masses.) But for many other words
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(e.g. , "poor", "God", "freedom", "fair", "national
interest", "tasty"), avoiding economic, theological,
political, moral, or gastronomic bias is exceedingly
difficult.
Finally, it is important that the normal usage of
the average typical user of the word be one found within
"standard" contexts, for non-standard and unusual con¬
tends may permit the attachment of an idiosyncratic sur-
meaning for the purposes at hand. Two physicists, e.g.,
might in the course of a discussion of particle theory
constantly tali about the "mass" of an electron, moaning
by that its rest mass. But wo would be misled if wo
were to include what they said about rest mass into our
general account of "mass" itself.
I do not pretend that this is a complete list of
the problems that would face anyone who attested to
determine what a word means from the way people use
it. But they are problems we are all, as language
users, involvod in, and each of us decides them or
accepts others' decisions on authority (lee it from our
parents, peers, dictionaries, or whatnot). The main
point I wish to pross, however, is that the situation
is no .better and no worse for the meanings of proper
names.
If we set out to discover the meaning of a name
by looking at its uses, we are at the very least
limited to the uses made by those who have used the
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name at least once. But that is too generous. We need
somehow to limit our survey to those who have not just
repeated the name or mentioned it spontaneously, for
neither of the latter could bo a source of genuine
knowledge about what the name names. We need to
restrict ourselves to "typical" users of the name.
But how do we exclude some users as "atypical", espe¬
cially with regard to names used by many who have
practically no knowledge or only meagre second-hand
knowledge of the thing named? That I have no answer
is why 1 am driven to talk of "typical" users of names.
But any typical user of some name might upon one
occasion or another use the name in an abnormal way—
he might sarcastically refer to a local poet as "Byron",
or flatteringly refer to the town beauty as "Venus".
Characteristics garnered from such uses can in general
play no rolo in our determination of the meanings of
names; we can consider only "normal" uses. But at
best I could only provide an ad hog list of abnormal
uses to be excluded with no illusion that it would be
complete.
She typical users of a name, from whom wo are to
figure out what the name means, must be not any sample
of them, but an "average" one. It should not reflect
any bias due to views held by an inordinately large
proportion of the morobers of the sample, such as might
be found concerning "Marx", e.g., from a survey done
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mostly in Arizona, or "God" from a survey in Sicily.
How one is to ascertain a proper balance of views, and
of what views, I am not sure. We all do, however, make
judgements aJx>ut what is an average sample of typical
users of a name, just as we do for any word. How we
ought to go about it is the problem.
Even if we were to figure out who the average
typical users of names were and what their normal uses
were, we would still have to worry about special situ¬
ations where an unusual use of a name is temporarily
employed by virtue of extra, added meaning. The situ¬
ations I have in mind are those in which mutual under¬
standing of which tiling is being referred to by the name
is achieved through some local contextual characteris¬
tics the thing has being adopted as sufficiently iden-
tifieatory. But these characteristics can be (and
often are) extremely local, and cannot, therefore, be
part of the name's meaning; meanings must derive from
"usual" (i.e., non*contextually dependent) uses.
Putting all these qualifications together, we
might say that the meaning of a proper name must be
found among those properties of the named thing which
reflect the normal use of that name by an average assort¬
ment of its typical users for purposes of identification
and roidentification, within usual contexts. As much
can also be said for words in general. I do not at
present know how to be raore specific than that.
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It might bo suggested that we could employ statis¬
tical methods to determine in advance what we mean by
"normal", "typical", "average", and "usual". Speaking
generally about all words, we might say that a minimal
(i.e., a not necessarily complete) set of properties
implied by any given word would be those which at least
11% (where "X" is determined by bell curves and the like)
of the users of the word do deem to be necessary if the
use of the word is not to become incomprehensible. At
least two factors in this formulation, however, are
genuine sources of trouble: how should we sharpen
"incomprehensible" into an adequate criterion, and who
(yet again) are "the users of the word"? (Although
there are problems for meanings of words in general,
my remarks below will be confined to proper names,
since they are what I am principally interested in
here.)
l
All of vis are constantly learning more about many
individuals. How do we decide when what we learn is
definitory of the tiling, and hence part of what its
name should mean, or rather that it is and should remain
simply further information about it, information which
were it to prove inaccurate would not affect our under¬
standing of which thing it is, but would affect only
what we thought about that thing? Consider an example—
suppose we knew a little about Ilomer, the blind poet,
and then found out that he did not write both the Illiad
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and the Odyssey. Prior to our believing that to be true
would have to be our tacit agreement that the use of
"Honor" in such a statement is comprehensible. But
whether we thought it comprehensible or not would depend
upon whether we thought that the meaning of "Homer"
involved "wrote both the Illiad and the Odyssey". Of
course if we did think it incomprehensible, yet had
independent evidence that the Illiad and the Odyssey were
not written by the same man (such as word frequency and
distribution studies), we could revise what we took
"Horner" to mean, and count our discovery as true. The
meanings we attach to words need not be impervious to
facts. But we must recognise that it would be incompre¬
hensible to use the name "Homer" in the two incompatible
ways suggested. The only trouble is that comprehensi-
bility and incomprehensibility depend upon the meanings
we attach to names, and so cannot furnish an independent
criterion. Moreover, the ©sample exploits incompati¬
bility as the basis of the incomprehensibility, and
clearly that is not sufficient for establishing the
minimal set of properties necessary for a comprehensible
use of the name. For on the basis of compatibility
alone we know that no given property and its negation
can be without incomprehensibility implied by a word,
and this applies to all properties (at least, with regard
to any specific word, all properties within certain
specific "categories"). Incompatibility, then, over-
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determines the set: it would include all properties the
thing has, not just those somehow 'essential' to it with
regard to hot; it is usually identified by those who have
occasion to refer to it by name. Some stronger restric¬
tion is necessary, and what that might bo I do not know.
I suspect that the most simple procedure for actually
operating the method suggested alcove would be to try to
discover sets of statements, with the name in question
as subject, which as a whole are rejected as incompre¬
hensible, and then to try to isolate more specifically
which are the offending jmrtapositions. This, presuma¬
bly, would reveal what a sample of the users of a name
considered the meaning of the name to bo, using an
obsorvationally simple acceptance/rejection indication
of camprehensibility.
As to the problem of who are the users of the name,
I do not have even a plausible answer. Clearly the
sample cannot be random, for the responses of anyone
totally ignorant of what the name means would be
irrelevant, and too many names are not known to too many
people. But while subjects totally ignorant of the name
(i,.e., of what the name is used to refer to) could easily
be eliminated from the sample, those who know the meaning
of the name only partially could not be so easily dealt
with. In fact, for many names there are vast numbers
of people who fall into this group, and how could we
separate those with an inadequate, from those with on
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adequate (if partial) grasp of the name (the so-called
'users of the none5), without appealing to sane previ¬
ously established meaning of the name? (Imagine the
situation: "We cannot use hin in our example—he thinks
•Kant' implies 'wrote the Tractatus1. We can use him,
however, because he thinks it implies 'wrote the
Critique of Impractical Ideas1"I)
Perhaps if a largo enough sample were used, the
properties arising due to ignorance of the name would
be random enough to Ixa sufficiently Infrequent so as
not to 3x3 found among X% of the sample. That is, however,
as much a hope as a guess.
Regardless of the adequacy of ay tentative proposals
for the solutions to these problems, it remains that
they are not special to one who holds that proper names
have meanings. They are, rather, problems for the
theory of moaning generally. As such, they con cast
no doubt on the view that proxcer names do have meanings,
and that as a consequence, statements with proper names
as their subject are general.
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CHAPTER II. DEIJOlTSTIiTlTIVES AIJD DESCRIPTIONS
This chapter will be considerably briefer than the
preceding one, for I think that the chief burden upon
one who advocates the generality of the proposition is
in establishing that proper names have meaning. Also,
the main framework and the requisite distinctions for
elucidating and supporting that claim do not need to be
repeated here, only presupposed. Consequently, my
central concern will be to specify in what sense state¬
ments with demonstratives or descriptions as subjects
are general, and to discuss certain issues which
naturally arise, including several which have been raised
by others.
1. Demonstratives
In the last chapter I argued that so-called singu¬
lar statements containing proper names as subjects are
general because proper names are not singular terms,
singular terms being such as to require that they are
somehow connected to one and only one existing thing.
That proper names are singular terms I called the deno¬
tation theory, and I opposed to it the connotative
theory, which says that proper names presuppose certain
properties, and that these properties are what enable
us to refer to things by using their names. More strict¬
ly, they are what enable us to be assured that we can
isolate from amongst all the tilings in the world that
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to which we or someone else refers by name. For pur¬
poses of communication we frequently depend upon tan¬
gential and circumstantial—'contextual'—properties,
and even upon the simple faith that it must be some one
particular thing, even if we cannot figure out which,
because his speech behavior, which we trust, indicates
that he lias some special thing in mind.
This kind of communicatory trust is quite common,
and I would be the last to object to its common use in
our talk (my intent lias never been revisionary). It
is parasitic, however, on better methods of identifica¬
tion. And contextual considerations represent no real
advance towards a satisfactory explanation for our suc¬
cess in understanding one another either. Talk about
context is useful only insofar as it is construed as
talk about the nonlinguistic recognition of certain
states verbally ropresentable as complex general terms.
(I call them 'complex11 because they typically contain
components which are traditionally thought of as singu¬
lar terms—proper names, demonstratives, and descrip¬
tions. But if the over-all argument I am making is
correct, these components do not involve non-generality
at all, so the qualification 'complex' could be dropped.)
For names of things we are acquainted with, or things
not too remotely related to what we are acquainted with,
and which moreover are not so well known as to be famous
(i.e., -whoso names are fairly restricted with regard to
3G0
their typical users)--for these names (which, incidently,
includes for most if not all people most of the names
they know) it is most often the case that their meanings
will include contextual properties corresponding to
those "complex" general terms. Of course communication
can succeed when either the speaker or hearer or both
have only a minimal grasp of the meaning of the name
used, or even if both only knew of some (not necessarily
the same) contextual property which, for all they know,
has only one instance. But one is inclined to regard
such cases as consequences of luck more than anything
else. For if we ask the speaker or hearer: just which
thing was referred to?, and get no better answer than
some general term we know to be severally applicable,
our reaction is likely to be: but which one?
So long as this kind of question is reasonable, it
is reasonable to doubt that the attempted reference has
been successful. Just having mentally intended or wished
to refer to something, and having exploited the usual
linguistic formula for referring, is no guarantee. If
figuring out which thing was intended is as much a
problem for the speaker as it might be for any poten¬
tial hearer, we ought properly to be reluctant to admit
that anything more than an attempt to refer was accom¬
plished. To the extent that the question "which one?"
is allayed, the respondent can identify that to which
he wants to refer. Having communicated does not entail
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that the communicants could, in any situation, success¬
fully refer to what thoy aro communicating about. They
could do that only if they could identify the referent,
i.e., could always isolate if from everything else
plausibly confused with it. But being able to do that
is to know the meaning of its name,
However, while a connotative account of proper
names shows us how we can in practice communicate to
each other regarding specific individuals, it shows us
how in principle (ultimately via the contingency of the
identity of indiscernibles) proper names remain incapa¬
ble of guaranteeing the uniqueness and existence of
what we ever use any specific proper name to talk about.
We can use proper names to refer because they have
moanings, and because of the general nature of their
meanings communication may falter; in practice it never
need do so irreparably, but theoretically it must always,
for the simple reason that no set of characterisations
can claim unique instantiation (or, for that matter,
instantiation itself, i.e., existence; this aspect is
rather trivial for proper names, but not so for descrip¬
tions) .
In the same way, demonstratives are general too.
That is, they each have a meaning, and by that fact are
not singular terms. As a consequence of the extra¬
ordinary lack of specificity in the meanings of all
demonstratives, a secondary argument as to their
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generality can be mounted. They are at opposite poles
from proper names in this respect; the moaning of a
proper name is such as to hopefully (albeit vainly)
capture one thing, while the meanings of demonstratives
are such as to capture almost anything, although not
all at once. This last qualification reveals something
essential about all demonstratives, but if we tem¬
porarily ignore it, wo can focus upon the former fact,
and argue that since "me" can be used by different
people, on a variety of occasions, that "this" is used
then for one, now another thing, that "these" become
"those", that one person's "here" is another's "there"—
that because of all this and more the words concerned
could not ever be thought of as words designating some
one, and not airy other, object. They are multiply
applicable, hence general.
Bradley uses 3ueh an argument, and I think it is
1
an appropriate one. It is secondary, however, because
while it is true that we can all use "me", it ignores
that aspect of demonstratives mentioned above, their
'onceness'. nonetheless, it is a sufficient reply to
Russell's early view that demonstratives are the para-
digm, if not the only (logically proper) names. For
demonstratives, but no proper name, can be (univocally)
used to refer to different things.
See above, p. 138.
n
See above, p. 199.
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It is interesting that Russell eventually felt the
force of this argument, and even adopted it against his
earlier view:
The -word "this" is one word, which has, in some
sense, a constant meaning. But if we treat it as
a more name, it cannot have in any sense a con¬
stant meaning, for a name means merely what it
designates, and the designation of "this" is con¬
tinually changing.1
Bradley, of course, was very alive to the peculiari¬
ties of "tills"; he recognised that in any one particular
use of "this" we intentionally mean to exclude all those
other situations in which "this" is ever used. But
ho tried to render the 'lonliness 8 of the demonstrative
a semantical matter. He tried, that is, to force into
the meanings of demonstratives a notion of "presence"
which--while remaining an idea, and hence universal--
was essentially particular, and as such could not "be
o
true elsewhere". When discussing this view of Bradlo^-'s
I argued that it was a consequence of confusing meaning
as implied universals, with meaning as object intended,
or 'that had in mind*. In using a demonstrative to
refer, one has in mind a particular object to which one
wants to refer, but the language lias limitations as a
vehicle of reference through meanings in the former and
(linguistically) only proper sense. Demonstratives, at
"^Russell, An Inquir y into Meaning and Truth, p. 109.
There remains in this passage, however, the objection¬
able view that names mean what they are used to refer to.
o
See above, pp. 140-145.
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the opposite polo or specificity from proper names, cap¬
ture so much that a proper understanding of their role
in communication is impossible without some account of
the contents of their specific uses, which is just a
simple way of saying that in any situation of communica¬
tion involving demonstrative reference, more of the
individuating characteristics of the thing being referred
to (beyond those connoted by the demonstrative itself)
are assumed to be understood as being obvious, than
would be so assumed were a name to be employed instead.
Understanding a particular demonstrative reference ought,
then, to be capable of being represented as an explicit
account of those assumed characteristics which impli¬
citly figure in our identification of the referent.
Having become aware of the general nature of
demonstratives, Russell did not lose his earlier appreci¬
ation of their particularity. In fact he still retained
it as a criticism of considering then as purely general.
The passage above quoted continues:
If, on the other hand, we treat "this" as a con¬
cealed description, e.cj., "the object of atten¬
tion" it will then aXways apply to everything
that is ever a "this", whereas in fact it never
applies to xaoro than one thing at a time.2.
It is curious that such a persistent and ardent
critic of Bradley's should have succumbed to the very
same temptation: describing demonstratives as meaning
^Russell, op. cit., pp. 109-110.
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(for Russell, "applying to") only one thing. Russell,
admittedly, did not try to talk of particular ideas.
Ilis move -was vaguely in the right direction, -which is
away from the constant meanings of the words, I do not
propose to discuss his view, because it is unclear just
what it is; most of his discussion at the relevant place
is preoccupied with giving a causal account of the dif¬
ferences between "this" and "that", and he merely
asserts that the meaning of "this" has to be found in
some causal process directly connected with a percep¬
tion."'* which perception (this one, or that one maybe?)
is left unexplored.
Bradley was far more aware of the difficulties
connected with the 'oneoness8 of demonstratives, for his
proposal was overtly desperate, There is simply no way
to avoid the fact that our use of demonstratives is
such as to allow many tills's, that's, here's, and now's,
no matter how specific our thoughts might be, no matter
how 'present' the things Ice nor whatever their physical
connections with us might Ice.
It is true, as Russell emphasises from a different
perspective, that we intend to refer to one thing (or
group of things) at a time when we use demonstratives,
Russell, ibid., p. 111. His words are: "What
is true is that "this11 depends upon the relation of a
user of a word to the object with which the word is
connected", and from the ensuing discussion it is
clear that the relation is taken to be a causal one.
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and hen? we nonage to communicate our intentions is a
natter of genuine interest. But it cannot be a natter
solely of the meanings of the demonstratives then-
solves. The most we can attribute to the moaning of any
demonstrative (in this respect of singularity) is the
idea of "thisness", as Bradley called it, "Thisness,
if we like, we may call particularity. It is the
idea itself of singularity, or uniqueness as I should
like to put it for reasons which will emerge in the next
section; and while the tiling which is unique is not the
word or its meaning, but the thing to which we wish to
refer, uniqueness is an idea: it belongs "to the con¬
tent, and is the general character of every appearance
2
in space or time." Russell came very close to this
formulation, and to that extent he was right:
There is obviously a general concept involved,
namely "object of attention", but something more
than this general concept is required in order to
secure the temporary uniqueness of "this".^
Both Russell and Bradley recognised that including
the idea of uniqueness, or particularity, in the meaning
of "this" is insufficient to explain the communication
of which particular, unique thing wo intend to refer to,
and Russell's course is more plausible than Bradley's,
since almost any would be. (More charitably, Russell
^"Bradley, PL, p. 65,
2Ibid.
uRussell, op. cit., p. Ill,
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seems to be saying something roughly true, even if it
gets us nowhere nearer to an explanation of how we
communicate.) But both of them fail to recognise that
any adequate account of what demonstratives mean, as
opposed to what we mean (i.e., intend) when we use
demonstratives to refer to something, must include the
idea of uniqueness, but cannot provide for the actual
particularity of the thing itself. Meanings, after
all, are essentially general, even when their purpose
is to claim outright that they are uniquely instantiated.
This is an implicit purpose of demonstratives, and an
explicit one for some descriptions (for all of them
according to Russell), and I shall postpone my comments
on this latter consideration until I come to descriptions
themselves. For the time being, I would only point out
that to seek any source of particularity within the
meaning of any demonstrative would be to look for limits
of applicability for the demonstrative in question be¬
yond the limits imposed by that aspect of its meaning
which does not involve uniqueness, such as "within some
(spatially or figuratively) near context" for "this",
"belonging or pertaining to the speaker" for "my", or
"within the time-stretch (or a reasonable extension
of it) of this utterance" for "now", etc. Any such
limits could be readily falsified with examples.
In summary, demonstratives are used to refer to
specific things, just as proper names are. For the
sane reasons that account for the occasional failure to
get across just which thing we are referring to with a
name, we cannot expect to isolate some component within
the meanings of demonstratives which captures just that
thing we want, on any occasion, to refer to. The best
we can do is to count as part of the meaning of any
demonstrative that it be used, on each occasion of its
use, to refer to 3ome particular thing or other.
"Particularity" is part of its meaning, but nothing in
particular is. Homos are quite otherwise, for their
meanings do make a fair stab at isolating that to which
they are used to refer. And while a uniform account of
the general nature of their meanings might plausibly be
sought, no such uniform account could be given of the
nonlinguistic, or contextual (which is not to say non-
general), requisites of communication. The contextual
demands of names are often minimal, of demonstratives
usually maximal, and therein lies their important dif¬
ferences. These differences should not obscure the
salient fact that from the point of view of their
meanings, demonstratives are, like proper names, general.
The confusion over the ambiguity in "meaning" which put
Bradley's analysis askew (and which, as an early doc¬
trine of Russell's, returned to haunt his in other
respects superior later view)# ought to be considered
secondary to the main thrust of his argument that the pro¬
position is general, because no component of it is not.
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2. Doscriptions
21ig only element yot to be considered in making
good the claim at the ond of the section above is tho
definite description. Bradley had nothing to say about
it—apparently he never considered if a recognisable
and problematic category. However, in his principle
•work—roughly contemporary with Bradley's Principles
of Logic—Frege recognised it as a typo of expression
which could be the logical subject of a proposition,
and he was aware of the complications descriptions pose
when nothing or more than one thing fit the description.
Ho natter how prone we are to use it, being in the wrong
tradition is ultimately a rather lame emeuse for an
inadequate analysis. Bit that matter is minor; what
is important is that no discussion of singular terms
and generality can ignore descriptions, and particu¬
larly, Russell's claims about thorn.
In tho midst of these claims is a criticism of
Frege which has generated some considerable controversy,
and I do not propose to enter the lists. It remains
beyond doubt that Prege thought of definite descriptions
as singular terms with an analysable structure, the
important part of which is a specific general charac¬
teristic of which it is supposed to be true that only
one thing lias that characteristic. If this is the case,
^For further reference, see the reviews by Kaplan,
Journal of Symbolic Logic, v. 34, 1969, pp. 142-145.
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the description refers to that thing; if not, it refers
to a specific (and rather camples) set. ^ The interesting
difference between Russell and Frege is their methods
for handling the failure of the indiecernibility of
identicals (i.e., the subetitutivity of identicals) in
intensional conteerie. Linshoy has explored this aspect
of their divergence quite fully, and has satisfactorily
established, in my opinion, both that the scope devices
proposed in "On Denoting" and employed in Principle
Hathomatiea were designed to meet the truth-functional
problems of intensional contents, and that they are
p
inadequate for thin purpose.
I mention all of this only for the negative pur¬
pose of removing these issues from our present con¬
sideration. ileithor Russell's comprehension of Froge,
nor the adequacy of his handling of the principle of
substitutivity has any direct bearing upon the question
of generality. On both Frege's and Russell's view,
indeed, the definite description is understood, roughly,
as a general term with one, but only one thing satis¬
fying it. Frege's move is to construe descriptions as
by definition being singular terms, and by some rather
ad hoc definitions in the Grundcresotae he achieves
^Frego, The Basic Laws of Arithmetic (tr. Furth),
11. For more on tHis interpretation, see the next
footnote but one.
O
Linskoy, Referring, ch. V: "Extensionality and
Description", pp. 67-84 (with the appendix).
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something noro or loss to this effect." Russell's novo
is to analyse statements in which definite descriptions
are the subjects as only ostensibly containing then as
subjects: really, they are a conjunction of statononis
"The ad hoc character of Frege's choico for the
referent or an empty description lias been the source of
a variety of proposals for a better referent. (See,
e.g., Scott, "Existence and Description in Formal Logic",
Pertrand Russell, Phlioso'idier of the Century (ed.
ScFoennaiiT, pp. 181-200. I night acklHQiat Scott's
motivation, at least with respect to Froge, is based
upon the misinterpretation of Frege's 'berth.orlauf"
as moaning the sot of objects which fall under a con¬
cept—those objects which as arguments to the concept
yield as value the True. Only thus could Scott say that
for Frego, "the >3" denotes the null class when there
are no 3.) All such proposals, however, labor under
the illusion that our inability to refer using certain
descriptions ought to be remedied by gifting us with
unexpected things to refer to.
Furthermore, the positively eccentric nature of
Frege's proposal becomes apparent upon considering that
"the golden mountain is a range" and'the set which is
not a sot, is a set" are both true. "Range" in the
first statement translates 'berthverlauf", following
Russell (Principles of liatheioatics, section 484} and
Wells ("Frege's Ontology^ "^HcTReview of Iletaphysics,
IV, 1981, pp. 537-573, section ITTT^urth translates it
"course-of'-values" ("Introduction", Frege, The Basic
Laws of Arithmetic (tr. Furth), p. liv).
Tug second statement exploits Well's and Furth's
explanation of what Frege's range (or course-of -values)
is: it is, for some function ©£, the set of ordered
pairs, oach consisting of first an argument for 3K,
and secondly the value of 3% for that argument. (Wells,
ibid.; Furth, op. cit., pp. xxsvii-xsxviii.) Definite
descriptions are thought of by Frege as expressions
consisting of "the- followed by an expression for a
concept, concepts being functions whose values are
truth-values for any object as argument. Definite
descriptions con therefore be understood as themselves
being functions with values defined in accordance with
certain restrictions on their arguments, the value in
any specific caso being what the description denotes.
Froge defines this function so that if one and only
one object A falls under the concept of 3g, the expres¬
sion "the 3" sliall denote A; if no object or more than
one falls under 3£, "the 3" shall denote the range which
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to the effect that there does exist a thing so described,
that there is only one, and that it moreover has the
property ascribed to it by the rest of the statement,
Both Frege and Eussell thinlc of the definite description
is, respectively, either the set of ordered pairs
obtained by pairing every object with the False, or the
set obtained by pairing every object with the False
except those objects which fall under and pairing
those with the True, The function "\£" Frege actually
defines as a substitute for the definite description
cannot be directly compared to expressions of the form
"the ®", because while its values are defined to cor¬
respond to the objects denoted by such expressions, its
arguments in no direct way correspond to anything which
night follow (or might be thought to be expressed by
what might follow) the "the". In other words, !V is
not a symbolic substitute for "the". The ersats
description "\£" is a function, whose value is either
the object which falls under "<££", or else, when no or
no single object falls under it is the argument
itself, which is a range as previously described.
Presumably, then, since there is no object which falls
under the concept what is a set only if it ig. not a
set, the value of i!\£" for that concept is the range oftEat concept, which xs the set of all ordered pairs
whose second member is the False, Thus "the set which
is not a set" denotes a set, making "the set which is
not a set, is a set"--our second example above--denote
the True.
^Some important qualifications might be observed
by saying that -14,01 in Principia llathomatica,
nf (? z) (fe)" is defined as "(3xnyT(3x a# xi y . ?x)".
(The quotation marks represent mention conventions, not
quotation ones; I have adopted the implicit convention
for description scopes which Eussell and Whitehead sug¬
gest immediately below *14.01, and the now common use
of variable letters from the end of the alphabet.)
The defining expression can easily be shown to entail
"(3x)Lfe . (y) (x / y D ~3?y) . ¥xJ", whose meaning
in English could hardly be better expressed than in
the statement to which this note is appended.
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as a kind of expression which by its nature involves a
unique existing thing in the world. The idea that any
linguistic expression could demand this 1 labeled as
pernicious at the outset of Part II, and have been
arguing against ever since. There are no linguistic
forms which can legitimately stipulate their own unique
instantiation either covertly or (as I shall come to
below) explicitly.
The pressure of this fact drove Frege and Russell
into stratagems of avoidance. They both reasoned
that since a statement with a definite description which
failed somehow in one or the other of these respects
could not be true, all that is needed is some account of
why they are false. Frege said in effect that "the
King of France is bald" is false because it is false
that a certain (or, for that matter, any) class is
bald. Russell thought it false because he thought that
"there exists a King of France" is false. But while it
is true that no class is bald, and that there is no
King of France, it does not follow that "the King of
France is bald" is false, /in attempt to use a certain
combination of words to state a fact may fail for a
variety of reasons, only one of which is that there is
no such fact. To represent all such cases as attempts
to assert that scaae specific state of affairs which does
not obtain, does obtain, is to put an arbitrary straight-
jacket upon explanations of statement failure. It is
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close, if not tantamount, to the imposition of a fact/
false-fact dichotomy, a metaphysical extravagance to
which Russell, at least, has declared himself sensitive.
Another way statements might fail in their purpose
has been well understood since Strawson's discussion of
"On Denoting". He points out that if an expression
cannot be successfully used to refer, because the condi¬
tions for successfully achieving a reference are not
satisfied, then any statement using that expression as
n
a subject fails. Strawson says that any such failed
statement is neither true nor false (actually, that it
is not a statement, since statements are made only by
uttering a true or false sentence--sentences cannot be
used to make a statement otherwise), and it has some¬
times been thought that the issue between Russell and
Strawson could be reduced to and resolved by deciding
on an intuitive, or perhaps an empirical basis whether
utterances such as "the King of France is bald" are
false or in some limbo between truth and falsity, This
is silly. It ignores entirely the substantive matter
of Strawson's criticism, namely that assertion and
entailment are confused in Russell's analysis with the
conditions for successfully referring. If we say that
"the King of France is bald", it is not the case that
I have expressed Strawson's insight in my own
somewhat different terminology; cf. Strawson, "On
Referring", Hind, v. 59, 1950, pp. 320-344; reprinted
in Philosophy and Ordinary Language, (ed.) Caton, pp.
162-193.
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we have in pari oaid that "there now exists a King of
France", nor that a purely logical deduction can produce
it (pace -*14.21 in Principia Hathenatica). What we can
say is that if we utter the former set of words, we can
hope to have said something true (or even false) only
if we managed to refer to some one existing thing by
using the expression "the King of France" when we used
it as the subject. No general term can require its
own unique actual instantiation. That they might,
motivated both the idea that descriptions are not general,
and that being not general they must contain within
themselves their own denial of plurality and vacuity.
To show in detail just how they contain these denials
was, then, all husoell needed to do in order to complete
his theory of descriptions. But surely we do not need
such drastic measures as the elimination of all definite
descriptions from the category of expressions which can
be used to refer, only to allow them to sneak back into
subject positions through the back door of "theoretically
superfluous" definitions; nor such improbable fishing
about for objects to be denoted by nonconformist
descriptions. As a class, descriptions are expressions
which can foe used to refer, but not all are such as to
be capable of being used successfully to refer. To bo
able to use one to do that, it must be possible to
identify that which is being referred to, and that can¬
not be done unless the thing being referred to _is a
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thing, i.e., it exists, and is in some sense uniquely
isolable from other things.
Does this mean that any statement fails which has
as a subject a definite description that, as a general
term, applies to no or more than one thing? We must,
in general, answer no on both counts. If statement
failure is contrasted with a statement's being either
true or false, it should be admitted that general state-
ments which are analytically true (such as (x) (x «= x) ),
are true even in the possible worlds where any non-
selfcontradictory, yet empty, description could furnish
a substitution instance. Suppose, for example, that
actually there were no swimmers; it would nonetheless
not be a statement failure, but true to say that the
fastest swimmer is the fastest swimmer. It is true
because there could be no fastest swimmer who was not
the fastest swimmer, not merely because there is a
fastest swimmer (which ex hypothesi, there is not).
Statements can be made whose function is not to pick
out some part of the world and then to declare that some
characteristic, beyond those the knowledge of which is
needed to identify which part of the world had been
intended, is true of it. Statements can be made whoso
function is to describe linguistic or conceptual con¬
nections, and their truth or falsity is independent of
theorem 182 in Quine, Mathematical Logic.
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the existence of things, and of there existing one and
only one such described thing. Our example above can
easily and naturally lee understood as a claim to the
effect that if something were to bo described by the
expression "the fastest swimmer" when it occurs on the
left of the identity sign, then it must be described by
that same expression when it occurs on the right. If
anything is true that should be, yet no assertion of
an existential character has been made."5* So at least
some statements with empty descriptions as subjects are
not examples of statement failure.
The question remains concerning statements whose
definite description subjects are not uniquely applica¬
ble—are they all failures? Reading "On Denoting"
tends to cause myopia in this direction, for the examples
are almost all descriptions pertaining to one or no thing.
But much more common are expressions of the form "the ©"
where "<5" is never meant by the user of the expression
to represent a general term applicable to one at least,
but just one thing. Conversations are dotted with
■%,'hus the theorem *14.22 in Prirtcipia mathematics
is false--it holds only if the biconditional is replaced
with a conditional, but not with a conditional 'going
the other way'. "The swimmer is a swimmer" is neces¬
sarily true, and is implied by "there is a swimmer",
since tautologies are implied by any statement. It
does not, however, imply that there is a swimmer for
the 3amo reason that "the golden mountain is a mountain"
and "the round square is square" do not imply the
existence of golden mountains and round squares. The
half of *14.22 which does hold, does so because
"$(?x)(&x)" is always true.
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"the <5"'s in positions which would have to be rendered
as logical subject positions, yet to attribute to the
users of some of those statements the thought that they
had actually given a unique identificatory description,
on pains of failure of communication, or at best of
falsity, is to distort both intentions and accomplish¬
ments .
Strawson was the first to point out this inadequacy
i
of Russell's analysis. In a later work he isolated a
special class of descriptions which demands special
attention in connection with the uniqueness question we
are considering. These are descriptions which explicitly
"proclaim, as it were, the uniqueness of their applica-
o
tion". He calls them "logically individuating descrip¬
tions", and he distinguishes two subsets. I list these
below, together with an explanation and some examples
for each:
logically individuat incr descriptions - -those descrip¬
tions which carry an explicit claim to uniqueness.
E.g., the first Icing, the only house he owned,
the largest stone within one mile of Stonehenge,
the woman John is married to;
but not, the table, the book on the desk, the
car.
1
Strawson, "On Referring", Philosophy and Ordinary
Language. (ed.) Caton, p. 170.
2
Strawson, Individuals, p. 14.
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I. a. oure individuating descriptions—those descrip¬
tions in (I) which contain no proper names of
any kind, nor any form of demonstrative.
E.g., the first king, the only material use¬
ful in heating-pad covers, the theoretically
maximal magnetisibility of ferric compounds;
but not, the woman John loves, the oldest
human bone yet found, the present state of the
economy.
I. b. quasi-pure individuatincr descriptions—those
descriptions as in (I.a.5, except that they con¬
tain a demonstrative element restricting the
objects described to the past and present.
E.g., the one epileptic king so far, the
only virgin birth 'till now, the oldest human
bone yet found, the only house he has owned;
but not, the woman John is married to,
the only house that will ever be owned, the
house he owns.
Just why Strawson should provide only these sub¬
classes of (I) and not others is not clear. Why should
there not be a whole plethora of quasi-pure individu¬
ating descriptions, distinguished from one another by
any number of ad hoc restrictions upon their demonstra¬
tive component? W© could have individuating descriptions
limited entirely to things in the present (the current
state of the economy, the only railroad still privately
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owned), or limited to the future (the only person who
will ever learn to read minds, the fastest short-
distance sprinter excepting the current title-holder),
or limited to some demonstratively indicated place (why
is time so favored?), or limited to things in the posses¬
sion of the speaker (the only son of mine, the first
inkling I had of the general duplicity of governments
regarding policies of social welfare). The list could
go on. But the point should already be obvious:
Strawson1a classification of individuating descriptions
is not merely not exhaustive, but arbitrary. Less
arbitrary is his distinction between individuating and
purely individuating descriptions, but even here I
would argue that the distinction collapses, and for the
1
same reasons I used above against Wiggins. Proper
names, demonstratives, and definite descriptions are
general (temporarily excepting, for the sake of the
current argument, the individuating descriptions being
here discussed); consequently their presence in the
predicative component of a description cannot suddenly
convert the description into a term -which bespeaks its
own uniqueness. Within the predicative component (the
"S" in "the <§") they function as elements contributory
to its whole meaning, which is just how they function
2
when they occur elsewhere in a statement. Therefore
^"See above, pp. 334-335.
2fhus we can appreciate the completely misguided
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all individuating descriptions are "pure" within the
spirit of Strawson's use of that term. Since there is,
then, no point in the distinguishing qualification
"pure", I shall simply omit it when tallcing about this
class of descriptions.
I argued above that the non-existence of anything
corresponding to a description need not cause statement
failure, that in particular it does not in analytic
statements involving such descriptions. Since individu¬
ating descriptions are a subclass of descriptions, this
holds for them as well (indeed, the example used above
employs an individuating description: "the fastest
swimmer"). Is a similar argument available for unique¬
ness? To see why a negative answer is demanded we must
notice that statement failure is avoided in those cases
because the descriptions are not being used to refer to
nature of Ilargolis' attack on Quine, based on the pussle
that "if "Socrates" as a name has a reference but not a
sense (in the sense specified) and if "Socrates" in
the phrase "is Socrates" (reparsed) is a general term
that" has a sense, the connection between these seemingly
identical, but in fact quite different, terms is not
at all clear." (Ilargolis, "On Names: Sense and
Reference", American Philosomical Quarterly, v. 5,
1968, p. 2067) The sense, for Ilargolis, xn which a
name has no sense is that one cannot state its meaning,
or give a definition or synonya for it. The problems
connected with stating the meaning of a proper name I
have acknowledged above; but once we admit that being
aisle to state the exact meaning (if there be an exact
one) of a name is not a necessary condition of the
name's having a meaning, and that every name does have
a meaning, then Ilargolis' identity crisis evaporates.
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some specific thing. Existence is connected with
definite descriptions the sane way it is with proper
names: if the thing one purports to refer to by using
the expression in question does not exist (i.e., is not
a thing at all), one cannot succeed in roferring to it.
Under the conditions imagined for the example above,
"the fastest swimmer is an Australian" would be a
failure because there is nothing the subject expression
could be used to refer to. But uniqueness is connected
descriptions as it is with demonstratives. To "the
fastest swimmer is the fastest swimmer" being true
when there are no swimmers, there is no parallel for
the lack of uniqueness, because part of the meaning of
any expression of the form "the 3" is that there is
only one 3. That is, such expressions—like demonstra¬
tives--contain the idea of particularity, of "onceness",
or as I prefer to call it, the idea of uniqueness.'"'
Even "the golden mountain is a mountain" would fail as
a statement if there were two such mountains. Since
part of the meaning of the expression is its own unique
applicability, it cannot (except when used in circum¬
stances I shall shortly describe) be successfully
employed in an act of reference when the rest of its
meaning is severally applicable. All this, however,
gets us no closer to knowing which thing, even though
^This may appear to conflict with what I said a few
pages back, but it does not, as will emerge below.
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•we know from the meaning of the expression that it is a
single thing, is the thing being referred to by the user
of the description. 'The first dog born at sea, you say?
This dog? Or that one? Or some other perhaps?"
Strawson lias made the point quite nicely, that (so-
called) individuating descriptions cannot be thought of
1
as singular terms tolling us in some direct manner just
which solitary thing is being referred to by the user
of the description. Knowing that the user had some
unique, particular thing in mind (and thus felt justi¬
fied in using an expression of the form "the <$»") is no
help in figuring out which thing it is. And piling on
further descriptions has the interesting disadvantage
that while drasticly limiting the theoretical possi¬
bilities, it also increases the possibility of the total
o
description becoming vacuous. I might add that no
matter how drasticly limited the possibilities are (i.e.,
no matter how rich the description becomes), they cannot
become limited to one unique thing, even if the idea
of uniqueness is stipulated in the teeth of its
theoretical impossibility.
*My term, not Strawson's—I have been using it for
an expression which is somehow intrinsically connected
with a single, existing real thing. The metaphors some¬
times found for this connection are 3uch as "chalk-mark"
and "filament"; "umbilical cord" has always seemed to
me particularly apt and appropriately silly.
2
Strawaon, Individuals. pp. 15-16.
3See above on the identity of indisaernibles,
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But if individuating descriptions cannot actually
individuate--!.e., pick out and isolate some unique
individual—even though they explicitly proclaim to do
so, how in general do they differ from other definite
descriptions, all of which contain the idea of unique¬
ness implicitly? I believe this question to be an
interesting one, for its answer affords a clue to a more
appropriate (though perhaps necessarily fragmentary)
understanding of descriptions. Very often we want to
and do use definite descriptions whose descriptive
content is by no means thought to be uniquely instanti¬
ated; but feeling the force of particularity in "the",
and noticing the multiplicity of things described, we
overtly include the idea of uniqueness as a (redundant)
reinforcement. More often than simple reinforcement,
however, (which usually only makes the situation xjorse:
being conscious of the fact that "the king" cannot be
used to refer to the single king because there are
many, we would hardly remedy the matter by using "the
only king") what we do is to reinforce together with
adding further locutions which try to establish unique¬
ness by specifying a single position xfithin some spatial,
temporal, qualitative, or other ordering. E.g., "the
first king", "the kindest king", "the only king so far",
"the present king". Individuating descriptions, in
other words, are attempts to remind us of the idea of
uniqueness in "the expressions, and to furnish some
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further descriptions with respect to which the unen-
larged description is to be more plausibly thought of
as uniquely applicable. But such further descriptive
content has to be formally construed as part of the
descriptive content as a whole, and thus as being in
of "the <5". "The first king", e.g., amounts to
"the only non-preceded king", and will be "non-
preceded king", with the juxtaposition of "the" and "only"
showing the latter clearly to be redundant. Viewed this
way, individuating descriptions are simply idioms used
to make explicit the typically implicit uniqueness of
"the" and to add further circumscribing detail.
This idiomatic tendency is a symptom of inadequacy
in typical uses of "the 5" expressions. They seem to
claim uniqueness, yet nobody considers that someone
who uses them is trying to uniquely specify some object
via alone. What we want to do is to tell others
something about some object; but what we say inade¬
quately isolates that object about which we want to
talk. The techniques of individuating descriptions
amount at bottom to an emphasis of the fact that definite
descriptions include the idea of definiteness itself,
and that they often do little else beyond providing a
rather commonly found characteristic.
What, we are not only entitled but obliged to ask,
enables us to communicate with descriptions as referring
terms, whether or not they overtly claim uniqueness?
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The important aspect of definite descriptions with regard
to this kind of question is, I think, their possession
of the very idea of definiteness which led Russell
to call thorn that. But from that fact it certainly does
not follow that we should expect to be told that when
wo use an egression such as "the table" to refer, our
statement entails that there is only one table in the
world. Russell's recourse of admonishment—suggesting
that we should have used the expression "a table"—and
tile ensuing distinction between strict and non-strict
employments of "the §" expressions, is at best a tech¬
nical device for excusing us from uttering outright false¬
hoods, but at worst it expects us to reform our intention
referring to something into stating something else
quite general ranging over everything. Strictly speaking,
so the account runs, when we say of a particular table
that "the table is on fire", we ought (charitably) to
be taken to have actually meant that "at least one
object somewhere or other of all objects there are, is
both a table and is on fire". Such a proposal ought,
in my view, to be tabled on that particular table.' Hot
only is it revisionary, but it reflects, quite simply,
a misunderstanding of how definite descriptions are
employed in the ordinary communication of facts about
^Russell, "On Denoting", Logic and Knowledge (od.
Harsh), p. 44: "How the, when it Ts strictly used,
involves uniqueness; we do, it is true, speak of 'the
son of So-and-so' even when So-and-so has several sons,
but it would Ixs more correct to say 'a son of So-and-so'."
tilings. If we construe Russell's remark not as an
attempt to scold us into behaving according to his theory
of descriptions, but as a suggestion for an empirically
justifiable (and theoretically useful) distinction, we
need to know what the empirical basis of the classifi¬
cation is to be. Can Russell—or anyone for that mat¬
ter- -give us a method for determining whether a specific
definite description is an oppression which if employed
as the subject expression in an attempt to state a fact
will result in a true or false statement, instead of a
non-statement, without circularly stipulating that the
"strict" use of descriptions requires that there be one
and only one thing satisfying the description? Unless
"strictness" can bo defined independently of the unique
applicability of a description, it is of no use in
determining when a description does describe only one
thing, and consequently when we ought to apply Russell's
analysis (were we ever to -cant to do so).
In fact, there is nothing wrong with using descrip¬
tions such as "the table"; we do so instead of saying
"a table" precisely because we wish to exploit the idea
of uniqueness in the definite article in order to com¬
municate our intention to refer to a single particular
thing. If by conveying some dominant characteristic
(though usually a by no moans uniquely applicable one)
together with the idea that we intend to refer to some
particular object having that characteristic, wo succeed
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in causing our listener (or reader) to realise just which,
object it is we are talking about, then we have communi¬
cated. But beyond the characteristic (e.g., "table"),
and the idea that we intend only one of the things having
that characteristic, and moreover, a certain one of
them, what gives our hearer the all-important clue as
to which one? What, in other words, forestalls the
query '"The table, yes, but which table"?
The correct answer can only be given in the most
general terns—it is that some principle of restriction
is, for one or more of a great variety of reasons,
mutually understood. Using a bit of jargon, this might
be put as a mutual understanding of some class of objects,
only one member of which lias the property conveyed by
the description (theoretical doubts due to the contin¬
gency of the identity of indiscernibles do not, of
course, represent a hurdle for communication--they do
only for attempts to construe expressions as singular
terms, i.e., expressions which are by themselves and
independently of the uses to which they might be put,
symbolically connected to one and only one actual
thing.)
For any description "the <£", how do we depict the
class ? which contains only one thing having the property
<3? I would suggest that there is no answer in general,
beyond a vague and not very fruitful reference to "con¬
text ', and that the class ? for any particular use of
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some egression "the S" can no more Ixj pinned down than
can tho different kinds of referential uses of "the
themselves. Consider some examples: in a long conver¬
sation about a confrontation between a policeman and
several demonstrators, someone says "But the cop had an
obligation to interrupt their actions"; having watched
a television programme exposing the construction of a
pier in violation of coastal regulations protecting
wildlife, someone says "the pier ought to 1x5 dismantled";
out of the blue and a oropos of nothing prior, someone
says "the Prime Minister today suggested a policy which
is clearly beyond the mandate from last year's referen¬
dum". Plausible candidates for the class 1, respectively,
are: people about whom we have just been talking,
marine constructions which were subjects of a recent
television programme, and officials of our government,
Vendler has recently indicated how we ought to
proceed in discovering the restrictions which produce
f for any given case: we should consider pieces of dis¬
course larger than single statements, large enough to
bo found to contain scare explicit delineation of
His analysis represents a genuine advance in our under¬
standing of some uses of "the <&" expressions whoso
is not uniquely applicable; it is restricted, however,
to tho uses of such expressions within a group of state-
"j
Vendler, "Singular Terms", Linguistics in Phil¬
osophy, pp. 33-69.
dents, some of which when taken together do positively
identify the tiling intended to bo referred to through
the use of "the <$". His account, in other words, is
workable (i.e., it shows where to look for the informa¬
tion. needed to explain why the question ,3gho table, yes,
but which table?" often does not arise), but it cannot
be applied to situations where there is no relevant
surrounding conversation, as is the case in the second
and third ecsanplos above. His recourse in these cases
is to refer to superfluity, familiarity, circumstances,
or presuppositions, but it is precisely here that the
impediment to a fully general account is to be found,
regardless of how close Yendler's account has come, or
how slight his argument makes the impediment appear.
We seen to be capable of and even positively eager to
use definite descriptions, when intending some particu¬
lar thing, which have only the most remote and nebulous
chance of being correctly understood outside some nar¬
row circle as having been used to refer to that thing
had in mind. We might, e.g., bo referring to someone
mentioned in an esoteric journal left unsaid, or to
something well-known only within some relatively limited
profession (medicine, archeology, electronics, etc.),
or to someone locally famous, and so forth—all the
while, however, using such descriptions as would let
"^Vendler, ibid.; pp. 52, 54, 55-56; p. 56; pp. 61
(iii, viii), 62; and p. 66—respectively.
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only tlx© initiated know whom we wore talking about.
Doing in on a conversation is only one of the many ways
to be an 'initiate1, to be privy to the 'class of
restriction'. Beyond the very general stipulation that
in order for communication to succeed where descriptions
which describe many things are used to refer, there
must be a mutual understanding of some form of further
restriction--beyond that I am very skeptical towards the
possibility of an adequate account in any detail of
our communicatory successes which embraces these hard
cases.
To summarise briefly the results of this final
chapter, I would like to emphasise that while demonstra¬
tives and descriptions both contain the idea of particu¬
larity as a part of the meaning of each such expression
(overtly so--to no special consequence—in some descrip¬
tions), it does not follow from that, that the very real
particularity of the object referred to transfers back
to the expression itself, thereby disabling it from
over being used elsewhere to refer to another thing.
That there is something, and only one thing, are both
prerequisites of success in any attempt to refer;
that this particular thing is tied through a one-to-one
relationship to the egression used on some occasion to
refer to it is false.
From the results of the preceding chapter just as
much is true of proper names also. I have argued that
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the phenomena which led to the classification of names,
demonstratives, and descriptions as singular terms are
properly accounted for only in a theory which describes
linguistic reference to objects as an achievement act
that exploits expressions which have, a3 essential to
their referential employment, some general descriptive
meaning. (It has not been pretended, however, that
there axe no important problems with respect to accom¬
plishing an adequate account of the meanings of these
expressions, where such accounts are possible.) I
know of no other coherent doctrine of singular terms;
in particular I do not know of one which can moke sense
of the "mark" or "umbilical" metaphor seldom acknowl¬
edged but universally employed in systems which allow
non-general propositions. Ily conclusion is Bradley's,
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